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The cover-article consists of, in addition to a list of contents and a 
foreword, two main parts. Both parts have four chapters. Part 1 
starts with an introduction of R2P and proceeds thereafter to a 
discussion about language. Then follows a presentation of my 
published R2P articles, and finally, an exposition of my 
methodological approach. 
 
Part 2 first draws a context which is a springboard for the main 
discussion where I have chosen to lift a topic which is relevant as 
foundation for all my five articles, how to understand the imagination 
of state sovereignty as responsibility. Before the discussion, I present 
the theoretical framework I prefer to use, which is the approach to 
international relations (IR) known as the English School. The cover- 
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I started working with R2P, as part of my job as senior lecturer in political science at 
UiT the Arctic University of Norway (Tromsø), in late autumn 2012. Well, it is not completely 
true. It is more correct to say that I started my systematic work with R2P in autumn 2012, 
because, I had already, for some time, been looking for a research topic, to some extent 
new, not too broad, but also a relevant succession of my quite long occupation with human 
rights and human security. R2P, the national and international responsibility to protect all 
populations from mass atrocities, that is genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
ethnic cleansing, is indeed about both human rights and human security. Where mass 
atrocities take place, respect for human rights is absent, as is everything connected with 
human security. Neither is there much worth to call security for human beings living with a 
threat that mass atrocities may occur. 
 
R2P rests upon an understanding where state sovereignty closely connects to 
responsibility. This is an imagination, and as my discussion in part 2 will show, it is possible 
to challenge. In short, the imagination means that sovereigns, whoever they might be, are 
responsible for the protection of their subjects. This pertains to much more than protection 
against mass atrocities, but mass atrocities are what R2P addresses. R2P also implies an 
additional step, the engaging of the international community when sovereigns fail to provide 
the required protection. 
 
This document is a so-called cover-article. Its ‘feet’ are my five R2P articles, published 
in 2016, 2017, 2019 (two articles) and 2021. In the cover-article I refer to them as article 1, 2, 
3, 4 and 5. The cover-article is a framework. The purpose is both to connect the articles 
closer to each other, and to embed them in a broader relevant context. I explain this further 
in the introductory chapter. My articles all begin with an introduction of R2P. There certainly 
are scholars who read most of what books, academic journals, and diverse documents can 
offer about this topic. Yet, I do not presuppose that a reader somewhere in the world of for 
instance my third article has also read the former ones. It is of course thinkable, but 
probably rather an exception than a rule. My articles, as well as the cover-article, addresses 
mainly an academic audience, as contributions to ongoing academic debates. Yet, I do not 
foresee readers limited to one single academic discipline only, although scholars within 
disciplines like international relations (IR), political philosophy, and peace and conflict 
studies, will probably be those most familiar with the vocabulary. However, I have tried not 
to make broad knowledge of the topic a prerequisite for understanding the content of my 
arguments, with the ambition of appeal even to readers outside academia, for instance 
politicians, journalists, NGO1-employees etc. Therefore, the cover-article also contains a 
starting section where I introduce R2P. It is possible to read the cover-article independent of 
 
 
1 Non-governmental organization 
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the ordinary articles. Yet, it is my hope that readers of the cover-article who do not know my 
published articles might find inspiration to take a closer look at one or more of them. 
 
My work with R2P is a continuation of my earlier work with related topics. My first 
published article, as far back as in 1997, used theories from the academic discipline 
international relations (IR) to discuss the relationship between state sovereignty and 
universal human rights, starting with the observation that the two, apparently, did not enjoy 
each other’s company2. In 2006, I participated, together with a group of Norwegian and 
French colleagues, in a human security workshop at the Science Po University in Paris where 
I presented a paper questioning to what extent human security as a new concept adds new 
dimensions to human rights discussions. An internal Sciences Po journal printed a first 
version of an article based on this paper in 20073. After further development, it finally 
became my 2008 article about human security and central human rights debates, my only 
published article at level 2 in the Norwegian Christin4 system of evaluating academic 
journals5. This article as well as the one published in 1997 are in Norwegian language. 
 
During the years R2P has been my research focus, working with this has brought me 
to four international conferences, and a national one: Roehampton / London (2013), 
Ljubljana /Slovenia (2015), Leeds / England (2018), Copenhagen / Denmark (2019) and 
Tromsø / Norway (2020). Participation from my office in two virtual conferences in June 
2021 supplies this list. How conference participations have contributed to my work, I will 
discuss in detail in the methodology chapter. 
 
R2P represents a vision of a world where mass atrocities no longer exist. This alone is 
a good reason for doing research on the topic, but it was not the only reason behind my 
choice. I was, and I still am, fascinated about what kind of responsibility this is, for who, how 
far it reaches etc. I am also particularly interested in why the implementation of R2P policy 
objectives often generate complications and political controversy, even when broad 
agreement exists around the content of these objectives. Engagement from the 
international community brings the current international order based on state sovereignty 
into the discussion, with focus on possibilities as well as limitations. The years 2011 and 2012 
sparked intensive debates on many arenas in the aftermath of the military intervention in 
Libya, debates that have continued up until today. How to improve efforts for R2P 
implementation has become a central question. This is about to identify and to understand 
the challenges. It is also very much about the UN Security Council which anchors R2P’s 
 
2 Dahl-Eriksen, Tor. 1997. Statssuverenitet og internasjonale menneskerettigheter. Mennesker og rettigheter 
15(1), pp. 56-69. 
3 Dahl-Eriksen, Tor. 2007. Human security: A New Concept which adds New Dimensions to Human Rights 
Discussions? Human Security Journal 5 (Winter 2007), pp. 16-27. 
4 Christin is the name of the current research information system in Norway. 
5 Dahl-Eriksen, Tor. 2008. Menneskelig sikkerhet og sentrale menneskerettighetsdebatter. Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
Menneskerettigheter (Nordic Journal of Human Rights) 26(1), pp. 64-76. 
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international dimension, how this body is composed and how it works. To create conditions 
allowing for learning from failures is equally important, but no matter of course. My R2P 
articles discuss these and related questions from various angles. One ambition with the 
cover-article is to try to unite some of these ends. 
 
I would like to thank colleagues at the Department for Social Sciences and members 
of my research-group Warped6 at UiT the Arctic University of Norway, who has been willing 
to read selected parts of my work in progress, providing me with useful comments. I would 
also like to thank the department for having offered me one year with status as guest 
researcher after my formal retirement from my position as senior lecturer in political science 



































6 Warped = War and Peace Dynamics. The research group is located partly at the Center for Peace Studies, 
partly at the Department for Social Sciences, at UiT the Arctic University of Norway. The group is composed of 
researchers from peace and conflict studies, political science, education, and social anthropology. The 
members work with a broad specter of topics relevant for the respective academic disciplines, but there are 
sufficient overlap enabling the members to comment each other’s work and to stimulate interesting 







This part of the cover-article has four chapters: an 
introduction (Chapter 1), a chapter reflecting on 
categories and language used about R2P (Chapter 2), a 
presentation of my published R2P articles (Chapter 3), 
and a chapter where I present my choice of 
methodology and discuss methodological challenges 




Chapter 1 Introducing R2P 
 
R2P is the established acronym7 for Responsibility to Protect. The principle8 demands 
protection for all populations against mass atrocities. Four categories of mass atrocities are 
addressed: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. The 
responsibility to protect is primarily a national responsibility, but it internationalizes when 
governments manifestly fail to provide the required protection. 
 
The ICISS-report introduced R2P to an international audience in December 2001. The 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was a Canadian 
government initiative responding to repeated calls from then UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan for world leaders to take responsibility on behalf of humanity. The background was 
UN failures to halt mass atrocities in the 1990s, particularly in Rwanda and The Balkans. 
When ICISS launched R2P, most of the world had its main attention directed at combating 
terrorism, in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks. Yet, at the UN World Summit in 
September 2005, the time had come for world leaders to collectively address R2P. 
 
The World Summit was a follow-up summit meeting to the UN’s 2000 Millennium 
Summit and the Declaration of the Millennium Development Goals. The three days General 
Assembly meeting in 2005 at the UN headquarter in New York, from 14-16 September, 
brought together more than 170 heads of states and governments, the largest gathering of 
state leaders that has ever taken place. On their web-sides, the UN describes this event as a 
once-in-a-generation opportunity to take bold decisions in the areas of development, 
security, human rights, and reform of the organization itself9. The World Summit Outcome 
Document, the negotiated document brought before the UN General Assembly for adoption 
at the end of the summit, is further in this text referred to as the Outcome Document. The 
Assembly adopted it by acclamation10. The consensus obtained signalized a unified stance by 
the international community on a range of crucial issues, like steps towards combating 
poverty, promoting development, and condemnation of all forms of terrorism, but also 
acceptance of a collective responsibility to protect populations against mass atrocities. 
However, the R2P adopted in 2005, described in §§ 138-139 in the Outcome Document, was, 
compared to what ICISS suggested, a more restricted version anchoring R2P’s international 
component solely to the UN Security Council. The Council declared its support for R2P in 
200611, and the General Assembly confirmed its support in 200912. 
 
 
7 Acronyms are shortened forms of words or phrases that may speed up communications when they become 
parts of everyday language. www.examples.yourdictionary.com. 
8 In chapter 2 I explain why I prefer to speak about R2P as a ‘principle’. 
9 www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/worldsummit_2005.shtml. 
10 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, adopted 16 September, 2005. 
11 UN Security Council Resolution 1674, adopted 28 June, 2006. 
12 UN General Assembly Resolution 63/308, adopted 15 September, 2009. 
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The R2P paragraphs is on page 30 in the Outcome Document. I add § 140 because it 
is also relevant for protection against mass atrocities: 
 
Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
 
§ 138 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance 
with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capacity. 
 
§ 138 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, to 
help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this 
context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its 
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit 
ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under 
stress before crisis and conflicts break out. 
 
§ 140 
We fully support the mission of the Special Advisor of the Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
It is common in the R2P literature to talk about R2P’s three pillars. The first one is the 
national responsibility governments have, to protect their populations from mass atrocities. 
The second pillar refers to the promise between state leaders to help each other to fulfil this 
responsibility. According to this pillar, the international community has an assisting role. The 
first and the second pillar is embedded in §138 of the Outcome Document. Yet, as described 
in §139, the Security Council shall be prepared to act when states manifestly fail to provide 
protection. This is the third pillar. 
 
Particularly after the Libya intervention in 2011, the use of vetoes has several times 
prevented effective Security Council action. Syria is the most heavily referred example. This 
is a reality extensively discussed in my articles. However, R2P represents a broad approach 
to deal with humanitarian crisis. This is due also to pillar three, the Security Council anchored 
component. The use of military force shall be the last resort, for activation only when other 
measures did not bring success, or if a conflict has escalated to a level where other options 
are no longer relevant. To use military force is always a controversial choice. The risk to 
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create more problems than it solves is highly relevant, in addition to the risks that such 
operations always involve for those directly engaged in them. I discuss these challenges in 
the articles. Prevention therefore often communicates to be the most important aspect 
connected to R2P. To prevent a conflict from escalating to a manmade catastrophe is always 
the less costly and the less political controversial alternative, but it must of course exist as a 
realistic option. Both The ICISS-report and several of the yearly R2P-reports from the UN 
Secretary General to the General Assembly are rich on suggested measures to use at 
different stages of conflicts, addressing root-causes as well as more immediate concerns. My 
articles describe some of these measures, most detailed in article 2 (pp. 50-51). 
 
R2P is about protection from mass atrocities, not from any violations of human 
rights. The categories genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, embed within 
international human rights law, as parts of general international law. The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the UN General Assembly 
on 9 December 194813, defines genocide in article 2. The first international treaty addressing 
the protection of civilians in war times was the fourth Geneva Convention from 1949, today 
ratified by all UN member states. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
into force from 1 July 2001 (adopted 1998), defines genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes in the articles 6-8. This document contains comprehensive lists of relevant 
human rights violations for each category. While war crimes only take place in wars, this 
need not be the case for crimes against humanity. The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ came into use 
during the Balkan wars in the 1990s. A commission of experts analyzing information about 
violations of humanitarian international law, a request from the Secretary General based on 
a Security Council resolution on former Yugoslavia dated 6 October 199214, specified ethnic 
cleansing to mean rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force of intimidation to 


















13 UN General Assembly Resolution 260 (III) 
14 UN Security Council Resolution 780 
15 S/1994/674 




Chapter 2 Reflections on categories and language used about R2P 
 
This chapter has three sections: 
2.1 Concept, principle, doctrine, or norm? 





2.1 Concept, principle, doctrine, or norm? 
 
The reason that I chose to dedicate a chapter of the cover-article to reflect upon 
categories and language used about R2P, is based on a certain experienced confusion. The 
choice of words describing what R2P is varies both among scholars and others, but many 
authors, also within academia, do not explain why they prefer a particular label. Therefore, 
the purpose with this chapter is partly to clarify my own position related to this, but also to 
bring some more clarity into R2P debates more generally. 
 
The categorization of R2P is not indifferent. Language matters for many reasons. We, 
as human beings, can describe and discuss various phenomena because of a sophisticated 
language, but our words are value-laden, not neutral, not context-free. Stefan Groth (2012, 
p. 13) explains the relevance of context in more detail: “Terms, and words, exist in 
contextual relationships that determine their meaning, their connotations and denotations. 
Context is not limited to the composition of words in sentences and texts. It also includes 
social and cultural factors”. A broad range of factors, external to the immediate occurrence, 
may influence the meaning of a term. Analysis of the relationship between language and 
language use exist within different academic disciplines who share this premise, to scrutinize 
both potential and actual use and implications (2012, p. 14). As pointed to by different 
scholars, language also matters because it influences status. The term ‘status’ says 
something about relative standing, rank or position (Brown, 1997, p. 1443). Language is not 
static. It evolves as shared understandings change. Yet, it may also be repetitive. Jeff Gifkins 
(2016, pp. 150-151) mentions some reasons why the language used in Security Council 
resolutions is important to the process of decision-making. The wording of resolutions 
reflects the current social environment. Language also informs future resolutions. It shapes 
them by giving preference to ‘previously agreed language’, and repetition of language is a 
form of reaffirmation. 
 
Some call R2P just a ‘concept’. Alex Bellamy (2009, p. 5) points to this being the 
preferred category among most governments. However, he wrote this in 2009. It might have 
changed since then. A concept is not much more than a proposal requiring further 
development before turning into shared expectations of appropriate behavior. Because 
invocation of R2P can produce very divergent policy outcomes, Tim Dunne (2015a, pp. 96- 
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97) finds it most logical to regard R2P as “a particular issue-specific framework within which 
deliberations and actions take place”. The borders between alternative categories are often 
rather diffuse, making it problematic to specify each exclusive category precisely. 
 
I prefer the label ‘principle’. According to the Cambridge Academic Content 
Dictionary17, a principle is a moral rule or standard of good behavior. It is more than a 
proposal. A principle includes sufficient shared understandings to allow it to function as a 
foundation for action (Bellamy, 2009, p. 6). Yet, it can be difficult to separate the meaning of 
a principle from that of a doctrine, a term derived from Latin ‘doctrina’, used about R2P by 
some authors. A possible translation is ‘what is taught’ (Brown, 1997, p. 423). ICISS saw R2P 
as an ‘emerging principle’, indicating continually development, although it is complicated to 
specify with great degree of precision how the embedded version will look. The border 
between a principle and a norm may also be diffuse. 
 
Described by themselves as a leading authority on R2P localized in New York and 
Geneva, The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect uses both a ‘global principle’ and 
an ‘international norm’. This is possible because the border between a principle and a norm 
is difficult to draw exactly. Academics quite often describe R2P as a ‘norm’, and for me, 
although I prefer to use ‘principle’, norm is the alternative category. Yet, a main reason for 
why I prefer to call R2P a principle is that principles usually come with weaker expectations 
than norms in specifying consequences for perpetrators. Although a norm may have a higher 
ranked status than a principle, it is my view that the choice of category should be the one 
that best matches the current R2P position in the real world, not the category one might 
mostly wish from a status point of view. However, I find norm to be a relevant category. 
Therefore, I will elaborate further on what norms are and how they work. Former UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay (2009, p. 11), talked about a ‘norm creation 
process’, but in an early stage with an unrealized potential. With the adoption in 2005, with 
collective responses accepted solely through the Security Council, it cannot be or have 
ambitions to become a legal norm (Schack, 2016, p. 76). Yet, Gareth Evans (2015, p. 28) does 
not completely exclude the possibility that legal obligations may evolve over time. 
 
 
2.2 What norms are and how they function 
 
There are two classic meanings of the term ‘norm.’ The first one sees norms simply as 
whatever standards, models or patterns who create expectations and regulate behavior 
among actors. A standard statistically determined or derived from numerous cases becomes 
the normal simply because it occurs most frequently (Reeve, 1996, p. 344). The other 
understanding of norms embodies judgements about what should be the case. Norms then 
 
 
17 www.dictionary.cambridge.org , Cambridge University Press 
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become standards guiding actors about what they ought to do to obtain preferable 
outcomes (Brown, 1997, p. 989; Hurrell, 2005, p. 143; Reeve, 1996, p. 344). While competing 
norms might be of both kinds, it is rather obvious that the second meaning is the most 
relevant one for discussions involving R2P. 
 
According to the sociologist Anthony Giddens (1997, p. 174), sanctions that promote 
conformity and protect against non-conformity accompany all norms in social settings. 
Sanctions are formal or informal reactions to the behavior of an actor from other actors, 
either positive by offering rewards for conformity, or negative by punishing behavior that do 
not confirm. The term ‘sanction’ here covers all sorts of reactions, but it is also possible to 
use it in a more limited way connected to R2P, for instance economic sanctions as a 
particular implementation tool. Norms can exist despite violations, but hardly in the 
rhetorical sphere alone decoupled from their influence on behavior. However, it is difficult 
to find a definition of norms in the literature pointing directly on actual behavior, or on 
sanctions as tools to discipline behavior. For instance, Jeffrey L. Legro (1997, p. 33) defines 
norms as “collective understandings of the proper behavior of actors”. This definition is in 
line with the second understanding discussed above, but I do not find it very helpful if the 
purpose is to separate it clearly from the meaning of the term ‘principle’. Norms do not 
either exist or not exist, but they come with varying strengths where the degree of collective 
understanding is important, although this is difficult to measure. 
 
All populations are entitled to protection against mass atrocities, without exceptions. 
Former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon (Ban, 2016, p. 5) expressed the global scope very 
clear in his 2016 report on R2P to the General Assembly: “The responsibility to protect 
encompasses all populations in all circumstances and at all times”. His words indicate a norm 
without limits in scope and time, a global norm. However, both scholars and others who 
prefer to describe R2P as a global norm tend to run into problems when they try to specify 
exactly what they mean. To establish such specifications is obviously difficult. Yet, a 
meaningful discussion must lean on certain criteria. Knowledge about the norm among 
relevant actors globally is a reasonable place to start. The UN adoption of R2P by consensus 
in 2005, the following resolutions, declarations, UN debates, the yearly R2P reports from the 
UN Secretary General, and numerous references to R2P in Security Council resolutions, leave 
no doubt that R2P satisfies this criterion. Recognition of the norm is the next step. The 2005 
adoption also indicates that this criterion is satisfied. One usually does not expect actors to 
express their support for a moral standard just because they are aware that it exists. 
Recognition of its validity is also a requirement. Yet, it is a fact that some states do not 
provide protection in accordance with R2P objectives. One may even suspect that there are 
states who barely try. On the other hand, one will not find any state leader who, in front of a 
domestic or an international audience, declares that his or her government does not 
recognize any responsibility to protect the population within their borders from mass
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atrocities. At least on the rhetorical level, a global recognition exists for the national 
component of R2P. 
 
The most robust norms are the most influential ones, and the more widely endorsed, 
the greater will be the impact (Legro, 1997, pp. 33-35). The international component of R2P, 
anchored in the UN Security Council, activates when states manifestly fail to fulfil their 
national responsibilities. The 2005 R2P adoption endorsed this too globally. World leaders 
accepted the existence of an international dimension connected to R2P that can mobilize 
through the Security Council, to help vulnerable states (R2P pillar 2), and to act with coercive 
measures (R2P pillar 3) when help is not sufficient1. However, and particularly after the 
debates that followed the 2011 intervention in Libya, deep disagreements have unveiled in 
the international community around the implementation of R2P pillar 3. The disagreements 
occur with the entrance of possible sanctions. Most controversial are situations where the 
Council consider the use of military force. 
 
As we have observed recently, not least in relation to the civil war in Syria, competing 
norms too often disturb the perspectives for successful implementation of R2P objectives. A 
particularly influential competitor is a strict interpretation of state sovereignty as non- 
intervention. Yet, each protection-case has its unique features. Experiences from other cases 
can be useful only to some extent. To specify generally the use of available means, how, 
when and by who, is very difficult. Because they work in atmospheres dominated by poor 
guidance and lack of strategic thinking, policy makers and military planners must often 
develop ad hoc operational concepts (Williams and Bellamy, 2012, p. 274). Lack of sufficient 
expertise to analyze events and to understand how to influence them, may enhance the 
possibility for mismatch between expectations and outcomes. A magnitude of factors may 
have influence, as for instance the capacity of available tools, and not least the local context. 
The 2005 World Summit pushed such complicated questions into an undefined future. This 
was favorable to obtain consensus because general texts often reflect what is possible to 
agree about at a particular moment in time. Yet, ambiguity around the basis for concrete 
decisions is not the receipt for smooth implementation. I discuss this dilemma most detailed 
in articles 3 and 4. Before the UN Security Council adopted the 2006 supportive resolution, 
there were intensive negotiations revealing deep-rooted disagreement over when and how 
to employ R2P (Turner, 2013, p. 140). Gerrit Kurz and Philip Rotmann (2016, p. 8) writes: 
“Lacking a recognized authority to settle its meaning after its adoption, the legal, practical 
and moral implications of R2P in specific situations remain deeply contested”. Sebastian von 
Einsiedel and Louise Bosetti (2016, p. 372) is quite specific: “Consensus around its sharp end, 
the hard cases where tough measures have to be considered, has always been frail”. Yet, 
Bellamy chooses to see this in another light with an important observation: 
 
1 R2P pillar 2 resides with the international community, but the pillar does not necessarily involve the UN Security 
Council. 
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“Mass atrocities are thankfully too rare to allow us to develop sufficiently robust 
models telling us how they occur, how to stop them, and how to protect populations in each 
and every case. We simply have insufficient case evidence to draw general patterns or laws”. 
 
(Bellamy, 2015, p. 186) 
 
Described by David Leitch (2017, p. 525) who refers to Bellamy, mistranslations of a 
principle into policy need not undermine the principle itself. I notice that Leitch prefers to 
use the term ‘principle’, but the same is possible to say about a ‘norm’. Definitions of norms 
do not presuppose successful implementation. Generally, moral standards may exist 
independent of adhesion. Yet, one may argue that if a norm is difficult to implement 
successfully, it will be a week one, an indication that other norms, as noted above, dominate 
the relevant sphere. However, the broad approach to humanitarian crisis as R2P represents 
is probably far less controversial, compared to the concrete tools applied to specific 
situations. In his 2017-report to the UN General Assembly, Secretary General António 
Guterres (2017, p. 3) wrote that there is a consensus on the purposes of R2P that span every 
continent, as a national and international responsibility, which is universal and enduring. 
 
Norms in international spheres have two types of effects on state behavior. As 
explained by Luke Glanville (2016, p. 185), regulative effects constrain or encourage states to 
act in certain ways. Yet, norms may also influence the formation of state identity and 
generate possible re-interpretation of interests. This is constitutive effects, when norms get 
actors to comply, not only for instrumental reasons, but because they define both identities 
and interests to suit the norm. Scholars have suggested that while norms first merely 
regulate behavior, constitutive effects come later, gradually developing (2016, pp. 187-189). 
The position of a particular norm strengthens with the number of central actors identifying 
with it. The relevance of this for R2P is to what extent the ‘principle’ or ‘norm’ generates 
constitutive effects on the broader scale involving the most important decision-makers. If 
such effects are possible to find, it strengthens an argument for using ‘norm’ as the most 
suitable R2P category. 
 
For Glanville, the answer is positive, both in domestic settings and at the 
international level. He uses the March 2011 Libya mandate as an illustrating example: 
 
“The impact of the R2P norm on the decision to intervene can be clearly seen both at 
the domestic level, in the deliberations of the Obama administration, and also at the 
international level, in the deliberations of the Security Council”. 
(Glanville, 2016, P. 192). 
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For instance, he argues that the United States had no strategic interests calling for 
intervention in Libya. Combined with the emergence of a ‘habit of protection’ within the 
Council, this indicates constitutive effects at both levels (2016, p. 187). 
 
Well, this habit is more difficult to observe after 2011. Terry Gill (2013, p. 103) 
describes the role of the Council in relation to Libya, and the influence R2P had in shaping 
that role, as a stark contrast to the inaction of the Council in the face of comparable 
violations in Syria. In his 2016 R2P-report to the UN General Assembly, Secretary General 
Ban Ki-Moon (2016, p. 5) asked for collective will to protect our shared humanity. He also 
reminded the permanent Security Council members about their specific responsibility to 
demonstrate leadership, repeating the bid to exercise restraint in the use of veto when 
atrocity crimes are involved (2016, p. 14). If a habit of protection was as rooted in the 
Council as Glanville indicates, such reminders ought to be superfluous. Constitutive norm 
effects derived from R2P’s international component is difficult to argue for if the veto- 
powers regularly prioritize their own national interests, making timely action likely to occur 
only when these interests and humanitarian needs occasionally coincide. Ban Ki-Moon 
(2016, pp. 7-8) was worried about undermining consequences: “Unless the gap between 
member states commitment and the reality confronted by vulnerable populations is 
addressed, people lose faith in the institutions and the values we seek to uphold”. 
 
To search for constitutive effects implies to move into a ‘landscape’ rife with 
methodological challenges. It is not possible to observe such effects directly. What is 
possible to observe is behavior, actual as well as changes over time. Behavior needs 
interpretation. To interpret behavior or changes in behavior is an indirect approach to the 
phenomenon, and a particular interpretation is possible to challenge by another one. Since 
R2P embeds a favored moral standard, overestimation of favorable signs is a risk, at the 
domestic and at the global level. National responsibility to protect populations from mass 
atrocities existed long before R2P entered the arena, as a web of interwoven protection 
norms (Kurz and Rotmann, 2016, p. 7). I discuss this more detailed connected to state 
sovereignty in chapter 7. The shared understanding was a premise for the 2005 consensus. 
R2P’s entrance may have actualized the responsibility, making violations less tolerant, more 
visible, and politically more costly. It is a more open question to what extent R2P has 
increased willingness to extend the responsibility to protect beyond territorial borders. Yet, 
although hardly possible to document, at least some state leaders may have become more 
conscious about the need to decide whether narrow national goals or broad universal values 
should guide their foreign policy (Amstutz, 2005, p. 97). 
 
Each year the UN General Assembly debates the R2P-reports from the Secretary 
General. Particularly the first debate in 2009 reports as one of the liveliest ever among 
member states (Sharma, 2010, pp. 132-133). One year later, Philip Cunliffe (2010, p. 35) 
wrote: “R2P has become the framework through which the international community’s 
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commitment to, and involvement in, crisis and conflict is mediated and understood”. 
According to him, R2P had by then reached a position of heavily use in conversations, among 
diplomats in the UN, and among states-people in general. In his defense of R2P, the title of 
his book from 2015, Bellamy (2015, p. 11) used the term ‘principle’ about R2P: “There is now 
no serious disagreement among the world’s governments about what the principle says and 
whether they have committed themselves to it”. Bellamy’s words indicate accept not only 
for the national component of R2P, but also that a supplementary international dimension 
exists. A positive interpretation of this is possible from the perspective of constitutive norm 
effects. Yet, certain facts may call for some restraint. The general degree of internalization is 
not a measurable entity, but the number of states participating in the General Assembly’s 
R2P debates may be an indicator. This number has fallen substantially after 2009 (Hoffmann, 
2015, p. 10). Additionally, Emily Paddon Rhoads and Jennifer Welsh (2019, p. 612) point to a 
trend particularly visible after 2014, that the Assembly discussions feature an increase in 
statements insisting that R2P is primarily a national responsibility, always with the role of the 
international community as secondary. The increase is possible to interpret as growing 
skepticism around particularly R2P’s third pillar. However, this interpretation need not 
capture the whole reality. Since the introduction of R2P, there has never been any doubt 
that the national responsibility is priority number one. The international dimension activates 
only if the national responsibility fails. It is, and has always been, irrelevant when 





There is also another aspect connected to language being worth some R2P based 
reflections. It is about the R2P rhetoric used in different contexts, not only intended 
meanings, but also what is not articulated. The term ‘intervention’ may cover quite much. 
Some authors include any application of pressure to a state, others confine it to the use of 
military force. ICISS (2001, p. 9) recognized the long history and the wide and popular usage 
of the phrase ‘humanitarian intervention’, including its descriptive usefulness in clearly 
focusing attention on a particular category of interventions, those undertaken for human 
protection purposes. However, there is a strong opposition among many humanitarian 
organizations and humanitarian workers to any militarization of the word ‘humanitarian’. 
Therefore, the Commission made a deliberate decision not to adopt the traditional 
intervention terminology. Their hope was that a change of language might encourage people 
to look with fresh eyes at the real issues involved in the sovereignty-intervention debate. 
ICISS launched the responsibility to protect as a new approach. They did not say that 
changing the language of the debate changes the substantive issues at stake, but they hoped 
that looking at the issues from a new perspective might prevent that the choice of words 
becomes a barrier to deal with the issues, making it easier to find acceptable answers. By 
conceptualizing the intervention issue in terms of a responsibility to protect, they based 
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their arguments partly on the principles inherent in the concept of sovereignty, partly in the 
impact of emerging principles of human rights and human security, and in addition changing 
state and intergovernmental practices. They abandoned talk about a ‘right to intervene’. 
This term is unhelpful because it focuses attention on the prerogatives of the intervening 
actors much more than on the potential beneficiaries of the action, and it turns attention 
away from what should happen before intervention becomes the alternative, as well as on 
the responsibilities in the aftermath of having used this tool (2001, p. 16). Instead, ICISS 
argued for some basic objectives18 that a new attitude to intervention on human protection 
grounds must meet. They also argued for a necessary re-characterization of state 
sovereignty, from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility, highlighting that 
sovereignty and responsibility is closely connected to each other (2001, pp. 11-13). This I will 
discuss more detailed in chapter 7. 
 
For moral reasons, it is impossible to argue against a right for all human beings 
anywhere in the world not becoming victims of mass atrocities, or to live under the threat of 
such abuses. Yet, the existence of responsibilities to protect populations from mass 
atrocities is a more complex matter. It includes obligations to act when the right is 
threatened, but it is not obvious who are obliged to do what, in which situations, how far the 
responsibility reaches etc. However, using a language with focus on the need for protection, 
and on the responsibility to provide for it, seems to have a potential to bring discussions 
about interventions above the circular and rather non-productive debates of interventions 
contrasting state sovereignty. 
 
Among the basic objectives ICISS (2001, p. 11) described for renewing the approach 
to intervention on human protection grounds, were to ensure the use of military force only 
for the proposed purposes. A plausible question then is to what extent one may expect a 
changed language to have this effect. It is probably not possible to measure in any reliable 
way. Yet, the debate in the aftermath of the Libyan intervention in 2011, based on UN 
Security Council Resolution 1973, may call for skepticism. In the discussions that lead up the 
adoption of the resolution, various actors heavily referred to R2P. In the aftermath, the 
implementing actors received substantial criticism for having stretched the mandate beyond 
the pure protection of Libyan civilians, to forward regime change. Particularly if this might 
have been a motive for one or more of these actors from the beginning, an unpleasant 
question arises. One can perhaps not exclude the possibility that one or more actors got an 
easier way to realize a hidden agenda, if new language made a military intervention more 




18 These basic objectives, described on page 11 in the ICISS-report, include the establishment of clearer criteria 
for rules and procedures. To establish the legitimacy of military intervention, when necessary, includes 
ensuring, that when it occurs, it is only for the purposes proposed, minimizing the human costs involved. The 
objectives also include to help eliminating the causes of conflict, enhancing the prospects for durable peace. 
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Chapter 3 My articles 
 
In this chapter, I briefly present my published R2P articles. Article 4 is in Norwegian 
language, but my presentation here is in English. This article has both a Norwegian and an 
English abstract published together with the article in the journal. The articles in full text, all 
in journals on level 1 in the Christin system for classifying publications, follow as attachments 
to the cover-article. 
 
 
My five published R2P articles are: 
Article 1 
Dahl-Eriksen, Tor. 2016. R2P and the “Thin Cosmopolitan Imagination”. The Fletcher Forum 
of World Affairs 40(2), pp. 123-138. 
 
The article asks how selected theoretical perspectives on international relations (IR) 
might explain and reduce the gap between the application of R2P in the real world and the 
requirements of a “thin cosmopolitan” imagination. Thin cosmopolitanism views humanity 
as a single moral community. It represents an ideal. The article gives an overview of the 
cosmopolitan tradition, and it explains the difference between thin and thick variants. The 
theoretical perspectives selected as analytical tools are the English School, constructivism, 
and critical theory. The discussion has three sections, relating R2P and thin cosmopolitanism 
to human rights, open inclusive debates, and state sovereignty. The conclusion summarizes 
how to explain, and suggests how to possibly reduce, the gap viewed through the lenses of 





Dahl-Eriksen, Tor. 2017. International Anarchy, Cooperation and Joint action. The Fletcher 
Forum of World Affairs 41(2), pp. 45-58. 
 
The question discussed in this article is to what extent R2P objectives can be 
successfully implemented through cooperation and joint action. The discussion is framed by 
four selected theoretical perspectives on international relations (IR): neorealism, 
neoliberalism, the English School, and constructivism, briefly presented in a separate 
section. These tools enlighten the discussion of real-world challenges to successful 
implementation, focusing on prevention, collective action, and international order. The 
article concludes that the neorealist perspective offers little room for cooperation and joint 
action. Neoliberals see possibilities when national and common interests unite. The English 
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School’s anarchical society adds moral grounds to the picture, while constructivists see 





Dahl-Eriksen, Tor. 2019. R2P and the UN Security Council: An “Unreliable Alliance”. 
International Journal on World Peace 36(1), pp. 33-60. 
 
When a state fails to provide protection, the responsibility to protect transfers to the 
international community represented by the UN Security Council. This article asks why R2P 
objectives are difficult to realize through the Council. The analytical tools are a classic study 
of implementation by Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, two pioneers within 
implementation studies, combined with insights about how complex organizations perform 
from the Swedish organizational theorist Nils Brunsson. A separate section presents the 
analytical tools with arguments for their relevance. A main ambition behind the choice of 
these tools was to demonstrate relevance exceeding time and space. The discussion has four 
sections: the policy of R2P, the composition of the UN Security Council and the role of the 
veto powers, organized hypocrisy, and implementing actors, the latter focusing on the 
relationship between these actors and decision makers. The article concludes with various 
examples that the selected tools can enrich ongoing R2P debates, despite lack of original 





Dahl-Eriksen, Tor. 2019. R2P i Sikkerhetsrådets klype – nødvendig, men problematisk. Norsk 
statsvitenskapelig tidssskrift 35(2), pp. 77-91. DOI: 10.18261/issn.1504-2936-2019-02-02 
 
A main ambition with this article was to deliver a contribution to academic R2P 
debates in the Norwegian language. The topic discussed is the same as in article 3. So are the 
selected analytical tools and the main conclusions, but compared to article 3, article 4 has a 
more comprehensive use of Brunsson. The introductions differ, being more directed at 
current events in this article. The examples used to underpin the arguments are partly 
different. Many references are common to both articles, but the articles also draw on 
different sources. Article 4 is perhaps the best article when it comes to clearly drawing the 
difference between the version of R2P launched by ICISS in 2001, and the adopted version at 




Dahl-Eriksen, Tor. 2021. R2P and rising Asian Powers. Millennial Asia (Sage Publications), pp. 
1-18, published online 10 March 2021. DOI: 10.1177/0976399621989464 
 
This article discusses prospects for the implementation of R2P objectives in a world 
where Asian powers rise. It is possible to see the article as a contribution to a broader 
debate about global governance, a concept used to understand global change. The 
discussion focuses on R2P’s three pillars; the national responsibility (pillar 1), international 
assistance (pillar 2), and international decisive action (pillar 3), the latter being the most 
controversial component of R2P, tied to the UN Security Council where China resides as a 
permanent member with a veto. India’s R2P position is also discussed, supplemented with 
some comments on selected East-Asian states. The article concludes that the rise of Asian 
powers does not threaten the national responsibility to protect. Neither is voluntary 
international assistance threatened, but assistance with coercive elements might be. 
However, without more clear criteria for the possible use of military force, mandates from 
the Security Council which allows this will probably be very rare. One must expect China to 
veto propositions that may forward regime change in targeted states. 
 
In the cover-article, I refer to my own articles as articles 1-5, and, when relevant, to 




Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
These sections compose the chapter: 
4.1 Before I formulated concrete research questions 
4.2 My research questions 
4.3 Collecting data from texts 
4.4 Validity, relevance, and reliability 
4.5 Conference participations 
4.6 Some final methodological reflections 
 
My methodological approach is entirely qualitative. With focus on how human beings 
understand and interpret different situations, this was for me the only relevant choice. 
Within the qualitative repertoire of possible methods, I found, in addition to participating in 
relevant conferences, that collecting data from written texts was the best option for my 
purpose, which has been to contribute to R2P debates by writing my own articles. This 
chapter has six sections describing my choice of methods. Section 4.1 is about my work with 
R2P before I started to formulate concrete questions to be discussed in articles. In section 
4.2 I proceed to the research questions, and section 4.3 is about how I have collected data 
from texts. Then follows a section, 4.4, reflecting on validity and reliability. In section 4.5 I 
elaborate on how I consider that my participation on conferences have contributed to my 




4.1 Before I formulated concrete research questions 
 
After having chosen R2P as my research topic, I began reading academic literature 
and various documents, about the principle and the context it embeds in. Yet, to read 
everything that might be relevant, is not possible. This actualizes the question of my criteria 
for the choice of sources. I registered with interest former UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan’s repeated pleads in the late 1990s for world leaders to take common responsibility 
to prevent new incidents like Rwanda and Srebrenica, and I read parts of the ICISS-report 
quite soon after it was published in December 2001. However, my research-focus then and 
in some following years was towards human rights and human security more broadly. The 
most important result of that work was my 2008 article about human security and central 
human rights debates in the Nordic Journal of Human Rights, as mentioned in the foreword 
of this cover-article19. I began my systematical work with R2P as my chosen research topic 
during my first research term in autumn 201220. 
 
 
19 This article is in Norwegian language. 
20 I qualified to apply for research terms after 2008 when my position at the university (UiT the Arctic University 
of Norway) changed from university lecturer to senior lecturer. I had a second research term in spring 2019. 
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The first whole book I read specifically about R2P was Alex J. Bellamy’s Responsibility 
to Protect, published in 2009, but read by me some time later. In the aftermath I consider 
this book as the most important one inspiring my choice. In the following, I started searching 
for academic articles about R2P, and I soon discovered a substantial flora to draw on. 
Reading books or articles almost always leads to discovering new sources using the author’s 
reference lists. This method has similarities with what Alan Bryman (2012, p. 202) calls 
‘snowball sampling’. It is a method where a researcher establishes initial contact with a small 
group of people who are relevant to the topic in question, and then uses these to establish 
contacts with others. In my case, the initial as well as the generated contacts were not with 
the persons themselves, but with their work. I also found interesting contributions to 
ongoing vibrant debates about the principle, through google search with relevant search 
words. Rather broad reading characterized this first period after I had chosen to focus my 
research on R2P, but as my general knowledge gradually built up, my dedication to 
contribute myself to the debates gradually materialized. Extension of my general knowledge 
of the topic also made it possible for me to see where contributions from me could be 
interesting for others. This influenced my continued search for relevant texts, narrowing the 
scope, with the ambition to formulate my own research questions. 
 
 
4.2 My research questions 
 
This section is about my research questions. To formulate research questions means 
to reduce the richness of the topic to certain precise statements, to determine what to focus 
on within the broad area of possibilities (Holliday, 2008, p. 28). As noted above, I first 
needed to acquire quite much knowledge about the topic broadly. Therefore, ontologically 
the research questions were influenced by a certain pre-understanding of the connection 
between my topic, R2P, and the real world. In addition, I can add my curiosity to find out 
more about some aspects of this connection, combined with a certain acquired ability 
through the broader reading to see where there might be a gap to fill, a general ambition 
with writing articles. 
 
Dag Ingvar Jacobsen (2018, pp. 14-15) mentions three main purposes connected to 
academic work, description, explanation, and prediction. To describe a phenomenon is to 
tell the reader what it looks like. To explain it is a step further, from how something looks to 
why. It includes elaborations about causality. To predict is an even more ambitious purpose 
directed at what may happen in the future. However, compared to the natural sciences, the 
social sciences are generally more careful when it comes to prediction. The three purposes 
are not mutually exclusive. To some extent they are all present in most investigations, 
although one of them often dominates in a particular piece of work. 
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None of my published R2P articles are mainly descriptive, although all of them 
contain descriptions about how things are. The descriptions function as springboards for the 
questions discussed in the articles. Article 1 asks how selected theoretical perspectives on 
international relations might explain and reduce the gap between the application of R2P in 
the real world and the requirements of a ‘thin cosmopolitan’ imagination. The primary 
purpose here was to explain, using relevant theoretical lenses as analytical tools. Yet, since 
the article also suggests ways to reduce the gap, it includes an element of prediction, but it is 
limited to unveil some possibilities. It does not predict any probability for these to realize. 
 
Article 2 uses another selection of theoretical perspectives, but here too the main 
ambition is to explain. The research question is to what extent R2P objectives can be 
successfully implemented through cooperation and joint action. The explanations vary 
through the specter of lenses. The purpose of using different lenses is to portrait this 
variation and to discuss it. There is also an element of prediction embedded in the 
discussion, but it is limited to what might happen if reality matches the theoretical 
postulates. Article 3 and 4 both discusses why R2P objectives are difficult to realize through 
the UN Security Council, focusing on R2P’s international dimension. The articles’ approaches 
are somewhat different, but both discussions draw on insights from a classical study of 
implementation and insights about how complex organizations perform. The current 
situation is described, and the examples, which partly overlap, partly not, function as basis 
for the descriptions. However, the main ambition with the articles is to explain the 
observable patterns, and insights originally developed for other purposes are the analytical 
tools used for explanation. The predictive element is limited to an underlying assumption 
that the problems will continue unless substantial reforms are implemented for how the 
Security Council works. The articles mention a couple of suggestions for change, but a 
discussion about the possibilities for these to manifest lies beyond their scopes. 
 
The only among the five articles that focuses mainly on prediction, is article 5. This 
article discusses the prospects for the implementation of R2P objectives in a world with 
rising Asian powers. There are elements of description and explanation included. For being 
able to predict, it is necessary to describe how the situation is, here the current R2P 
positions of China and India, and to explain how their positions have formed. Based on this, 
the article tries to draw the lines into the near future where both China and India are rising 
powers demanding more influence on global issues, but with different prerequisites since 
only China is among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. 
 
The main discussion in the cover-article, located in Chapter 7, is about sovereignty as 
responsibility. The research question encompass what sovereignty as responsibility is, how 
this imagination has been understood historically, and how it is understood in current 
debates, including critical voices and my comments to these. The discussion both describes 
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and explains, but is not very predictive, although there might be certain predictive elements 
included in my comments to the critical voices. 
 
It is a requirement to research questions that they should be exciting. One may argue 
that it is a subjective matter what an exciting question is. However, used in this context, 
what is exciting is not primarily about the topic as such, but about openness. This means to 
formulate questions where it is not obvious what the answers are (2018, p. 54). I will argue 
that the research questions in my published articles as well as those I discuss in chapter 7 in 
the cover-article, all satisfy this criterium. None of them excludes the possibility that the 
discussion may lead to other results than expected. However, my research questions are not 
neutral or value-free. Completely neutral and value-free research is impossible. To choose 
one question implies not to choose other possibilities, and no research questions are totally 
independent of the researcher’s own values (2018, p. 55). For instance, when I in the articles 
3 and 4 ask why R2P objectives are difficult to realize through the UN Security Council, there 
is an underlying assumption that this is problematic, because these objectives represent a 
valued moral standard. 
 
The methodology literature also mentions a couple of other requirements. Research 
questions should preferably be formulated as simple as possible because simple 
formulations are best suited to establish the ‘red thread’ and thereby to guide more precise 
what the following discussions shall focus on. This has the effect of sharpening the search for 
relevant supporting literature. Good research questions are also fruitful in the sense of 
making it possible for the researcher to contribute to the academic community by adding 
new knowledge (Holme and Krohn Solvang, 1991, pp. 38-39). 
 
To formulate precise research questions with few words is a challenge. When it 
comes to my articles, I have at least tried not to use more words than what I found as a 
necessary minimum to express what I had in mind to discuss. The question of fruitfulness 
touches directly upon my ambition to contribute to the academic community, and I will 
enlighten it with some examples. Before I formulated the research question for the paper 
which I later developed to article 1, I had decided to participate in the conference ‘The 
Cosmopolitan Ideal: Challenges and Opportunities’ at Roehampton University in summer 
201321. The challenge for me was to find an open interesting question with R2P put into the 
context of cosmopolitanism. I decided to discuss how to explain and to reduce the gap 
between the application of R2P in the real world and a ‘thin cosmopolitan’ imagination, 
looked through the lenses of selected theoretical perspectives on IR. The answers are not 
given. They depend much on how I interpret the potential embedded in the perspectives, 
which I express through my arguments. I had acquired sufficient knowledge about current 
R2P-debates to see that my ambition could add something new to them. However, to write 
 
21 I had some knowledge about this university already through an earlier visit to its library during my work with 
human rights issues. 
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the article, I also had to expand my knowledge about the set of ideas that compose the 
cosmopolitan vision. One book was particularly helpful for me, The Cosmopolitan 
Imagination by Gerard Delanty, published in 200922. 
 
I will argue that the articles 3 and 4 generated new knowledge about why the 
implementation of R2P objectives through the UN Security Council is problematic, or at least 
deepened existing knowledge. Yet, to the extent I managed to show that a classical 
theoretical framework can generate insight in other settings than the original one, I see this 
as my most important contribution with these two articles. I also see article 2, where I 
discuss R2P in relation to the possibilities for cooperation and joint action under the shadow 
of international anarchy, as adding some new knowledge to the debates, or at least did so 
when published in 2017. It has not the same originality as the later articles 3 and 4 since it 
uses mainstream IR perspectives, but in doing so it draws on quite much theoretical 
literature. That is not the trend among the majority of R2P scholars. Article 5 does perhaps 
not supply any lack of literature about the R2P positions of China, India, and other Asian 
states. I refer to some of the existing literature in my text. However, although my article has 
a bias in the balance, favoring China, I have not found any other article with a main ambition 
to compare the Chinese and the Indian positions. 
 
Neither is my choice of theoretical perspectives random. For my discussions of the 
research questions in the articles 1 and 2, I selected the perspectives from the academic 
discipline international relations (IR) I found best suited, based on my general knowledge of 
theories within this discipline. I selected the analytical framework for discussing the research 
questions in the articles 3 and 4 because I saw a potential with a rather original choice. I am 
aware of that my choices of analytical frameworks at least to some extent influence my 
search for empirical data. However, I consider my approach to be pragmatic. Jacobsen 
(2018, p. 35) uses the term ‘abduction’ for research projects where the search for 
descriptions and explanations takes place as a continuing interchange between theory and 
empirical data. Abduction, or abductive reasoning, is about forming conclusions from the 
information that is known. The conclusions will have a remnant of uncertainty or doubt, 
often expressed with terms like ‘best available’ or ‘most likely’23. 
 
In the aftermath, writing of the articles might look like an overall plan. Yet, saying 
that is to overstate. For instance, when I wrote article 1 which connects R2P to 
cosmopolitanism, published in 2016, I did not know that I would come to publish an article 
about R2P and rising Asian powers five years later. Yet, this does not mean that the choice of 
topics has popped up by coincidence. There is an element of coincidence present, but there 
 
 
22 Delanty, Gerard. 2009. The Cosmopolitan Imagination. The Renewal of Critical Social Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
23 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/deduction-vs-induction-vs- 
abduction. www.en.wikipedia/org/wiki/Abductive_reasoning. 
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is also a progression which reflects what I found it interesting to continue with after having 
completed one piece. My participation on relevant conferences had influence on my way 
forward. This I will discuss more detailed in section 4.5. The progression is probably best 
visible if one looks backwards from article 5. One may then discover that article 5 has 
important connections to the articles 3 and 4. The latter discuss implementation of R2P 
objectives through the UN Security Council. Article 5 draws also on knowledge about the 
functioning of the Council, but it connects this knowledge specifically to the R2P positions of 
rising Asian powers. 
 
 
4.3 Collecting data from texts 
 
My next step, after having formulated the research question for article 1, was to 
collect data from written texts, data suited to enlighten this question. The same procedure 
pertains to the other articles. With data in my context, I mean statements from authors and 
various kinds of information about R2P and connected topics. All my work with R2P relies on 
this, and additional data acquired through participation in conferences. The texts I have used 
to support my own arguments include a substantial number of books, book-chapters in 
edited volumes, articles published in academic journals, and one doctoral thesis24. The ICISS 
report (2001) is particularly important. In addition to these come selected UN Security 
Council and UN General Assembly resolutions, various other UN documents, among them 
the World Summit Outcome Document (2005)25 and the yearly R2P-reports from the UN 
Secretary General to the General Assembly (since 2009), publications from the Global and 
the European Centers for the Responsibility to Protect, encyclopedias, handbooks and 
dictionaries, and, but to a lesser extent, articles in newspapers and news magazines, and 
various web-documents. Literature is also the basis for my use of selected theoretical 
perspectives as analytical tools, in the published articles and in the cover article. 
 
My approach is hermeneutic. As I understand Jacobsen (2018, p. 28), this approach 
captures reality best when a particular phenomenon can draw on broad support from many 
sources. The term ‘hermeneutics’ is derived from the Greek word her-meneutice, which 
means to explain, to interpret or to translate. It is the ‘art of interpretation’, the techniques 
involved in understanding written texts. Yet, a text is a cultural product, developed within a 
context. The central idea behind hermeneutics is therefore to search for the meaning of a 
text from the perspective of the author, but at the same time being sensitive to the social 
and historical context it was produced within (Kuckartz, 2013, p. 18; Bryman, 2010, p. 560). 
In this cover-article the latter is particularly visible in part 2 where I discuss how selected 
philosophers have viewed the connection between sovereign power and responsibilities. 
Both in the articles and in the cover article it is me who interpret the variety of written 
 
24 Schack, 2016. 
25 This document is a UN General Assembly Resolution. 
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sources I draw on, and my interpretations lay the foundations for my discussions and 
conclusions. To the extent that my discussions produce new knowledge, it stems from a 
continuous process of interpretations where data from various sources become parts of a 
larger framework of understanding. 
 
Data I collect from texts are for me secondary data, originally collected by others for 
other purposes than mine. The use of secondary data is common in all the social sciences 
(Jacobsen, 2018, p. 140). Yet, since statements from authors and other sorts of information I 
can draw from the texts are not there meant to serve my research questions, my challenge is 
to find out to what extent these data are useful in relation to my work. This also requires a 
certain carefulness about not to use citations to underpin arguments in a way the cited 
person obviously would not have been comfortable with. Statements can sometimes change 
meaning when moved from one context to another (2018, pp. 51-52). 
 
The discussions in the articles 3 and 4 draw on academic literature about the Security 
Council, specific UN resolutions, and other UN documents. However, to establish the 
theoretical framework, I had to find and read its basic literature, Pressman and Wildavsky 
about implementation, and Brunsson about how complex organizations perform26. In 
addition to the general literature about, and documents connected to, the Security Council, 
my work with article 5 demanded me to search for another selection of R2P articles, those 
with an Asian focus. This introduced me to several Asian scholars I had not been familiar 
with before. The work with this cover-article has further turned my attention to other kinds 
of specific literature, particularly about how the connection between sovereignty and 
responsibility has been viewed, in earlier days as well as more recently. 
 
When I refer to an author’s statement in a particular book, sometimes I have read the 
whole book, but not always. It might have been a particular chapter that attracted my 
attention because of its relevance for one of my research questions. Edited volumes with 
contributions from many authors often contain some chapters I find very relevant and 
others less relevant, or perhaps not relevant at all, dependent on what I search for. 
 
Here in the cover-article, I have chosen the APA-style27 of reference, with a couple of 
modifications. I prefer this style when I can choose, because it is, after my opinion, a 
reference system offering good overview without being too complex to use. APA requires 
page numbers only for direct quotations, but when available, I use numbers systematically 
throughout the text for all references. It is my ambition to give authors credit when I build 
on their arguments in my own texts. This may be possible to obtain even without using page- 
numbers. However, I also wish that my readers shall be able easy to find and to control the 
 
26 This literature was available in my local university library in Tromsø. 
27 APA = American Psychological Association. The APA-style is used by authors within many academic 
disciplines. 
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arguments in the cited sources. For a book of perhaps 300 pages, this can be quite difficult 
without any indication of where in the book the argument is situated. In the reference list, I 
do not use parenthesis for the year of publishing. The list shows DOI28 for articles where this 
is available. The reference-styles in my articles vary. This does not mirror my preferences. 
Each journal has its separate requirements to which authors must adhere. DOI is available 
for my articles 4 and 5, but not for the articles 1, 2 and 3 (see Chapter 3 in the cover-article). 
 
 
4.4 Validity, relevance, and reliability 
 
Validity concerns the integrity of the conclusions generated from a piece of research. 
There are different aspects of validity, but when used on its own, validity usually refers to 
‘measurement validity’, the degree to which a measure of a concept truly reflects that 
concept (Bryman, 2012, pp. 713 and 717). Chava and David Nachmias (1990, p. 138) explain: 
“The problem of validity arises because measurement in the social sciences is, with very few 
exceptions, indirect. Under such circumstances, researchers are never completely certain 
that they are measuring the precise property they intend to measure”. 
 
Data origin from sources. Therefore, the validity of research based on these sources 
strongly depends on the quality of them, but we cannot measure this directly. What is 
possible is to reflect upon to what extent preferred sources were available, to discuss the 
informative ability of the sources used, and to reflect upon possible biases in cases where 
certain wished sources were not available. The integrity of a conclusion increases with the 
number of sources it is based upon, particularly when these sources are independent of each 
other. In addition, the best sources are often those who are close to the phenomenon in 
question (Jacobsen, 2018, pp, 239-241). 
 
The validity of my own conclusions depends partly on to what extent I have 
succeeded to find relevant sources, partly on that the sources I have collected data from are 
reliable. I begin with the question of relevance. In the initial phase of my work, almost 
everything written about R2P had at least some relevance. After having formulated specific 
research questions, the scope of relevance narrows substantially to a search for data that 
matches my focus. I normally start this search with finding titles I think cover a relevant 
content. Some books have a content list of chapter-headings only, others more detailed lists 
specifying sections. For the most part, this is sufficient for me to decide if the source is worth 
to read for the current purpose. Before taking a decision, it might also be useful to read 
selected sequences of the text. In finding relevant articles I normally also start by searching 
for titles. The next step is to read abstracts. These are usually, although not always, 
sufficiently informative to give me an impression of their relevance. My starting point may 
 
 
28 Digital Object Identifier System 
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also be a search for authors, particularly when I am curious about what they may have 
written in addition to publications I am already familiar with. An author of an article I have 
found relevant will often have references to other authors who are occupied with similar 
questions. The ‘snowball’ described earlier in the chapter is operative here, and perhaps 
more important the more dedicated the search for relevant data is. To search for relevant 
sources is perhaps not a very difficult task to perform, but it is time consuming. 
 
The question of reliability can be more challenging. The basic question is to what 
extent it is possible to trust the chosen sources. Information in written texts is not very 
spontaneous. Dependent on what sort of text we talk about, this can be both positive and 
negative. The positive aspect is that authors have had time to reflect upon their statements 
before writing them down. This has a potential to make the statements more precise and 
then to increase the quality of the information. However, less spontaneity may also give 
more space for manipulation of the reader (2018, p. 172). 
 
An essential part of the sources I refer to in my R2P articles and in this cover-article 
are academic books and articles, written by scholars who in most cases have done 
substantial research on the topics they discuss. To rely heavily on this sort of literature has 
been a conscious choice for me. The reference lists accompanying the articles reflect this. To 
choose articles from journals credited by points in the Norwegian Christin-system, 
guarantees that they have gone through a process with blind review before publishing. 
Although this is a quite rough measure of academic quality, such processes enhance the 
reliability of sources. Fellow scholars have tested the arguments, and in many cases made 
the authors to reformulate and sharpen their statements. 
 
Books and articles are personal sources. On the other hand, documents produced by 
a collective unity are of another kind. These are institutional sources (2018, p. 188). UN 
resolutions and other UN documents belong to this group. These documents have been of 
utter importance to supply me with data for my discussions, but resolutions from the UN 
Security Council and the UN General Assembly are not academic texts. To collect data from 
them implies certain other challenges. They reflect what the member states have been able 
to agree upon at a particular time, often related to an event. Agreement is often more 
important than clarity, particularly when opinions differ and the alternative to a text 
reflecting compromises most likely is no agreement. I discuss this in more detail in the 
articles 3 and 4, focusing on the implications for the implementation of R2P objectives 
through the Security Council. When a situation calls for urgent action, producing the texts 
may take place under time-pressure with poor control of the language. When I study these 
texts, I look for statements reflecting agreements, but I also try to obtain an impression of 
the scope for interpretations inherent in the texts, which can sometimes be quite large. 
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An example may illustrate this. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 gave the 
mandate that authorized military operations against Libya in 2011. The text authorizes, 
amongst a variety of efforts, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian 
protected areas in Libya29. Nine Security Council members voted for the resolution, six 
abstained from voting, among them the veto-powers Russia and China. None voted against 
it. In the aftermath, the implementing actors have received much criticism for having 
stretched the mandate too far by forwarding regime change. In the following years, the 
Council was unable to deal effectively with the humanitarian crisis in Syria, due to frequent 
uses of vetoes from Russia and China on proposed resolutions. In article 5 (p. 16), I conclude 
that also in the future, China is very unlikely to accept the use of military force for protection 
purposes if it includes possible regime changes. 
 
The text in Resolution 1973 required implementing actors to report their choice of 
measures to the Council. An interesting point is if the formulation ‘all necessary measures’ 
can be interpreted to include regime change. The critics will surely answer no. It is rather a 
standard phrase for allowing the use of military force. Yet, this remains a question of 
interpretation. Nothing is explicitly said about regime change. Language, or in this case 
perhaps lack of language, obviously matters. 
 
Internet represents an expanding source of information with much to offer 
researchers, but with many challenges connected to reliability. One of them is to determine 
what kind of source one deals with. Some sources may try to give the impression of being 
more reliable than what they are. There exist certain techniques one may use to evaluate 
this. My articles do not rely heavily on internet sources, but when I have used such sources, I 
have tried to establish a picture of why this source exists. The quality of the language is also 
an indicator of its reliability. 
 
My published R2P articles have no references to Wikipedia, but the cover-article has 
some few. Scholars as well as others have for several years discussed to what extent this 
source, a free online encyclopedia created and edited by volunteers around the world, is 
acceptable to cite. Those who are negative have probably become fewer as Wikipedia has 
developed. According to Jacobsen (2018, p. 192), Wikipedia is now on its way to become a 
source with considerable credibility. The challenge is to use it with the caution academic 
writing requires. We are talking about the without comparison largest collection of data in 
the world, encompassing almost every thinkable topic. There is much content of excellent 
quality, but it is sometimes a challenge to separate information of high quality from more 
dubious texts. When texts are open for edit, everyone can write. Wikipedia has a policy that 
contributions should be verifiable against published reliable sources. The texts often contain 
references to many other sources, but it is not possible to find out who the original authors 
 
 
29 Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), p. 3 section 4. 
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are. If citing from Wikipedia, it should therefore preferably not be the only source 
supporting an argument. 
 
A particular reliability challenge arose connected to my discussion in this document 
about the historical roots of sovereignty as responsibility. The sources I used to find the 
views of prominent political philosophers were not the original works of Hobbes, Kant etc. I 
relied on how other authors have understood them, authors who, to a varying degree, base 
their arguments on the original texts. For me, this is a weakness, but I have found it to be an 
acceptable one for my purpose, which has been to paint an overall picture, not to go deep 
into the thinking of each single philosopher. I try to balance this weakness by using data 
from three or more sources for each selected philosopher. 
 
 
4.5 Conference participations 
 
In this section I will discuss how conference participations have contributed 
methodologically to my work with R2P. The conferences I will argue have done that are: 
 
a) Roehampton July 2013: The Cosmopolitan Ideal: Challenges and Opportunities 
b) Ljubljana April 2015: Responsibility to Protect in Theory and Practice 
c) Leeds September 2018: Alternatives to Military Intervention under R2P 
d) Copenhagen June 2019: The Asian Dynamics Initiative Conference 
e) Tromsø January 2020: The Norwegian National Political Science Conference 
 
I will also comment two conferences I participated on virtually from my own office in 
June 2021, one of them with a paper presentation. 
 
As I see it, participation in conferences has been useful for my work in different ways. 
Most important has been to receive comments on presented papers. Yet, to give comments 
to the presentations from other participants is also useful. I will soon explain how. All these 
conferences were events with a combination of keynote-lectures held in plenum, and panels 
dedicated to specific topics, where I as a participant could choose which panel to join, 
guided by relevance for own my work. In addition, conferences are social arenas30. The 
academic discussions continue beyond the formal settings, with possibilities for dialogues 
without strict time schemes, and to establish contacts with fellow researchers from different 
academic institutions around the world. All these conferences had a size which I was 
comfortable with, ranging from 40-50 up to around 150 participants. The virtual ADI 
conference had approximately 600 participants spread around the world, but I had direct 
contact only with those about 30 who participated in the same panel as I did. 
 
 
30 This cannot be said about virtual conferences. 
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A paper is a work in progress. The purpose of presenting papers on conferences is, at 
least for me and I suppose for most other participants, to receive comments that are helpful 
in developing the text further into an article. Such comments may pertain to the content of 
the paper as well as to the structure of it. All my published R2P-articles, except article 2, 
have a history as conference papers31. Article 1 connects to paper presentations on two 
conferences, Roehampton July 2013, and Ljubljana April 2015. The Roehampton 
conference32 took place in an early phase of my R2P work. The conference addressed 
cosmopolitanism broadly. My paper discussed how to understand the confirmation of R2P in 
the international sphere from a cosmopolitan perspective. Based on feedback both 
immediately after my presentation and more informally at the social events, I developed it 
further to what might be called a first version of an article. It was accepted for presentation 
at the Ljubljana conference33, an international conference purely dedicated to R2P34. 
Comments from fellow participants helped me to further improve the text, and then to get it 
published in the American journal The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs in the summer 2016 
edition. This was my first published R2P-article. 
 
The articles 3 and 4 both owe credit to a paper-presentation in Leeds in September 
2018. The conference was a special R2P event organized by the European Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, located at the University of Leeds (England), in cooperation with 
BISA / IR2PWG35. I got the idea to use insights from Pressman and Wildavsky’s classic study 
of implementation from the 1960’s, combined with Brunsson’s somewhat later studies 
connected to the performance of complex organizations, through discussions with 
colleagues at home about possible ways to proceed with my R2P ‘project’36. The paper 
presented was already quite developed in the direction of becoming an article. Yet, the 
feedback I got in Leeds about my choice of theoretical framework, convinced me that this 
represented something new, interesting, and original. Despite the differences described in 
chapter 3, the articles 3 and 4 discuss the same main question. The journals are for article 3 
the March 2019 edition of the International Journal on World Peace (American), and for 





31 I wrote article 2 as a response to a call from The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs for contributions with focus 
on possibilities and limitations of joint action among international actors. 
32 The conference was arranged by the Global Studies Association. 
33 All accepted papers for this conference were distributed to the participants as chapters in a conference book 
shortly before the conference started. The title of this book, edited by Dr. Vasilka Sancin, was ‘Responsibility to 
Protect: Where Do We Stand Ten Years After’. 
34 The Faculty of Law at the University of Ljubljana (Slovenia) arranges this conference each second year. 
35 BISA = The British International Studies Association, a society that promotes the study of international 
relations. IR2PWG is the BISA Working Group on Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. 
36 I like to call it a project, although it is designed by me alone, with only one participant, me. However, it was 
not very project-like from the beginning. Rather, it has gradually developed to become a sort of a project. 
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The Asian Dynamics Initiative Conference (ADI) in Copenhagen is a yearly event 
focusing on Asian politics broadly. At the June 2019 conference I participated in a panel 
about international order making in the age of US-Chinese relations. My paper discussed the 
perspectives for implementation of R2P objectives in a more Asia-dominated world order. 
Based on comments from other panel participants, and later from members of my research 
group at home, Warped, I developed the paper to an article entitled ‘R2P and rising Asian 
Powers’. This is my article 5, published online in the journal Millennial Asia (SAGE) 10 Mars, 
2021. 
 
Panels are arenas for giving as well as receiving. I participate because I wish to 
receive relevant comments as help to drive my work forward. However, I am of course 
aware of that the other participants are there for mostly the same reason. It is my 
responsibility to contribute to their work by reading their texts before attending, and by 
giving my comments in the discussions following the presentations. To comment the work of 
other participants requires reading it consciously with a special focus on the potential for 
improvement, to discover strengths and weaknesses, to evaluate how the author underpins 
the arguments, and to obtain an impression about to what extent the text is coherent, 
favorably composed etc. At the 2020 Tromsø conference, a Norwegian national political 
science conference addressing political issues broadly, my main role was to comment papers 
presented by others, in a panel dedicated to peace and conflict research. I did not present a 
paper myself on this conference, but I delivered a presentation covering my whole work with 
R2P. It generated some comments. Although hardly possible to measure, I am convinced 
that I have learned from the exercises of commenting the work of fellow academics, and 
that there are positive spillover effects to my own ‘project’. This effect is not fully dependent 
on the topic I comment, but it is probably most to gain when I comment on discussions that 
overlaps mine. Some conferences, like ADI, point out dedicated commentators for each 
paper before the panel meets. In Copenhagen in 2019 I had the pleasure to comment a 
paper discussing cooperation in a context of animosity, focusing on peacekeeping, 
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief in East Asia37. 
 
The first virtual conference I followed from home in June 2021 were the 
‘Responsibility to Protect in Theory and Practice’ conference normally arranged in Ljubljana 
each second year, but this year hosted by Edge Hill University38 in collaboration with the 
University of Ljubljana, the European Center for the Responsibility to Protect (ECR2P), and 
the British International Studies Association’s Working Group on Intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect (IR2PWG). I had the pleasure to listen to interesting keynotes and 




37 Rikard Jalkebro and Catherine Jones from the School of International Relations at University of St. Andrews, 
Scotland, presented this paper. 
38 Edge Hill University is situated in Ormskirk, England. 
40  
for my work, but I did not present my own paper or comment anyone’s paper on this 
conference. 
 
I did present, virtually, a new paper on the 2021 Asian Dynamics Initiative (ADI) 
conference arranged by the University of Copenhagen, in addition to commenting a paper 
from another participant. The title of the panel was ‘China goes global’. My new paper builds 
to some extent on my fifth R2P article, but my ambition now is to look closer on the Chinese 
R2P position particularly, and to include a discussion about to what extent, eventually for 
who, the Chinese position is problematic39. 
 
Although I cannot cite from lectures40, unless the text in the aftermath also comes in 
a printed and publicly available version, I am cautious to take good notes when listening to 
keynotes, particularly those directly addressing R2P. In this respect I will accentuate the 
introductory address at the 2015 Ljubljana conference by Jennifer Welsh, then Special 
Advisor to the UN Secretary General on R2P, addressing the overall conference topic about 
where R2P stood 10 years after the adoption, a speech at the 2018 Leeds conference with a 
gender perspective on R2P, delivered by Joanne Neenan41 from the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, and the keynote by Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director at the 
Global Center for R2P, who, at the virtual 2021 R2P conference hosted by Edge Hill 
University, addressed many of the current most urgent challenges to the implementation of 
R2P objectives. 
 
Most conferences offer exhibitions of relevant literature. These exhibitions are useful 
for discovering the newest titles available, often combined with the possibility to do a 
favorable purchase. At the Leeds conference a new book was released with a dedicated 
presentation by the author, James Pattison42. I mention this one particularly because it 
directly addressed the broad approach R2P is meant to be in dealing with humanitarian 
crisis, which was also the main topic for the conference. The book title is Alternatives to 
War. In the introduction, Pattison (2018, p. 1) writes: 
 
“Indeed, one of the central premises of the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine is 
that standing in face of mass atrocities is reprehensible. According to the R2P, the 
international community has a responsibility to protect threatened populations. Even if war 




39 China supports R2P pillar 1 (national responsibility) and expresses limited support for pillar 2 (international 
assistance). China is uncomfortable with pillar 3 (international action through the UN Security Council), without 
rejecting the pillar totally. 
40 I make one exception to this rule in the final remarks in chapter 8, but with a thorough explanation. 
41 Joanne Neenan is an international lawyer and diplomat, and the former head of the Peacekeeping, Human 
Rights and Conflict Prevention team at the UK Mission to the UN. 
42 James Pattison is professor in political science at the University of Manchester. 
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4.6 Some final methodological reflections 
 
During my work with R2P from late 2012 until today, I have successively accumulated 
more and more knowledge about the principle, generally and about specific aspects of it. 
The amount of relevant literature I have read has grown substantially and continues to do 
so, stimulated by a stream of new contributions from researchers in the field. There is more 
literature of relevance available for me to support my own arguments now, compared to 
some years ago. The accumulation of knowledge over time, and this is not only about 
reading more literature and diverse documents, but also knowledge gathered subsequently 
through my conference participations as described above, has made it possible for me to 
widen the scope of R2P-aspects where I feel I am able to participate with my arguments in 
academic debates. This is not to say that my later articles are necessarily of better academic 
quality than the first ones. After having completed article 1, I did not continue to work with 
cosmopolitanism. My focus changed, and I saw more choices because my repertoire of 
knowledge had broadened. However, for certain aspects of importance for all the articles, I 
have developed more clarity over time. Articles 4 and 5 are for instance more precise than 
my first two articles about the differences between the R2P presented in the ICISS-report in 
2001, and the more restricted version adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005, 






The cover-article’s second main part addresses the 
connection between state sovereignty and responsibility. The 
discussions in all my five published R2P articles build on the 
assumption that this connection exists. A better 
understanding is therefore expected to help efforts realizing 
R2P objectives under various circumstances. 
 
 
The research question is: 
 
How is it possible to understand the imagination of 
sovereignty as responsibility, by unveiling its historical 
roots, and through current debates? 
 
Part 2 of the cover-article has four chapters, 5-8. Chapter 5 
describes the context that frames the discussion. In Chapter 6 
I present my chosen analytical tool, the theory-tradition 
called the English School of international relations. Chapter 7 
is dedicated to the discussion. Part 2 ends with some final 




Chapter 5 Context 
 
This chapter has the following sections:  
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 International order 






This chapter is a portrait of the broader context that encompasses R2P. The principle 
has entered a world order dominated by sovereign states. The principle itself demands that 
the exercise of sovereign authority is responsible, to protect populations from mass 
atrocities. Sovereigns that do not act responsible in this respect, risk losing legitimacy, at 
home as well as in their relations to other sovereigns. I therefore choose to describe the 
context starting with a section about international order more generally. This establishes a 
framework. In connection with order, it is relevant to include some words about 
international law and international justice. Thereafter I proceed to give a deeper 
presentation of three concepts central to my discussion in chapter 7, first the concept that 
more than anything characterizes the current international order, state sovereignty, then 
the related concepts of responsibility and legitimacy. 
 
 
5.2 International order 
 
The concept international order refers to the pattern of activities or the set of 
arrangements that characterizes the mutual behavior of states. This pattern provides 
regularity to international relations. Different orders have existed through history, all since 
political units began to interact regularly. The basis for the current international order is the 
European state system established by the Peace of Westphalia (1648). This order gradually 
became global. Particularly during the last two centuries, several regional international 
orders have merged into a modern global order where it makes sense to talk about the state 
system as global, a global economy, and global circulation of ideas. In this order, a 
multiplicity of sovereign states coexist in a condition of anarchy, but some common 
standards for behavior and interaction are accepted. It is an order rejecting world 
government in favor of state sovereignty. It is fragmented, but this does not stop political 
units from interacting with each other. Interaction takes place within a framework that 
recognizes regulating elements, as for instance international law, diplomacy, and balances of 
power. The main purpose of regulatory arrangements is to provide peace and security 
through protection for the states and for the order. Stability is a key value for any order. 
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Change and developments mostly take place as processes of adaptation. One example is the 
emergence of new states (Lawson, 2017, pp. 38-41; Evans and Newnham, 1998, pp. 269- 
270). 
 
An important regulating element for the current international order is ‘international 
law’, or public international law, which is the branch of international law dealt with in my 
texts43. Its concern is the relations between states, with states as the legal entities. It 
consists of the rules, principles, customs, and agreements that states accept having the force 
of law in their relations. International law specifies, within different policy areas, what a 
state may legally do when interacting with other states or other relevant actors, as well as 
the behavior it may expect others to undertake (Evans and Newnham, 1998, pp. 261-262; 
Grieco et. al., 2019, pp. 150-151). 
 
The historical root of international law is possible to trace back to the Roman Empire, 
but it is common to consider Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Emerich de Vattel (1714-67) as 
‘fathers’ of modern international law, and the treaties of Augsburg (1555)44, Westphalia 
(1648), and Utrecht (1713-15)45 as important landmarks (Baylis et.al. 2017, p. 303). However, 
most of what we call international law today established during the last century, especially 
after WW2. Most common are ‘treaties’, accepted by signatories through national 
ratification. Treaties may address all states (universal), like for instance the Geneva Accords 
regulating the conduct of war, or only states in a particular region (non-universal). The North 
Atlantic Treaty exemplifies the latter. In addition to written (statutory) laws, international 
law also includes unwritten norms and rules called customary law. This refers to behaviors 
that has developed over time to become established practices. Many former unwritten 
practices have now become parts of written documents (Grieco et. al., 2019, pp. 151-152). 
 
There are important differences between national law systems and international law. 
Within states, citizens cannot pick and choose which laws they wish to obey. At the 
international level, states are only bound to the treaties they sign. Most states have a system 
for the enforcement of national laws. The lack of a centralized authority internationally 
makes international law mainly a self-help system. The hierarchy between laws we usually 
find in national political systems is absent in the international sphere. International law is 
fragmented. Grieco et. al. (2019, p. 155) writes: “Instead of a single, relatively coherent 
 
43 There exists also a branch called private international law dealing with rules and agreements between 
individuals and associations in different states. The globalization of the world economy, particularly the 
increased number of transactions between multinational organizations, has made private international law a 
growing institution (Bealey, 1999, p. 168). 
44 The Augsburg Settlement officially ended religious struggle within the Holy Roman Empire by allowing rulers 
to choose between Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism as the official confession of their states. 
(www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_of_Augsburg). 
45 The Peace of Utrecht is a series of peace treaties signed between 1713 and 1715 in the Dutch city Utrecht. 
The treaties ended the war about the vacant throne of Spain that had involved much of Europe for over a 
decade (www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_of_Utrecht). 
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system of civil and criminal law there are islands of international law, such as the law 
regarding commerce and, quite separately, the laws regarding human rights”. Compared to 
national law systems, the connections between current and past cases are weaker within 
international law, and states must give permissions before a case their involved in can be 
treated by an international court (Grieco et. al., 2019, pp. 154-155). 
 
The UN Charter and various UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions 
are central documents to all R2P discussions. The UN Charter is an international treaty. 
Member-states are bound by it. Article 103 contains a supremacy clause stating that the UN 
Charter shall prevail in events of conflict with other international agreements. As such, the 
UN Charter is the highest authority of international law46. The relationship between Security 
Council resolutions and international law is somewhat more complicated. The Council is a 
powerful political organ making political decisions. Its activities are defined in Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. It produces resolutions which may have legal consequences, but the Council 
itself is normally not conceived as a law-making body. Security Council resolutions generally 
bind only the addressees, which may be the whole specter from one single member-state to 
all of them47. General Assembly resolutions are recommendations, not laws. Yet, the 
Assembly is involved with international law at many levels. Different subsidiary bodies 
consider specific areas of international law and deliver reports to the plenary48. 
 
The bulk of international law concerned with human rights have expanded 
substantially after WW2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN 
General Assembly on December 10, 1948, is not legally binding, but it is the most important 
normative UN document. It is possible to argue with Jacob Weinrib (2019, p. 21), that the 
adoption of the declaration represented a significant change for the order of sovereign 
states. While the treaties of Westphalia49 primarily focused on the right to exercise 
authority, the declaration recognized the sovereign’s duties to the ruled. The declaration 
also generated the development of several treaties that are binding for states who, with 
their signatures, formally accept the obligations contained. The Universal Declaration forms, 
together with the 1966 adopted international covenants50 on Civil and Political Rights, and 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the so-called International Bill of Human Rights51. 
Other human rights treaties have followed, shaping the international order R2P has entered. 
In addition, Article 1 in the UN Charter defines promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights as one of the objectives of the organization. There are references to human 
rights in several other charter articles, including obligations for member states to act 
separately and jointly and in cooperation with the UN to achieve the objectives. 
 
46 www.law.jrank.org/pages/7739/International-Law-UN-Charter-United-Nations.html 
47   www.ukessays.com/essays/law/status-of-un-security-council-public-international-law.php 
48 www.research.un.org/en/docs/law/ga ; www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_resolution 
49 The importance of these treaties is further explained in the following section. 




Order and justice need not coincide. Yet, justice is a subjective term. No widespread 
agreement exists about its general applicability, neither on the meaning of justice in the 
international context (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 288). A traditional term which is closely 
related to international order is ‘international morality’, implying that international relations 
are, or at least ought to be, conducted based on certain shared ethical values, extending 
those embodied in international law (1998, p. 266). 
 
 
5.3 State sovereignty: concept and history 
 
State sovereignty is the broadest recognized constitutive institution defining the basic 
norms and rules for international behavior, by dividing most of the earth’s land-territory into 
sovereign states, hierarchically organized internally, and with mutual respect for the 
territorial integrity of each other. The constitutional independence of sovereign states is 
enshrined in the UN Charter as the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention52. 
 
In the Middle Ages, sovereign authority took different forms. Empire, the Catholic 
Church, and a variety of other units, competed to fill a political vacuum. In this vacuum, the 
modern state appeared, developed, and conquered the world (Zucca, 2015, pp. 399-400). 
The 1648 Peace of Westphalia did not create a coherent system of sovereign states. Some 
states relevant to call sovereign had already for a long time existed in Europe, and together 
with numerous new sovereign states, they continued to co-exist alongside other political 
units for a couple of centuries to come. States superseded feudal organization, but the shift 
to sovereign territorial states first gave rise to multiple institutional arrangements before a 
system of states emerged. The institutional evolution of the international system was no 
linear process, but the alternatives gradually weeded out, like for instance the Italian city- 
states (Spruyt, 1994, p. 16)53. Yet, 1648 represents an important watershed. The conferences 
in the German cities Münster and Osnabrück from May to October ended the Thirty Years 
War54. These conferences represented the first international arenas were the negotiating 
delegations all represented states, not religious authorities or for instance the once mighty 
Hansa-League of cities which still formally existed, but it was not allowed to join as an equal 
participant (1994, p. 16). 
 
The origins of the notion of sovereignty go back to ancient Rome, but the shaping of 
the concept to how we understand it today took place in the 17th and the 18th Century 
Europe (Morris, 2019, p. 87). The modern concept of sovereignty arose 
 
 
52 The UN Charter, Chapter 1, articles 2.1, 2.4 and 2.7 
53 It is problematic to call these city-states small sovereign states, because sovereign power was often 
domestically contested. 
54 The Thirty Years War describes numerous wars from 1616 to 1648 fought mainly in Central Europe. 
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together with the territorial state and the idea to concentrate power in the hands of the 
monarch. It was an idea sharply at stake with the political organization of feudal Europe 
structured through the Holy Roman Empire, with its crossing lines of authority dependent on 
the questions concerned. The centralized power gradually became impossible to challenge 
as kings and princes declared themselves as sovereigns. 
 
At the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815, state representatives, for the first time, 
signed treaties at a continental level. The implementation of numerous territorial changes 
reorganized the European political map after Napoleon’s wars. The overall result was a 
Europe with sovereign states as the dominant political unities. However, we must move 
forward to the dissolutions of the colonial empires in the 20th Century before we can talk 
about state sovereignty as a concept of universal extension. Today, with the exemption of 
the Antarctic and some disputed areas, all significant land territory belongs to a sovereign 
state. The system has become global in reach, and, according to Aaron James (2019, p. 256), 
it now ranks among the most consequential institutions in world history, setting basic 
territorial limits on political aspiration for people the world over. Yet, one ought to keep in 
mind that a world order with state sovereignty as its fundamental cornerstone is a more 
recent phenomenon than what we today may tend to imagine. 
 
The term ‘state’ derives from status, a Latin word with different meanings, among 
which are condition or position. In this context, one may talk about the position held by a 
ruler. The two words ‘right’ and ‘reign’, from which ‘sovereignty’ derives, came from the 
common Indo-European root ‘reg’ (Gencer, 2010, p. 329). The English word ‘reign’ is both a 
verb and a noun. It means to rule as king or queen, but it is also possible to use about the 
period of a particular sovereign’s rule. ‘Sovereign’ is a title applied to the supreme leader. In 
earlier days it was the monarch. The sovereign ruled a territory. The word is a loan from Old 
French soverain, which in turn origins from the Latin super, meaning ‘over’55. In his book Six 
livres de la république from 1567, the French political philosopher Jean Bodin argued for 
absolute and heritable power to the monarch, freed from all external authority. This work, 
together with Thomas Hobbes Leviathan from 1651, frequently mentions as the classic texts 
about how the concept of state sovereignty originated. The idea of the people as the source 
of impersonal state power, popular sovereignty, originated about a century later, very much 
through the writings of the French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau, and actualized with 
the American and the French revolutions. 
 
When a ruler or a government is not itself legally constrained, we have what Morris 
(2019, pp. 87-89) calls ‘classical sovereignty’. If absolute sovereignty is attributed to states, 
their authority cannot be constrained by for instance international law. Sovereignty is a kind 
of authority that differs from other authorities within its domain by being ultimate, the 




kinds of sovereignty that tend to have appeal today, limited versions where the sovereign 
does not claim to be legally unconstrained. The German scholar Carl Schmidt defined the 
sovereign as the one who decides in exceptional circumstances. A sovereign then acts by 
intervening occasionally, but this view is problematic. It is not obvious which circumstances 
are exceptional, or who shall decide this (2019, pp. 93-94)56. 
 
Together with the rise of the modern state system, a duality developed because the 
sovereigns sought simultaneously to establish domestic authority, and to fortify their 
positions towards other sovereigns. Yet, ‘internal’ (vertical) and ‘external’ (horizontal) 
sovereignty refer to different sorts of relations. One cannot easily derive the one directly 
from the other. Internal sovereignty is the exclusive right state authorities claim to give and 
to enforce laws within the defined territory. External sovereignty concerns the relations to 
other sovereign states, to recognition as a legitimate member of the international order. 
Recognition releases numerous rights, to control territories, to establish diplomatic ties with 
other states, and to become members of international organizations. Only sovereign states 
can obtain full UN membership. Formally, the principle of non-intervention enshrined in the 





The term responsibility is much used, but the precise meaning is often obscure. The 
concept implies a value judgement, but the values it embodies can differ according to the 
context, the discourse, and the views of the speaker. It is possible to be responsible in a 
variety of ways, which signify various usages of the concept (Bovens, 2011, p. 2299). In its 
general moral and legal sense, to be responsible is to be liable for one’s actions, which may 
cause reward or punishment. Problems connected to responsibility may arise when duties 
and obligations have not been clearly specified. This is a well-known phenomenon in 
complex organizations (Bealey, 1999, p. 286). 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary57 offers a comprehensive list of what responsibility can 
mean in different contexts. The whole list is not relevant for the discussions in my articles 
and in the cover-article, but some of the points are, like understanding responsibility as the 
capability of fulfilling an obligation or duty, the quality of being reliable and trustworthy. 
Responsibility might also simply be the fact of having a duty to do something, an assignment, 
a task, or a burden, for which one is responsible. Another use of the term is of being the 
cause or the originator of an event or series of events, for which one might be credited or 
blamed. Mark Bovens (2011, p. 2999) explains this more detailed. When used to indicate 
 
56 Morris refers to the book Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität by Carl Schmidt, 
first published in 1922. 
57 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2021. Oxford: Oxford University Press. www.oed.com 
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that someone or something has had the power to cause a particular event, responsibility 
coincides with causality. Not only humans, but also things, situations or circumstances can 
be responsible in this sense of agency, for example a virus for the outbreak of a pandemic. 
However, in a moral sense, responsibility pertains only to human agents. These must have 
the capacity to act responsibly, have had the possibility to act otherwise, and have 
developed a certain capacity to understand the consequences of their actions. 
 
Understood as a normative concept, responsibility is a virtue, indicating a set of 
standards for the behavior of actors, or a desirable condition. We can talk about responsible 
actors as actors with a positive moral attitude, a desirable character trait, or praiseworthy 
conduct. Active responsibility differs from passive. Active responsibility focuses on the 
prevention of undesirable situations and events. Passive responsibility activates after these 
events have taken place, about holding someone accountable (2011, pp. 2299-2300). 
 
Accountability, as a dimension of responsibility, establishes a relationship between 
an accuser and the accused, based on non-compliance with shared rules or regulations. This 
relationship focuses on monitoring, sanctioning, and correcting behavior. Relationship 
between an actor, being individual or collective, and other social units, is central to 
understand responsibility. Yet, responsibility is more than accountability, because it also 
includes a proactive component, related to tasks that lie in the future. As such, responsibility 
norms are guiding principles that leave space for debate, also about conditions for having 
the capability to take on responsibility (Vetterlain and Hansen-Magnusson, 2020, p. 9). 
 
As a noun, the word ‘responsibility’ is relatively modern, dating back to the end of 
the 19th Century58. For instance, Edmund Burke used it with reference to both obligation and 
capacity. However, the adjective ‘responsible’ is much older, used in the works of both 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. It can probably be traced back to the latin word 
responsabilis in the late Middle Ages (Bovens, 2011, p. 2300). 
 
More recently, responsibility has become a focal point in international politics, 
materialized in specific policy norms. These consist of shared expectations for relevant 
actors within a community about what constitutes appropriate behavior related to specific 
tasks. R2P is one example. Yet, policy norms are usually informed by broader and more 
fundamental norms, as for instance human rights norms when we talk about R2P (Vetterlein 
and Hansen-Magnusson, 2020, pp. 3 and 11). 
 
However, responsibility is a quite flexible term, as these words from Vetterlein and 
Hansen-Magnusson illustrate (2020, p. 8): “There is no straightforward answer to what 
responsibility is, as it contains moral as well as legal dimensions, while arguments can be 
made about who to assign responsibility to and on what basis”. 
 




To talk about sovereignty as legitimate or not presupposes a clarification of how to 
understand the term. Something is ‘legitimate’ when it is in accordance with established 
rules, principles, or standards. Legitimacy is the state or quality of being legitimate59. In 
international relations, legitimacy connects to notions of recognition. It is more often a 
political matter rather than a strictly legal one (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 302). David 
Beetham writes: 
 
“The legitimacy of any system of power, including that of its individual power 
holders, lies in the degree to which it is acknowledged as rightful, both by those involved 
with and subject to it and by third parties whose support and recognition it may depend on”. 
 
(Beetham, 2011, p. 1414) 
 
The term closely connects to the German sociologist Max Weber, for whom the core 
meaning of legitimacy was morally valid and rightful rule (Gilley, 2009, p. 3). Any power 
needs to justify itself. Those occupying positions of political power, have throughout human 
history sought to ground their authority in legitimacy. Legitimacy then refers to the property 
that the state’s procedures for making and enforcing laws are acceptable to the subjects 
(Beetham, 2011, pp. 1414-1415; Grant, 1996, p. 281). Acceptance means that subjects see 
the authorities as right and proper. Obedience alone is not sufficient because subjects may 
also obey the orders from a government that terrorizes them (Bealey, 1999, p. 189). 
 
Legitimacy is an old word. In ancient languages like Latin and Chinese, it implied only 
a narrow conception of following laws. Later it expanded to imply following shared moral 
standards (Gilley, 2009, introduction xi). Studies of legitimacy within political philosophy 
existed in ancient Greece. Yet, it is a rather recent subject for political science, dating from 
the early 20th century (Beetham, 2011 p. 1415). According to Gilley (2009, introduction xii- 
xiii), legitimacy has never been popular in the study of politics. There has rather been a 
tendency to dismiss the concept. Legitimacy can be tricky to measure and apply, but this is a 
property shared with many other important concepts. Yet, to eliminate legitimacy from the 
analysis in favor of what is easier to measure, is putting methodological precision ahead of 
substantive findings. Christopher Morris (2008, p. 15) points to much confusion about 
legitimacy in contemporary discussions, which indicates widespread lack of clarity and 
understanding. It is not, according to Beetham (2011, p. 1415), the definition of legitimacy 
being contested, rather questions like how legitimacy creates and maintains, what it is 
exactly that makes power rightful, and how significant legitimacy is for the effectiveness and 
maintenance of power relations. More clarity would be very helpful because the concept of 
 
 
59 dictionary.com/browse/ legitimacy 
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legitimacy is essential to making sense of our world of sovereign states. If the legitimacy of 
states is wrongly estimated, it may set in motion disastrous politics. Claims of illegitimacy 
may justify different forms of interventions (Gilley, 2009, p. 2). The term ‘illegitimacy’ refers 
to manifest breach of the conditions connected to legitimacy, as when governments are 
unable or unwilling to provide for basic security for their subjects (Beetham, 2011, p. 1418). 
The relevance for R2P debates is easy to recognize. 
 
Without legitimacy, states cannot efficiently perform the tasks assigned to them. 
Because lack of legitimacy may be debilitating, states always claim to be legitimate (Morris, 
2008, p. 15-16). Sovereign states need to legitimate themselves in relation to their subjects, 
and they need recognition from other states as legitimate members of the international 
community. A long tradition in political thought argues that only states with legitimate 
institutions and ideologies qualify as states. Gilley (2009, p. 8) refers to the famous antique 
Christian theologian and philosopher Augustine of Hippo (345 – 430)60 who called kingdoms 
without legitimacy ‘great bands of robbers’. 
 
Another question is to what extent legitimacy is either present or absent. According 
to Gilley (2009, p. 9), everyday usage of the concept often treats it as a dichotomous 
variable. State leaders seldom claim a particular state for being ‘fairly legitimate’. On the 
other hand, there are reasons for allowing degrees, treating legitimacy as a continuous 
variable. This avoids limiting subjects’ actions to either complete obedience or complete 
disobedience, and it allows for a dynamic process of generating legitimacy (2009, p. 59). 
With reference to Lynn White61, Gilley (2009, p. 11) points to real world politics where 
nothing is purely legitimate or illegitimate. Yet, it may be irrelevant to speak about 
legitimacy for so-called ‘failed states’, if they are no longer recognized as states (2009, p. 26). 
Christopher Morris (2008, pp. 30-31) deals with related questions. If full legitimacy means 
the genuine support of all subjects, no state has ever obtained that. As such, the 
fundamental form of political organization cannot measure up to its self-image. He solves 
this dilemma by allowing legitimacy to come with different strengths, from a strong variant 
where all subjects obey all valid laws that apply to them, unrealistic in the real world, to a 
weaker variant where subjects are obliged not to undermine state rule, and to support it in 
various ways (2008, pp. 22-25). On the other hand, focusing on the legitimacy of state 
constitutions, Jörg Kuhnelt (2008, p. 2) writes: “The justification of a state would be more 
than questionable if only the leaders or a minority of its citizens actually agree to it”. 
 
To believe that a state is legitimate is to dedicate a certain status to it. However, it is 
not sufficient to examine people’s beliefs. Morris (2008, pp. 17-20) treats legitimacy as a 
 
 
60 The book referred to by Gilley is Augustine of Hippo. Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans, 
translated by J.W.C. Wand 1963. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
61 White, Lynn. 2005. Introduction: Dimensions of Legitimacy. In White (ed.) Legitimacy: Ambiguities of Political 
Success or Failure in East and Southeast Asia, pp. 1-28. Singapore: World Scientific. 
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property of states. Legitimate states have the ‘right to exist’. Others have no right to destroy 
them. To the state attaches a ‘territory’. The correlating duty on others is non-interference. 
Legitimate states have a ‘right to act’. Domestically this includes rights to make, to 
adjudicate, and to enforce laws. The state does not necessarily create all laws itself, but it 
determines the laws within its territory, expressed through Weber’s monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force. Internationally the right to act implies to enter into agreements, 
treaties, and alliances, with other states, or within the framework of international 
organizations. 
 
Rightful rule means rule in accordance with shared moral standards of a political 
community. Therefore, states seeking legitimacy must perform well (Gilley, 2009, p. 5). What 
this precisely means, varies across space and time. As such, the sources of legitimacy are not 
universal (2009, p. 32). To have an obligation is to be the subject of a normative 
requirement. Sources of obligations may be moral or legal. Sharp distinctions between these 
are not always easy to draw (Morris, 2008, p. 21). For Thomas Bierstecker (2005, pp. 162- 
163), the legitimate state fulfils its international commitments and obligations. These have 
changed over time, often in connection with challenges. The criteria for recognition as 
sovereign states are therefore not static. He suggests thinking of sovereignty in terms of a 
continual contestation of practices. Some agents push the boundaries of legitimate practice, 
while others resist the changes. Yet, there is some evidence that the international 
community has become increasingly more intrusive into earlier assumed domains of 
domestic affairs62.  This matches the following words by Gilley: 
 
“States are increasingly linked through shared standards of legitimacy that widen 
their responsibilities in global society. What drives states, and what pull them together in the 
future, is the question of how political power can be used in a legitimate manner, 
domestically and internationally”. 
 

















62 Biersteker refers to the ambiguity contained in the UN Charter on the issue of sovereignty. 
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Chapter 6 Theory: The English School of international relations 
 
The theory chapter is composed of the following sections: 
 
6.1 Why this approach? 
6.2 Brief history 
6.3 System and society 
6.4 Pluralism, solidarism, and world society 
6.5 International order and justice 
6.6 The legacy of R.J. Vincent 
6.7 IR as a human world 





6.1 Why this approach? 
 
I used the English School as one among other theoretical approaches in my R2P 
articles 1 and 2. In the cover-article I have chosen this as my single selection. There are 
several reasons for why I find the English School particularly well suited as analytical tool for 
discussions connected to state sovereignty and to R2P. The most important ones are: 
 
1. The English School occupies a middle ground within IR, which realizes that we live in 
an imperfect world where signs of optimism coexist with signs of pessimism. I expect 
this to be a suited tool to analyze possibilities as well as limitations connected to 
state sovereignty understood as responsibility, and to the destiny of R2P objectives. 
2. The ‘international society’ is the most important English School concept. It is a 
society composed of sovereign states. Yet, the societal aspects of the international 
sphere, heavily influences the location and the character of responsibilities, with 
consequences for perspectives related to R2P. 
3. The English school offers comprehensive insights into international order, the 
relationship between order and justice included. 
4. R2P is about a valued normative standard, and the English School views IR as a 
fundamentally normative enterprise. 
5. History is important for English School scholars. The arrangements we observe today 
are only possible to understand through knowledge about their development. 
6. The English School makes human beings visible. Human beings operate in contexts, 
but the main international actors are the states-people; politicians, diplomats etc. 
acting on behalf of their states. In dealing with mass atrocities, it is important to 
understand the space for action. This implies to identify responsible human beings. 
7. The English School addresses questions connected to human rights and to 
humanitarian-based interventions, with obvious relevance for discussions about the 
meaning of state sovereignty, and for the implementation of R2P objectives. 
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This chapter draws on many sources. Yet, among all books and articles written within 
the framework of the English School, one book stands out as the most important one, 
Hedley Bull’s famous masterpiece The Anarchical Society, first published in 1977. The 
following sections in this chapter, and the discussion in chapter 7, has several references to 
it. For more recent discussions about what the English School can offer in the 21.st Century, 
it is worth to mention Andrew Hurrell’s book On Global Order from 2007, and Barry Buzan’s 
An Introduction to the English School of International Relations published in 2014. 
 
 
6.2 Brief history 
 
The English School is named so, because the original scholars worked in 
England, although not all of them were English born63. The central institution was, and is, 
LSE64 in London, accompanied by the universities in Oxford, Cambridge, and Aberystwyth 
(Wales). The English School’s influence on scholarly work has been greatest in Britain, but 
today there is significant interest in the insight the school has delivered in many parts of the 
world. In the 21st Century, it has consolidated itself as one of the most important approaches 
to IR, and as the principal alternative to mainstream American theorizing in the field, with 
succession of scholars across generations. (Knudsen, 2008, pp. 224-225; Brown, 2019, p. 47; 
Buzan, 2014, pp. 10-11; Dunne, 2021, p. 108; Linklater, 2009, p. 86). 
 
As an instinctive and original perspective on international relations with the 
international society as the primary object of analysis, the English School took shape during 
the 1950s, 60s and 70s. An important year is 1959 with the establishment of the British 
Committee on the Theory of International politics. The committee, chaired by Herbert 
Butterfield65, gathered scholars from different academic disciplines to discuss problems and 
aspects of IR theory, developing particularly the study of international society66. The other 
most influential members of the first generation of English School scholars were Hedley Bull, 
Martin Wight, Adam Watson, R. J. Vincent, and James Mayall. Apart from the individual 
works, the Committee produced two important edited volumes, in 1966 Diplomatic 
Investigations edited by Butterfield and Wight, and in 1984 The Expansion of International 
Society edited by Bull and Watson (Buzan, 2014, p. 7). More recently, the school has further 
developed through the works of Robert Jackson, Andrew Hurrell, Tim Dunne, Barry Buzan, 
Ian Clark, Nicholas Wheeler and Richard Little. English School scholars agree about the 
central questions to ask, and that the approach represents a theoretical framework suited to 
 
63 Hedley Bull was born in Sydney and worked as a professor at the Australian National University in Canberra 
before he moved to England in 1953 where he continued his academic career as professor at LSE and at the 
university of Oxford. 
64 London School of Economics and Political Science 
65 Herbert Butterfield was professor of history at the University of Cambridge. 
66   www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British.commitee_on_the_theory_of_international_politics. 
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find answers. They also agree to focus mainly on IR at the global level. Yet, the tradition is 
broad enough to embody substantial variation. Barry Buzan explains: 
 
“The English School is a ‘great conversation comprised of anyone who wants to talk 
about the concepts of international and world society and who relates in some substantive 
way to the foundational literature on those topics. It is not a school in the narrow sense of 
representing a specific line of thought on which all adherents are agreed”. 
 
(Buzan, 2014, p. 8) 
 
The English School has intellectual roots to the European international law tradition 
with philosophers like Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel, but also to European political 
theory more generally. More contemporary sources of inspiration include the early liberal 
internationalists (idealists) of the 1920s, and the generation of classical realists that entered 
the scene thereafter, although, to use Tony Brems Knudsens’ words (2008, pp. 224-225), 
English School scholars had quarrels with both. The English School was from the beginning at 
odds with both the realist preoccupation with international anarchy and power politics, and 
the idealist quest for radical transformation. 
 
 
6.3 System and society 
 
The English School rests on an important observation, that international relations 
display a remarkably high level of order, and surprisingly little inter-state violence, despite 
the absence of a world-wide monopoly of power. The foundational claim of the English 
School is that sovereign states form a society, but it is an anarchic society since states do not 
have to submit to a higher power (Linklater, 2009, p. 86). Yet, the idea of an ‘international 
society’, the flagship concept of the English School, has older roots. Barry Buzan (2014, p. 5) 
points to connections with international law at least back to the nineteenth century. He 
mentions the German historian Heeren’s discussion of state-systems from 1834 as influential 
on early English School thinking67. 
 
There are, according to English School logics, three distinct spheres in international 
relations operating simultaneously. These are the international system, the international 
society, and the world society. Martin Wight saw this as a debate between three groups of 
thinkers representing three traditions of IR-theory, realists (Hobbes and Machiavelli), 
rationalists (Grotius), and revolutionists (Kant) (Bull, 1977, p. xi; Buzan, 2014, p. 12; Murray, 
2015, pp. 1-2). The three traditions frame, with Buzan’s (2014, p. 19) words, the English 
 
67 The source is Heeren, A.H.L. 1834. A Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies, 
from its Formation at the Close of the Fifteenth Century, to its Re-establishment upon the fall of Napoleon. 
Translated by D.A. Talboys. Oxford. 
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School’s ‘great conversation’, setting out the primary positions that are always in some 
sense in play in discussions about foreign policy and international relations. Rationalists 
believe that human beings are not only sinful and bloodthirsty, but also rational. The 
epistemological significance of rationalism is that reason is itself a source of knowledge, 
superior to, and independent of, sense perceptions (Wight, 1991, p. 13). 
 
This is how Hedley Bull described an international system and an international society 
in his book Anarchical Society: 
 
“A system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states have 
sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to 
cause them to behave – at least in some measures – as parts of a whole”. 
 
(Bull, 1977, p. 9) 
 
“A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious 
of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one 
another, and share in the working of common institutions”. 
 
(Bull, 1977, p. 13) 
 
The international system is about power politics among states, centered on the 
structure and process of international anarchy. Within IR theory, this position is closely 
connected to realism. International systems emerge whenever states start to interact. State 
leaders need not be aware that the states they represent are part of a system. Yet, as 
members of an international society, they must recognize some common ground (Little, 
2000, p. 408). 
 
Bull (1977, p. 8) started with the existence of states understood as independent 
political communities, each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in 
relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface, and a particular segment of the human 
population. The international society, originally European, has expanded to become 
worldwide in scope, reflected through the institution of state sovereignty and UN 
membership, as a society of states. This society is a distinct form not analogous to domestic 
societies. It emphasizes the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules, and 
institutions. How states perceive each other is a major determinant to explain their 
interaction. States exist in a society they shape, but the society also shapes the states. The 
logic of anarchy needs a supplying social element to obtain a meaningful picture of state 
behavior. The vocabulary of the English School includes a dichotomy between first and 
second order societies. First order societies are composed of individual human beings. The 
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society of states is a second order society with durable collectivities as members (Buzan, 
2014, p. 15). 
 
 
6.4 Pluralism, solidarism, and world society 
 
The state-centered version where non-state actors play a secondary role, is a pluralist 
international society. As a minimum it is an institutional arrangement restricted to the 
maintenance of order. Rules are complied with because fidelity to them are relatively cost- 
free, but the collective benefits are enormous. A good example is the elaborate rules 
connected to diplomatic privileges68. Great powers, limited war, and balance of power are 
practices that evolved over many centuries and that helped to sustain order (Dunne, 2021, 
p. 117). John Williams explains pluralism with these words: 
 
“The pluralist position within the English School is typically associated with an 
account of international society that stresses three principal features: the centrality to inter- 
state consensus to international order, the significance of ethical diversity (or pluralism) 
among states, and the fragility of normative progress”. 
(Williams, 2015, p. 105) 
 
The solidarist international society is an extension of the pluralist version. Like 
pluralism, it is defined by shared values and institutions, and held together by binding rules. 
The difference is the content of the values and the character of the rules and institutions. In 
a solidarist international society individuals are entitled to basic rights, but still the 
immediate members of the international society are states rather than individual human 
beings (Bull, 1977, p. 25). 
 
English School scholars debate how ‘social’ the international society is and has the 
potential to become. Some emphasize that the dynamics of power and competition still have 
a central place. Others argue that shared norms and rules progressively weakens and 
delegitimizes the role of power and coercion (Grieco et. al., 2019, p. 86). The first position is 
pluralist, expecting states able only to agree on minimum requirements such as mutual 
respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, and the codes of diplomacy. From this 
perspective, rules and institutions mainly function to prevent war and to handle conflicts 
between states. The second position relies on an assumption of a higher degree of solidarity 
among states, with implications for the conduct of international relations, including that the 
enforcement of common rules may under certain circumstances be a legitimate concern for 
the international society in common. Dunne writes: 
 
 
68 Acceptance that representatives of states are not subject to the laws of their host country is a principle that 
has received widespread compliance for many centuries (Dunne, 2021, p. 117). 
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“In a solidarist order, individuals are entitled to basic human rights such as the right 
not to be indiscriminately killed or harmed. If harm is being undertaken on a large scale, and 
the sovereign state is either the perpetrator of the crime – or is unable to prevent it – then 
solidarists believe that the members of international society have a duty to intervene to 
protect peoples at risk”. 
(Dunne, 2015b, p. 62) 
 
Traditionally, the English School has been inclined to regard developments connected 
to solidarity with caution (Knudsen, 2008, p. 227). Debates about to what extent it is 
possible to observe a development from a pluralist international society to a more solidarist 
one draw on historical insights about earlier developments regionally as well as globally. 
Buzan expresses a positive view, but with reservations: 
 
“In its historical understanding it shows convincingly how what was initially a mainly 
pluralist society of states has become increasingly solidarist in its practices and institutions, 
including even on the tough issues of human rights, albeit still being very far away from any 
sort of solidarist utopia”. 
(Buzan, 2014, p. 132) 
 
Andrew Hurrell (2007, pp. 4-5) supports this view. He points to a dramatic and 
sustained move towards more and more far-reaching international institutions and a similar 
increase in the scope, range, and intrusiveness of international rules and norms. This is hard 
to make sense of within the framework of pluralism, which he considers too pessimistic 
about the constraints of power politics, and too sceptic about the international value 
consensus ever likely to establish. Solidarism, on the other hand, appeals to an international 
community capable of fulfilling a broader range of political and moral purposes. 
 
The third element in the English School triad is world society. This is a broad concept 
that attempts to link together all parts of the human community, including entities whose 
moral concerns traditionally lay outside international society. By focusing on non-state 
actors, different global arrangements, and the whole global population, world society 
transcends the state system. The idea is cosmopolitan. The English School is not generally a 
cosmopolitan perspective, but it includes an element of cosmopolitanism69. Yet, world 
society is the least developed among the three concepts (Buzan, 2014, pp. 12-13; Dunne, 
2021, p. 122; Murray, 2015, p. 2). Buzan (2014, pp. 14-15) describes the relationship 
between the three perspectives as a fluid framework of elements in continuous coexistence 
and interplay. In the real world their strength in relation to each other will vary with time 




69 In my R2P article 1 (2016, p. 126) I underline this point with reference to the English School as a normative 
perspective, but not a cosmopolitan one. 
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as one indicator of an evolving world society, with the UN Charter representing a particularly 
important stage in this evolution. 
 
 
6.5 International order and justice 
 
The concept international order is of great importance to the English School 
generally, and it was a main concern for Hedley Bull. In The Anarchical Society he discusses 
order from a variety of angles. This is how he defined the term: “By international order I 
mean a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary of the society of states, or 
international society” (Bull, 1977, p. 8). Certain contingent facts can make for order even 
without any conception among states of common interests. For example, a balance of power 
may arise in an international system without any consciously design, with the absence of any 
belief that it serves common interests, and without any attempt to regulate or 
institutionalize it. It still may help to limit violence (1977, pp. 62-63). However, this is not the 
order Bull talked about. He wrote: 
 
“Within international society, as in other societies, order is the consequence not 
merely of contingent facts like this, but of a sense of common interests in the elementary 
goals of social life; rules describing behavior that sustains these goals; and institutions that 
makes these rules effective”. 
(Bull, 1977, p. 63) 
 
Drawing on a range of scholars70, Andrew Hurrell (2007, p. 2) differs between social 
order as fact and order as value, although these categories are often hard to disentangle. 
Order as fact can be understood as regular patterns of human behavior, in contrast to chaos, 
instability and lack of predictability. Order as value requires in addition a particular kind of 
pattern infused with meaning by human beings. This involves a particular set of goals, 
objectives, and values, generating outcomes. 
 
For rules to play a role in social life, they must be effective. They must be obeyed, at 
least to some degree. Bull (1977, p. 54) presents a list of functions connected to the 
effectiveness of rules, but all of them need not be essential in each specific case. First, rules 
need to be ‘made’. Someone must formulate them. Then there is a need to ‘communicate’ 
the content to those to whom the rules apply. Rules may need to be ‘administered’, which 
implies certain acts to be carried out. Questions may arise around the meaning of specific 
rules. This calls for ‘interpretation’. To be effective, rules must be possible to ‘enforce’, for 
instance by one or another sort of sanctions on non-compliance. Rules also need acceptance 
as ‘legitimate’ by members of the society to whom they apply. Changing circumstances may 
 
 
70 Among them are Hedley Bull and Jon Elster. 
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demand rules to be ‘adaptive’, sometimes to the extent of being replaced by new ones, but 
they must also be ‘protected’ against developments likely to undermine them. 
 
Bull argued that all societies have arrangements for protecting three primary goals. 
These are placing constraints on violence, upholding property rights, and ensuring that 
actors keep agreements. The international society includes states with radically different 
cultures, religions, and philosophies of government, but it is a shared interest to protect 
these goals because political communities generally wish to constrain the use of force and 
bring civility to their external relations. However, conventions and institutions that preserve 
order between states will be stronger among those who share the same general way of life 
(Linklater, 2009, pp. 91-93). The western invention of the nation-state has, despite 
multiculturalism, proved remarkably attractive around the world (Brown, 2019, p. 48). 
Territorial political units seem to be unavoidable because they meet a genuine need. States 
cannot escape anarchy, but an international system’s regulatory rules and institutions 
usually develop to the point where the members become conscious of common values. This 
transforms the system to an international society, allowing states to manage anarchy more 
effectively. International institutions become more than places where states compete for 
influence and power, but this does not imply that more radical developments are achievable. 
English School scholars try to understand the most important obstacles to improvement. 
They see great powers as posing the most serious threats. Great powers may rewrite rules to 
suit their own interests, but they can also be responsible actors that do not always prioritize 
self-interests (Grieco et.al, 2019, p. 85; Linklater, 2009, pp. 89-90). 
 
The relationship between order and justice has occupied several English School 
scholars. Bull offers a comprehensive discussion in The Anarchical Society: 
 
“Order is not merely an actual or possible condition or state of affairs in world 
politics, it is also very generally regarded as a value. But it is not the only value in relation to 
which international conduct can be shaped, nor is it necessarily an overriding one”. 
 
(Bull, 1977, p. 74) 
 
Justice is the human value most often contrasted with order. Ideas about justice are 
moral ideas, treating human actions as rights in themselves, not merely as means to achieve 
ends. Considerations of justice must therefore separate from those of law, interest, 
prudence, or necessity (1977, p. 75). Ideas of international justice allow states to claim 
certain rights, but also put some duties on them. These rights and duties are not merely legal 
in character, but also moral. For example, states can refer to equality and fairness of 
treatment and therefore claim a moral right to sovereignty applied equally to themselves 
and to other states (1977, p. 79). 
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For Bull, the only way to realize more international justice was through the 
mechanisms of sovereign states and the international organizations they dominate. He 
recognized the existence of a category called world justice or cosmopolitan justice, but he 
was deeply skeptical, seeing a world society with a common good not to exist except as an 
idea or a myth. Bull admitted that in the real world there were no lack of self-appointed 
spokesmen of the common good. Yet, private individuals have no authority to speak for 
anyone else than themselves. Their views provide an even less authoritative guide to the 
common good than what leaders of sovereign states do, who at least can claim that they 
speak for a part of mankind larger than themselves. Agreements reached among states are 
notoriously the product of bargaining and compromise rather than considerations of which 
interests the whole of mankind may have (1977, pp. 80-82). 
 
The pluralist position within the English School is to prioritize order when order and 
justice is not possible to unite. As explained by Bull (1977, p. 83), justice, in any of its forms, 
is only possible to realize in the context of order. Yet, the international society’s influence is 
limited. The UN and its specialized agencies are formally committed to much more than the 
preservation of minimum order. It also espouses ideas of justice, international justice as well 
as justice for individual human beings. However, the UN Charter prioritizes the preservation 
of international peace and security. The current international order is rather inhospitable to 
the realization of ideas connected to world justice. 
 
Bull (1977, p. 85) writes: “When questions of human justice achieve a prominent 
place on the agenda of world political discussion, it is because it is the policy of particular 
states to raise them”. However, human rights abuses will often not activate international 
reactions, because it is not the policy of any state or group of states to get involved. One 
cannot expect the international order to provide general protection, only selective, but Bull 
does not argue for the preference of order to justice in any given case. He concludes: “The 
question about order versus justice will always be considered by the parties concerned in 
relation to the merits of a particular case (1977, p. 93). 
 
Recent English School scholars who position themselves as solidarists are not 
comfortable with this prioritization. They tend to see basic human rights as a floor beneath 
states, not a ceiling above them. This is the position of scholars like Tim Dunne, Nicholas 
Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy. The foundation for this position honors R. J. Vincent and his 
book Human Rights in International Relations71 from 1986 (Gallagher, 2015, p. 51). The next 







71 Vincent, R. J. 1986. Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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6.6 The legacy of R. J. Vincent 
 
Raymond John Vincent (1943-1990), probably better known as R. J. Vincent, is among 
the most important scholars within the English School, despite that he only reached 47 years 
of age. His work, much inspired by Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, concentrated particularly 
on two issues, human rights in world politics, and intervention. He paid attention to the 
consistence of human rights, the possibility to measure eventual progress, and the 
difficulties connected to the promotion of human rights in international diplomacy (Griffiths 
et. al., 2009, p. 231). Through Vincent’s academic career, it is possible to see a development 
from a strict support for a pluralist interpretation of international society, to a more 
solidarist one in his later works. 
 
In his book Nonintervention and International order, published in the context of the 
Cold War in 1974, Vincent segregated ‘intervention’ from ‘interference’. While interference 
is a normal activity in international relations, intervention is the use of coercive means to 
alter the behavior, or perhaps even change the government, of a target state. The rule of 
non-intervention prohibits this. Vincent admitted that rules for legitimate intervention has 
normative appeal. Yet, in the early phases of his academic career, he endorsed a rigorous 
adherence to non-intervention (2009, pp. 235-237). 
 
However, he discussed possible exceptions to the principle of non-intervention in his 
1974 book, based on an alternative doctrine of internationally sanctioned minimum 
standards of human conduct, where states failing to meet these standards has no recourse 
to the principle. Much of his skepticism had its roots in the lack of guarantee for the 
impartiality of intervening states. They might very well intervene for some interest of their 
own, making the target state the object of its will, rather than the arena for the realization of 
some moral good. About the consequences of accepting the alternative, he wrote: 
 
“If a right of humanitarian intervention is to be allowed despite the partiality of the 
intervening state, and notwithstanding its mixture of motives, the less worthy consequences 
of that doctrine have to be tolerated along with any good effect that it might achieve”. 
 
(Vincent, 1974, p. 348) 
 
Vincent was not happy with this conclusion. He devoted much effort in his later 
academic career to explore possible changes in the conditions underpinning his arguments. 
The result was another important contribution to the development of English School 
thinking. Like Hedley Bull, he argued that international justice was not achievable without 
order. Neither did he see international law as an agent for transforming the society of states. 
Yet, in his later works, he saw the survival of the existing international society being 
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dependent on progress. Otherwise, it would degenerate to great power dominance (Griffiths 
et. al., 2009, pp. 237-239). 
 
 
6.7 IR as a human world 
 
The English School is a theoretical approach to IR where human beings are visible. 
Buzan (2014, p. 18) refers to Manning72 as the classical exponent for understanding 
international society as a set of ideas to be found in the minds and language of those who 
talk and act on behalf of states, states-people like politicians, diplomats etc. Ideas 
incorporate into the official thinking of states about their mutual intercourse, but states are 
not thinking entities. Those who think are human beings. Therefore, to understand world 
politics, analysts need to understand the thoughts that underlie the actions of states-people. 
This implies to analyze a variety of factors, like interests, intentions, wishes, hopes and fear. 
States do not have any existence apart from the human beings, the citizens, and the 
governments, that compose them and act on their behalf. As explained by Jackson and 
Sørensen (2003, p. 141), the English School views international relations as a special branch 
of human relations that occur in historical time, involving rules, norms, and values. Their 
scholars study this historical human world. Jackson and Sørensen also refer to a concept 
developed by Bull, the exercise of judgement. About what Bull meant with this, they write: 
 
“IR scholars fully understand that foreign policy sometimes presents difficult moral 
choices to the states-people involved – i.e. choices about conflicting political values and 
goals. IR scholars should be able to evaluate those choices in terms of the situation in which 
they are made and the values at stake. A difficult foreign-policy choice in this regard would 
be the decision to go to war or the decision to engage in humanitarian intervention”. 
 
(Jackson and Sørensen, 2003, p. 140) 
 
The institution of diplomacy plays a vital role to promote understanding and discover 
common ground to prevent misunderstanding of aspirations and intentions. Bull (1977, pp. 
163-164) presents a list of functions diplomacy has fulfilled in relation to international order. 
Diplomacy facilitates communication between political leaders of states and other entities 
on the international arena. Diplomats are messengers with international recognized 
immunity. They negotiate agreements, particularly by determining areas of overlapping 
interests. States base their foreign politics on information gathered by diplomats. Within 
international affairs, friction is a constant source of tensions, included between states with 
close relations to each other. An important function for diplomacy is therefore to minimize 
the effects of such friction. The role of diplomats as symbols shall neither be 
 
 
72 Manning, C. A. W. 1962. The Nature of International Society. London: Macmillan 
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underestimated. They symbolize the society of states as visible expressions of the existence 
of rules, to which states, and other international actors, pay at least some allegiance. Hurrell 
(2007, p. 37) mentions many of the same points. He highlights the importance of diplomacy 
in providing for an institutional framework to allow for political negotiation to take place in 
strained and often very difficult circumstances. 
 
Modern international society exists both at the ideational and the concrete level. It 
exists as an idea inside the minds of state leaders, diplomats, representatives of different 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, scholars, journalists, and ordinary 
citizens. More concrete is the existence in shared rules, codes of conduct, and institutions, 
physically expressed through documents of international law, embassies etc. The 
imperatives of reason, morality and law require the maintenance of orderly and meaningful 
coexistence, but not a world government or a universal society of humankind (Knudsen, 
2008, pp. 225-225). 
 
To focus on states-people acting on behalf of states implies to consider a substantial 
number of variables. Methodologically, the English School offers a holistic approach. Bull 
opposed the positivist methods that in the 1950s and 60s dominated American theoretical 
approaches to IR, insisting that material causality was appropriate only to the study of 
systems. Societies could only be understood through the consciousness and moral character 
of the actors within them (Buzan, 2014, p. 22). 
 
 
6.8 The English School and other IR theories 
 
The other theoretical approaches it is most common to compare the English School 
with are realism, liberalism, and constructivism. It has become part of conventional wisdom 
that the English School sees itself as providing a via media between the two more polarized 
positions of realism and liberalism (Little, 2000, p. 396). The English School accepts the 
realist view that states operate within anarchy, form balances of power, and quite 
frequently resort to war. However, states are more social than what realists admit. They 
have also organized themselves into a society where they have developed norms, rules, and 
institutions, to manage the state system and soften the consequences of its anarchical 
character. Yet, one cannot expect to find the same extent of cooperation internationally as 
inside stable national societies. Since violence among states probably is ineradicable, the 
English School is at odds with utopian idealists and cosmopolitans who believe in the 
possibility to establish perpetual peace. Progress in international relations is possible to a 
limited extent, but it will not take place through radical reforms. Such projects are from the 
English School approach either impossible, undesirable, or both. Therefore, there are more 
to world politics than what realists suggest, but there will always be less than the desires 
expressed by many liberalists. States pursue their national interests on the international 
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arena, but not at all costs. If they do, the international society will be in danger. Yet, 
although states are self-interested, they share an interest in a predictable and rule-based 
environment. Therefore, they have incentives to build relations with each other to establish 
mutual expectations about the terms of their interactions (Brown, 2019, p. 47; Buzan, 2014, 
p. 30; Grieco et. al, 2019, p. 85; Linklater, 2009, pp. 87-88). 
 
Some scholars have pointed to interesting similarities between the English School 
and Morgenthau’s classical realism, but at the same time finding few similarities with the 
mechanistic world view that dominates the more recent neorealist approaches73. The 
English School highlights the interplay between the three traditions international system, 
international society, and world society. It also offers an account of IR which combines 
theory with history, morality with power, and agency with structure. As a fundamentally 
normative enterprise, the school is the principal alternative to mainstream North American 
theorizations of IR (Dunne, 2021, pp. 108-112). However, the relationship between the 
English School and the traditions of realism and liberalism is not only a via media position. By 
introducing the international society of states, the English School also creates a keystone to 
an independent set of concepts, as described in this chapter. Further, because international 
societies may come in a variety of forms, the school can offer various visions of the future 
(Buzan, 2014, pp. 25-29). 
 
The relationship between the English School and liberalism may be illustrated 
through different views on primary and secondary institutions. The primary institutions are 
durable routinized practices such as state sovereignty, international law, and diplomacy. 
Secondary institutions are international organizations. While primary institutions give birth 
to and make secondary institutions possible, once established secondary institutions may 
shape and modify primary ones (Costa Buranelli, 2015, p. 12). Liberalists focus mainly on the 
secondary institutions as instruments of reforms. The English School’s main occupation is 
with the primary ones, which they see as difficult to manipulate. Secondary institutions are 
for English School scholars reflective and supportive of primary ones, but they are 
constrained by the framing of these institutions. The English School’s historical perspective 
on the fundamental practices underlying specific institutions also differ from liberal regime 
theory who mostly deal with contemporary events (Buzan, 2014, pp. 30-31). The school does 
not postulate any mechanical relationship between the past and the present. Yet, by 
studying how international societies have evolved gives us a tool to understand their 
embedded potentials, possibilities as well as obstacles. In contrast, realists tend to see 
history as repetitions, while liberalists often limit their search for change and progress to 





73 Richard Little is among them. Buzan refers to his 2003 article ‘The English School vs. American Realism: A 
Meeting of Minds or Divided by Common Language?’, pp. 443-460 in Review of International Studies 29(3). 
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In an ‘anarchical society’ states act within a system of norms that they regularly 
regard as constraining. Yet, states themselves create these norms (Brown, 2019, p. 57). This 
is related to the constructivist view of agents and structures as mutually constituting each 
other in a dynamic process. Constructivists and English School scholars both engage 
themselves with how to understand the social basis of international relations. However, 
constructivism emerged from epistemological and methodical debates and does not have 
the roots connected to history as characterizes English School research. Constructivists are 
normally more positive to the possibilities for social change than pluralist English School 
scholars, but the two approaches have come closer to each other on this question through 
the solidarist branch of the English School. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion 
 
This chapter discusses the following main research question: 
 
How is it possible to understand the imagination of sovereignty as responsibility, by 
unveiling its historical roots, and through current debates? 
 
To answer this, the discussion focuses on the following specific questions: 
 
1. What is sovereignty as responsibility? 
2. Which historical roots can this imagination draw on? 
3. How is sovereignty as responsibility criticized within current debates? 
4. What are my responses to a selection of critical voices? 
 
The discussion in section 7.2 tries to answer the first specific question. Historical roots are 
traced in section 7.3. Then follows the critical voices and my comments in section 7.4. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Chapter 7 contains the following sections and sub-sections: 
 
7.1 Introduction 
7.2 Sovereignty as responsibility 
7.3 Historical roots of sovereignty as responsibility 






7.3.7 Other voices before the 20th Century 
7.3.8 The early 20th Century 
7.3.9 After WW2 
7.3.10 Conclusion so far 
7.4 Critical voices and my comments 
7.4.1 Over-view 
7.4.2 Main argument a) 
7.4.3 Main argument b) 
7.4.4 Main argument c) 
7.4.5 Main argument d) 
7.4.5 My comments to the arguments presented 




My R2P articles all understand responsibility as an aspect of state sovereignty. To 
some extent, the articles explain what this means, but the connection between 
responsibility and state sovereignty is not the focus for any of them. The articles treat this 
connection more as a basic assumption, or a platform for developing arguments related to 
their research questions. This chapter is an attempt to discuss the meaning of this 
assumption more detailed, to clarify the concepts involved, to trace the historical roots of 
thinking, to discover the main supportive arguments, but also to find and to comment critical 
voices. I use the English School approach to international relations, generally described in 
chapter 6, as my analytical tool. In chapter 6, section 6.1, I explain why I find this approach 
particularly relevant. 
 
The basic modern source for the connection between state sovereignty and 
responsibility is the ICISS-report. Other important sources are several UN resolutions and 
various statements from all UN secretary-generals in this millennium. ICISS suggested an 
understanding of state sovereignty where state leaders who claim sovereign authority must 
demonstrate responsibility if the claim shall be a legitimate one, not just in relation to their 
subjects, but also to the outside world. The following citation from the report explains this 
more precise: 
 
“Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly 
recognized in state practice, has a threefold significance. First, it implies that state 
authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and 
promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political authorities are 
responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. 
Thirdly it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they 
are accountable for their acts of commission and omission”. 




7.2 Sovereignty as responsibility 
 
The above cited text points to a domestic responsibility that state authorities have, to 
protect their citizens. However, it also points to an extended responsibility, to the 
international community through the UN, and the international community can make state 
agents accountable. R2P is based on these responsibilities, the national which is primary, but 
which becomes international if the national one fails. 
 
The national responsibility connected to state sovereignty is not principally 
controversial, although there are states, members of the UN, where governments do not live 
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up to the expected standards. The traditional understanding of the principle of non- 
intervention, anchored in the UN Charter, does not say that governments can do what they 
wish to the population residing on their territories. What it does say is that what happens 
inside state borders is domestic affairs, and the responsible authorities are the national 
ones. In this understanding, these affairs do not concern the international community. The 
traditional understanding is therefore possible to unify with a pure national responsibility, 
but in principle not with an international one since governments, from this perspective, are 
not accountable to any outside power. In its most extreme version, even mass atrocities 
become domestic affairs, dedicated to internal treatment without external interference. This 
understanding is in some of the literature called Westphalian, with reference to the 1648 
Peace-treaty. Yet, as pointed to by Luke Glanville (2011, p. 243), it is possible to argue that 
the reference to Westphalia is mistaken. An alternative is to see the traditional 
understanding primarily as a child born by the creation of the United Nations. Sovereignty as 
self-governance and freedom from outside interference firmly establishes in international 
law in 1945. The traditional understanding was popular among scholars as well as politicians 
through the Cold War. Interventions for humanitarian purposes were seldom on the 
international agenda in this period when numerous former colonies gained independence 
and became UN members. 
 
Within academia, the dominance of the traditional understanding was particularly 
strong during the 1950s and 60s, coinciding with the golden years of realism in the academic 
discipline of international relations (IR). The traditional position is closest, although not 
exclusively, connected to scholars who define themselves as realists. These scholars see the 
sovereign state as the only important international actor, and they tend to downplay the 
role of international organizations to become battlegrounds for struggle between states 
much more than arenas for cooperation. 
 
The pluralist and the solidarist positions within the English School also take the states 
for being the most important international actors. However, the view that domestic affairs 
do not concern the world beyond state borders, is possible to upheld only if we consider the 
international realm as nothing more than a system. States in a system have contacts 
between themselves. They do interact, but it is power politics that dominates according to 
the logic of international anarchy. From the English School perspective, this alone is an 
unsatisfactory description of the real world. What is missing is the social element that 
visualizes when states recognize some common ground (Little, 2008, p. 408). As Bull (1977, 
p. 9) explains, states form a society by developing consciousness of certain common 
interests and values, and that they conceive themselves to be bound by rules generated 
from this. However, what English School scholars call a pluralist international society needs 
not be more than an institutional arrangement restricted to the maintenance of order. If this 
is the case, a responsibility towards the international community in line with ICISS’ 
suggestions, will have a rather weak foundation, especially if it includes the possibility to 
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held state leaders accountable. As pointed to by Williams (2015, p. 105), from an English 
School pluralist position normative progress is fragile. Yet, from the solidarist position, the 
picture looks different. According to Dunne (2015b, p. 62), for solidarists it may under 
certain circumstances be legitimate for the international society to enforce common rules. 
Solidarists even see the protection of peoples at risk as a duty for members of the society of 
states. Therefore, English School scholars who take this position will probably have few 
problems embracing the recommendations from ICISS. 
 
 
The fundament for the UN is the principle that all states are equally sovereign under 
international law74. The UN Charter, Chapter 1, article 2.4, explains what this means for each 
member state: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”. The 
purpose with article 2.4 is to protect national freedom and different identities, an 
affirmation of states’ right to shape and to determine their own destiny. ICISS too recognized 
state sovereignty as the best line of defense for many states in a world where power and 
resources are unequally distributed. However, the UN Charter as a whole, does not express 
any unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its people. At least in our era, 
sovereigns as lawmakers and law enforcers do not stand above the scrutiny of morality. 
Former UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis M. Deng (2010a, p. 356), 
explains why: “The Nuremberg trials and the mounting humanitarian and human rights 
movement following the end of the Second World War represented a watershed: the 
sovereign power of a state was never again to enjoy such unfettered authority”. Neither did 
ICISS, during their worldwide consultations before the launch of the report, hear any of 
those consulted express such a claim. None of them denied responsibility to respect the 
dignity and the basic rights of not just citizens, but of all people within their borders75. 
 
State authorities still holding that the responsibility to deal with mass atrocities 
belongs solely to domestic affairs and cannot be transferred to the international level, may 
lean themselves on the UN Charter Chapter 1, article 2.7, saying: “Nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state”. Since the UN Charter does not 
explicitly clarify which matters are, and which are not, inside domestic spheres, to interpret 
the text widely in favor of the national responsibility is possible. To what extent it is a 
reasonable interpretation is another question. Article 2.7 also states that its content shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under the UN Charter Chapter VII. In 
accordance with article 42 of the chapter, the UN Security Council can mandate military 
 
74 The UN Charter, Chapter 1, article 2.1. 
75 ICISS describes the consultations on page 83 in the report. For hearing the broadest possible range of views, 
they held 11 regional roundtables and national consultations around the world during the mandate period 
from July 2000 to July 2001. Participants were a variety of national and regional officials, representatives from 
civil societies, NGOs, academic institutions, and think tanks. 
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operations against a member state, but the prerequisite is that Council members see this as 
necessary to maintain or to restore international peace and security. It is not obvious that all 
situations where mass atrocities are involved qualify for being a threat in this respect. An 
isolated reading of the text in article 2.7 can be that mass atrocities only call for international 
response if the situation represents a threat of causing severe harm beyond the borders of 
the state in question. The alternative will be to define that mass atrocities always represent 
a threat to international peace and security because of the potential to cause harm. This 
seems for me as a definition matching the following statement by Francis M. Deng (2010b, p. 
83), given in an interview conducted by Aidan Hehir for the Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding: “I don’t see sovereignty as a negative concept enabling you to barricade 
yourself against the world”. I refer to this statement in three of my R2P articles (article 1, p. 
133; article 2, p. 54; article 5, p. 10). 
 
This discussion goes, as I see it, right into debates within the English School about 
how normatively developed the international society is. Pluralists see severe limitations. 
They regard developments connected to solidarity with caution (Knudsen, 2008, p. 227). On 
the other hand, solidarists tend to mean that the content of values, and the character of 
rules and institutions, have already developed beyond the view of pluralism, although not so 
far as the notion of a world society indicates. In a solidarist international society, individuals 
are entitled to basic human rights (Dunne, 2021, p. 118). As described in chapter 6, section 
6.4, English School scholar R. J. Vincent strived with the position of human rights within 
world politics throughout his whole academic career. He started with a strict support for the 
pluralist position, including a rigorous adherence to non-intervention. His later works are 
more sympathetic to solidarism, although he remained sceptic to the motives among states 
for intervening under a humanitarian ‘umbrella’ (Griffiths et. al., 2009, pp. 231-237). 
 
The ICISS-report (2001, foreword, p. xi) presents a summary of R2P’s core principles 
in a synopsis. There are two basic principles. The first one confirms that state sovereignty 
implies responsibility. Obligations to protect the population against mass atrocities are an 
integral part of the sovereignty concept. The second one says that the principle of non- 
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect where a population suffers 
serious harm. R2P further embraces three specific responsibilities, to prevent, to react and 
to rebuild, with prevention as the single most important dimension. Prevention options 
always are the preferred choice. I explain why this is so in all my R2P articles, but most 
detailed in article 2 where a separate section is dedicated to prevention (article 1, p. 131; 
article 2, pp. 50-51; article 3, p. 45; article 4, p. 79; article 5, pp. 7-8). The responsibility to 
react means to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures. 
This may include different coercive measures, with military intervention reserved for the 
extreme cases. The responsibility to rebuild is particularly relevant after a military 
intervention. By addressing the causes of the harm, it means the providing of assistance with 
recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation. 
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The imagination is that responsibility and legitimate sovereignty is inseparable. To 
talk about illegitimate sovereignty is meaningless because no such variant of sovereignty 
exists. It is either sovereignty with responsibilities, or no sovereignty at all. State leaders 
must demonstrate that they take their protection responsibilities seriously, domestically for 
acceptance by the population, and internationally to gain recognition as sovereign entities 
by other sovereigns, as legitimate members of the international community understood as 
the community of UN member states. The ICISS-report ascertains that UN membership is the 
final symbol of sovereign statehood and thus the seal of acceptance into the community of 
states. Full UN membership is only for sovereign states, with the rights and duties this 
membership releases. To sign an international treaty like the UN Charter is a sovereign act. It 
means to adhere voluntarily to the requirements of the treaty, and UN membership comes 
with requirements: 
 
“The Charter of the UN is in itself an example of an international obligation 
voluntarily accepted by member states. On the one hand, in granting membership of the UN, 
the international community welcomes the signatory state as a responsible member of the 
community of nations76. On the other hand, the state itself, in signing the Charter, accepts 
the responsibilities of membership flowing from that signature”. 
(ICISS, 2001, p. 13). 
 
The ICISS-report understood the international realm as a community. This community 
is a society of states in accordance with English School thinking, and as such it contains more 
obligations for member states than the minimum required from a pluralist position, but 
perhaps less than what would be desirable according to solidarism. Bull considered 
constraints of violence, upholding of property rights, and assuring that states keep 
agreements, as the ultimate foundation of international society. These goals are possible to 
achieve even within an international society composed of states that differ radically on 
indicators like government, culture, and religion (Linklater, 2009, pp. 91-93). As an 
international organization encompassing almost all states in the world, this is exactly what 
characterizes the UN. 
 
A substantial part of the ICISS-report discusses R2P’s international dimension. ICISS 
(2001, p. 1) acknowledges that so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’ has been 
controversial, when they have happened, and when they have failed to happen. Parts of the 
controversy derives from the potential of activities this term may cover. However, because 
reaction by military means is the most controversial alternative, the report argues that the 
language used in traditional sovereignty-intervention debates needs a new focus. R2P puts 
the needs of the potential beneficiaries of the action in the center of the debate, not the 
rights and prerogatives of the intervening actors (2001, pp. 16-17). The foundation for this 
 
76 The UN often uses the term ‘nation’ as substitute for ‘state’, mirrored also in the name of the organization. 
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argument is the new standards of conduct for states in the protection and advancement of 
international human rights gradually achieved after World War 2, creating a parallel 
transition from a culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international 
accountability (2001, p. 14.). Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng also see this as 
fundamental for the notion of sovereignty as responsibility. They write: 
 
“In response to the magnitude of the Holocaust and the atrocities of the Second 
World War, the United Nations developed international human rights standards to spell out 
the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights inherent to all individuals and with 
which every state was expected to comply. The standards marked an evolution in thinking 
from a strictly state-centered system in which sovereignty was absolute to one in which the 
behavior of states towards their own citizens became a matter of international concern and 
scrutiny”. 
(Cohen and Deng, 2016, pp. 2-3). 
 
I suppose the grip suggested by ICISS to change focus through use of language, will 
please scholars within the English School who adhere to a solidarist or a world society 
position. However, I doubt that an alternative language will change much for adherents of 
pluralism. We do of course not know how Bull and others from the first generation of English 
School scholars would have viewed this question if they had lived today. Bull wrote all his 
publications during the Cold War. Yet, his skeptical attitude towards interventions is not 
possible to understand mainly from a rhetorical point of view. It goes deeper because it 
concerns the sustainment of the whole international order, where the principle of non- 
intervention is a keystone. Bull was hesitant to enforce rights claims. He believed doing so 
could undermine the order (Dunne, 2021, p. 118). Vincent (1974, p. 348) recognized the 
normative appeal of rules for legitimate interventions, but even in his later works he was 
only willing to accept it under the condition of tolerance for the less worthy results it might 
produce in addition to possible good effects, without any guarantee the latter would 
materialize. On the other hand, Hurrell (2007, pp. 2007) points to solidarism as appealing to 
an international community which fulfils a broader range of political and moral purposes. He 
means to observe this in the real world, as a move which has developed more far-reaching 
international institutions and a substantial increase in scope, range and intrusiveness of 
international norms and rules. Yet, for pluralists it is problematic to allow this development 
to enter their framework. 
 
A reminder is here on its place. The R2P version adopted by the World Summit in 
2005 is more limited compared to the version launched by ICISS in 2001. The adopted 
version is very clear that implementation of R2P objectives is to take place within the 
framework of existing international law. I most clearly emphasize this in my last two R2P 
articles with references to Marc Schack and Alex Bellamy (article 4, p. 79; article 5, p. 3). To 
challenge international law was not an option for a consensus-based decision among the UN 
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member states. The preparedness to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner, 
is in the adopted version anchored solely in the UN Security Council. In cases where the 
members of the Council cannot agree, no collective action will manifest. ICISS was aware of 
this challenge. The report includes a discussion about what to do when the Security Council 
fails to act (ICISS, 2001, pp. 53-55). The Commission were clear that the Security Council 
should be the first port of call on any matter relating to military intervention for human 
protection purposes, but the commission-members kept an open mind to whether it should 
be the last. Among their suggested alternatives were the General Assembly’s ‘Uniting for 
Peace’ procedures developed in 1950. I cite from the report: 
 
“Although the General Assembly lacks the power to direct that action be taken, a 
decision by the General Assembly in favor of action, if supported by an overwhelming 
majority of member states, would provide a high degree of legitimacy for an intervention 
which subsequently took place, and encourage the Security Council to rethink its position”. 
 
(ICISS, 2001, p. 53, article 6.30). 
 
However, this one, as well as other suggestions in the report like collective 
interventions pursued by regional or sub-regional organizations without a Security Council 
mandate, did not find the way to the adopted version. The broad consensus became 
possible when these suggestions were abandoned. Neither does the adopted version offer 
any clear understanding of ‘state sovereignty’ as the foundation for R2P. §138 and 139 do 
not mention the word ‘sovereignty’ at all. The paragraphs talk about national 
responsibilities, but do not explicitly say that these responsibilities are aspects of the 
respective government’s sovereign power. One may of course interpret that this is the 
meaning of the text, but the reason for not making it too precise is probably once again that 
doing so could have threatened the consensus. General texts often simply reflect the limits 
of possible agreement, with implications in the move from policy formulation to 
implementation. I discuss this in detail in my articles 3 and 4, highlighted by insights from the 
classical study of implementation by Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky. 
 
The text in §139 talks about an international responsibility which activates when 
states do not fulfil their national obligations. Although the paragraphs do not repeat ICISS’ 
formulations, timely and decisive action from the Security Council against the will of a 
government is hardly possible to unite with a strict traditional understanding of the non- 
intervention principle. On the other hand, it suits very well together with ICISS’ second basic 
principle described above, saying that non-intervention yields to the international 
responsibility to protect where a population suffers serious harm. The international 
community has through §139 accepted that when states manifestly fail to provide 
protection, the responsibility to protect, for the same population, transfers to the UN 
Security Council. This is a confirmation by the international community that mass atrocities 
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are not a domestic concern solely. Yet, this transfer of responsibility comes with a 
reservation. To be prepared to act is not the same as being obliged. An explicit obligation 
would have challenged existing international law, and therefore not possible to agree about. 
Still, after the adoption of R2P, the Security Council has the prerogative to choose to stay 
inactive when the members do not find the common ground needed for timely action. The 
adoption of R2P in 2005 did not solve this dilemma. In the aftermath of Libya 2011, civilians 
in several conflict torn areas suffer from the consequences. Viewed from the perspective of 
the English School approach to international relations, this fragility becomes more difficult to 
explain the more solidarism one predicts as existing in the international realm. From a world 
society position it seems mostly to remind us that the real world is far from the 
cosmopolitan ideal. Yet, as Buzan writes (2014, pp. 14-15), the relationship between the 
perspectives of international system, international society, and world society, is best 
understood as a fluid framework of elements in continuous interplay and coexistence. Their 
strengths in relation to each other will in the real world vary with time and place. 
 
There is nothing in the relevant documents indicating that a transfer of responsibility 
from a state to the international level implies a corresponding transfer of sovereignty itself. 
The ICISS-report (2001, pp. 7-8) discusses what sovereignty as responsibility means, but does 
not suggest any such transfer. The authors say the opposite. Their suggestions do not imply 
any transfer of sovereignty (2001, p. 13)77. The 2005 Outcome Document does not address 
this question. Yet, if the responsibility component is an inseparable part of legitimate 
sovereignty, a transfer of this component to another actor is easiest to understand as a 
move within a sort of vacuum where sovereignty for the state in question is suspended 
temporarily, practically, but probably not formally. To imagine the new actor as a new 
formal sovereign raises severe principal problems for the relationship between a sovereign 
and the subjects. It also challenges the current international order as an order of sovereign 
states, based on an assumption of sovereignty located to domestic spheres. States may, as 
voluntary sovereign acts, transfer sovereign authority on specific issue areas to international 
organizations. EU’s member-states have done that to a substantial degree. However, forced 
transfer belongs to another and much more problematic category. 
 
 
7.3 The historical roots of sovereignty as responsibility 
 
The English School approach to international relations takes history seriously. The 
current international society is only possible to understand through knowledge about how it 






77 I return to this question in section 7.4.6. 
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characteristics and become global in scope78. This includes to understand the most 
important concepts involved, and relations between these concepts, for instance how state 
sovereignty is connected to responsibility. In this section I will take a closer look at how 
sovereignty as responsibility has been understood historically. A substantial part of the 
discussion will focus on a selection of prominent philosophers who have occupied 
themselves with this topic. 
 
 
7.3.1 Some general considerations 
 
My R2P articles mention the deep historical roots of the idea that sovereignty comes 
with responsibilities, but do not elaborate further on it. I choose to trace these roots in the 
cover-article because my arguments in the published articles all rests on this foundation. 
Sovereignty as responsibility is not a new idea formed in our era. According to Luke Glanville 
(2011, pp. 233-234), sovereign authority has involved varied and evolving responsibilities 
since its first articulation in the 16th and 17th centuries, as opposed to a simplified story 
where sovereignty was established with ahistorical rights of sovereigns. Sovereign 
responsibilities are not a late arriving morally abstract challenge. 
 
The discussion will show that the connection between sovereignty and responsibility 
is as old as sovereignty itself. The concept of state sovereignty closely parallels the rise of 
territorial states in Europe. Therefore, I find it most relevant to begin my discussion in late 
renaissance, although political philosophers have dealt with questions about how rulers can 
legitimate their positions, and which obligations they have towards their subjects, at least 
since antique Greece. The concept of ‘natural law’, on which many renaissance thinkers 
based their arguments, has tracks back to Aristoteles in the third century before Christ. 
Natural law is an imagination of a system of rights and duties derived from nature, and 
therefore universally valid independent of society and manmade (positive) law. Human 
beings have the capacity to discover and to understand the content of natural law through 
reason. The Romans used the Greek conception of natural law as an instrument for legal 
development, referred to by the Roman politician, lawyer, and author Markus T. Cicero (106 
b. Chr. – 43 b. Chr.). The Laws of ancient Rome, in the Middle Ages further developed by the 
Catholic philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), has inspired lawmaking in most of the 
western civilization. Originally, the law of the state applied only to its citizens. Foreigners had 
rights only if protected by some treaty between Rome and their state, but such treaties 




78 The English School literature on comparative international societies in a world historical context is relatively 
small. It consists mainly of two classical works, Martin Wights Systems of States from 1977, and Adam Watsons 
The Evolution of International Society from 1992 (Buzan, 2014, p. 47). 
79 Encyclopedia Britannica Online: www.britannica.com/ topic/Roman Law 
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Among the philosophers most often referred in the literature about sovereignty, I 
have chosen to give particular attention to Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and Immanuel 
Kant. This is not a random selection. As described in my theory chapter, according to English 
School logic three distinct spheres operate simultaneously in international relations, the 
international system, the international society, and world society. Martin Wight talked about 
these as a triad of three traditions within IR-theory, realism, rationalism, and revolutionism, 
and within the English School discourse these concepts are often codified as Hobbesian, 
Grotian, and Kantian (Buzan, 2014, pp. 12-13; Murray, 2015, pp. 1-2). Yet, as pointed to by 
Murray (2015, p. 2), world society is the least developed of the three spheres. It was even 
less developed when Wight suggested his triad. English School scholars of today will 
probably see Kant as much as an inspirator for the solidarist position within the school as for 
the world society point of view. 
 
Grotius lived until 1645. He did not have the events of 1648 as background for his 
writings. Hobbes and Kant both published their works after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, 
Hobbes quite close to this important year, Kant more than a century later. Yet, the 
connections to English School thinking are not the only reasons for paying particular 
attention to these philosophers. They were genuinely occupied with the connection 
between sovereignty and responsibility in their works. I also add Jean Bodin and John Locke 
to the list, and I start with Bodin. It is widely agreed that his Six Livres de la Republique from 
1576, published well before the Peace of Westphalia, represents the first systematic 
discussion about the nature of sovereignty. My argument for including Locke is his extensive 
analysis of the relationship between sovereigns and subjects. 
 
Support for the idea that sovereignty comes with responsibilities is not difficult to 
find. None of the philosophers presented here, argue for the opposite. To limit sovereign 
authority may not have been their original intentions, but, obviously, their occupation with 
how to justify supreme rule made it difficult to avoid the connection to responsibilities 
(Glanville, 2011, p. 239). There are variations in the answers to what subjects have the right 
to do when sovereigns become tyrants. Further, those who argue for a right to domestic 
rebellion against despotic rule, do not necessarily support the idea that responsibilities can 
move to another actor when not taken care of at state level. ‘My’ philosophers do not 
consider the non-intervention principle to be absolute. Some acceptance for interventions 
exists, but with different justifications. Kant is a possible exception. This question was 
controversial for earlier thinkers, as it is today when R2P’s third pillar is on the table. 
 
My discussion is not based on the original works of the selected philosophers. This is 
of course a weakness. It makes me dependent on interpretations made by the authors of the 
books and articles I have used to find the philosophers’ views. I have chosen, for each 
philosopher, three or more sources to amend for some of this weakness. Yet, some single 
arguments still mainly rest on one source. For instance, this is the case with Hobbes’ view on 
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a space of action for external actors in cases where governments fail to protect. I rely on 
Peter Berkowitz for this interpretation. He refers to Chapter XXI in Leviathan where Hobbes 
clarifies the extreme conditions that absolve subjects of their duty to obey the sovereign. 
This chapter includes a statement that foreign war is an option for removing sovereigns 
having positioned themselves so badly (Berkowitz, 2008, pp. 18-19). If my intention had 
been to dive deep into the philosophers’ respective arguments, it would not have been 
sufficient not to use the original texts. Yet, this is not my purpose. My ambition is limited to 
paint an overall picture of how the imagination of sovereignty as responsibility has 
developed through history. In doing so, I will try to find the philosophers’ general views on to 
what extent sovereigns have responsibilities towards their subjects, which possibilities 
subjects have freeing themselves from non-protective sovereigns, and to what extent, in 
cases where sovereignty erodes due to lack of protection, other actors may legitimately 





Jean Bodin (1529-96), a French philosopher and legal theorist, is most famous for his 
Six Livres de la Republique published in 1576. It is a study of political power with the concept 
of sovereignty in the center. His backdrop was the religious wars in France. To overcome the 
disorder connected to these wars, he suggested that any properly constituted political 
society must have a sovereign which can make and break the law for the good of the society. 
Bodin gave the sovereign king this central role, bringing new thoughts into the philosophy of 
state building80. His ideas were based on Christianity. He saw the authority to make law by 
command as the distinguishing mark of the sovereign who had the right to do anything, but 
only with the purpose to realize the divine plan. This made sovereign authority limited, 
involving defense and maintenance of established rights and liberties for individuals and 
groups. He did not defend tyranny. Absolute authority was for Bodin not arbitrary, but 
bounded, entailing both rights and responsibilities. Yet, in his view, the sovereign did not 
require any consent from others. Neither was the sovereign subject to any higher authority 
(Glanville, 2011, pp. 237-238; Skinner, 1996, p. 39-40). 
 
Bodin did not deliver any extensive discussion about if and to what extent subjects 
have a right to rebel against their sovereigns. He rejected any general right of active 
revolution, but he admitted that subjects may legitimately refuse to obey an unjust order 
from the sovereign. Yet, Bodin’s position on this question is not lucidly worked out. His main 
occupation was with legal conditions for effective government. He was much less concerned 




80 Store norske leksikon, http://snl.no/Jean Bodin 
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One should perhaps expect Bodin, by many considered the most extreme apostle of 
sovereignty, to oppose all sorts of interventions for humanitarian reasons. However, 
according to Mortimer Sellers (2006, p. 130), this is not the case. Neither this question was 
analyzed to any depth by Bodin, but he conceded that one sovereign may intervene to 
punish another who governs without regard to common good of the subjects, or at least that 
some level of interference by governments or individuals to prevent the abuses of others 






The Dutch jurist and philosopher Huig de Groot, better known as Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), 
has inspired much thinking within the English School, especially for the pluralists. For the first 
generation of English School scholars, he was a key reference point. International law represents one 
of the primary institutions constituting a pluralist international society, and the English School has 
retained a stronger connection to international law than most other theoretical approaches to IR. 
Grotius is particularly known for his pioneer works within this field. Drawing heavily on concepts 
from Roman Law, Grotius argued for human nature as the source for moral and legal obligations. 
International law was based on natural law, which embraced both civil and divine dimensions. 
Different societies choose different forms of government, but for Grotius, all nations were subject to 
the same basic or natural law, and he saw natural law as founded in divine wisdom. His main work is 
On the Law of War and Peace published in 1625 (Barrett, 1996, p. 212, Buzan, 2014, pp. 102-103). 
 
Grotius saw sovereign power as the highest authority within a state, based upon a 
contractual agreement between the sovereign and the subjects (pactum), as a promise to the 
subjects from the sovereign who undertakes certain obligations. Internationally, the sovereign power 
encounters other sovereigns, among where none are superior. Grotius had a flexible approach to 
how different societies may organize the powers of sovereignty, but he also held it for unlikely that 
most civil societies were founded on utter subjection. One had to assume that rational people had 
preserved their most basic rights against arbitrary treatment. Civil authority is a human institution, 
and one had to credit the founders with intentions that would advance, not undermine, the aims of 
civil association. This has implications for where Grotius places the threshold for acceptable 
resistance towards sovereigns who misuse their powers. Grotius credited the people for being the 
ultimate source of sovereignty, but he did not contend that the people exercised it. That was 
normally entrusted to a government, or a ‘king’ in Grotius’ terminology. The people had no general 
right to recover from a ruler who acted oppressively. It could not be permissible to restrain and 
punish sovereigns whenever they misused their power. He only allowed this in situations of extreme 
necessity, for instance when a government turns its sword against innocent subjects, and even then, 
resistance had to be carried out without creating an even worse conflict. However, in such situations, 
Grotius assigned a role to third-party humanitarian intervention. Grotius believed that it was lawful 
to use force to stop innocent foreigners from being injured and harmed. A third-party would even 
remain free from the special obligations that constrain subjects from resisting and could therefore 
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intervene on their behalf (Dunne, 2021, p. 125; Neff, 2012, introduction xxix and p. 51; Straumann, 
2015, pp. 431-436)81. 
Grotius is often mentioned as a ‘founding father’ for the English School. Bull has several 
references to him in The Anarchical Society. The middle range of international society in the English 
School triad is often called Grotian. However, to locate the English School fully within the Grotian 
tradition is problematic, most so from a pluralist point of view. Grotius envisaged an international 
society where violence between Catholic and Protestant states would end up with a condition of 
peaceful coexistence. Particularly the pluralists within the school question the possibility to obtain 
the degree of international solidarity Grotius foresaw would develop among states (Knudsen, 2008, 
p. 225; Linklater, 2009, p. 95). Neither are they willing to embrace his views on possible humanitarian 
interventions without reservations. Tim Dunne explains why: 
 
“This enduring element of sympathy for the plight of people beyond borders is constantly 
held in check by other norms, institutions and practice. This is where the systemic element in English 
School thinking vies with the shared rules established by sovereign states (international society) and 
the aspirations of common humanity (world society). 
 





The 1648 Westphalian peace sparked off a new period of international relations, in 
need of new moral and legal principles. As English refugee in France who had escaped from 
Cromwell82 and the English Civil War83, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was himself definitively 
not in a position of power. Yet, he answered the challenge with his famous masterpiece 
Leviathan, published in 1651. Mark W. Janis writes: 
 
“So successful was the political settlements of Westphalia, so useful Hobbes’ concept 
of Leviathan and the sovereign state, that they became deeply embedded in the public 
consciousness. It is difficult now even to conceive that a world of sovereign states is an 
intellectual abstraction, a humanly-devised creation, albeit one of tremendous force and 
utility over more than three centuries”. 







81 In this sequence I have also used some data from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, according to their 
own description a peer-reviewed Academic Resource. The article about Grotius names no specific author. 
https://iep.utm.edu/grotius/#H3 
82 Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658) was an English general and politician leading the Parliament of England’s armies 
against King Charles I during the English Civil War. 
83 The English Civil War between 1642 and 1651 was a series of civil wars between parliamentarians and 
royalists about how to govern England. 
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Hobbes delivered a secular defense of absolute and indivisible rule84 where human 
beings themselves create and fashion moral and political standards. Individuals escape the 
brutal and insecure misery that characterizes the ‘state of nature’ through the ‘social 
contract’. In the state of nature, individuals are in principle free, but it is a freedom of small 
value since its companion is an enduring fear of being the victim of violence from other 
individuals. By submitting to a sovereign as a self-imposed constraint, they solve the 
problem. Peter Berkowitz writes: 
 
“This transfer requires individuals to give up the use of their private judgement in 
public matters and empowers the sovereign to enforce contracts, make and implement laws, 
settle disputes, and generally defend subjects from each other and from external threats”. 
 
(Berkowitz, 2008, p. 12). 
 
The transfer is an imagination. It might stem from an initial decision to join with 
others, or perhaps a tacit recognition of a common authority (2008, p. 17), but it is not a 
description of a concrete event at a particular time in history. Yet, a contract is a reciprocal 
arrangement. None enters one voluntarily in return for nothing. Hobbes’ Leviathan 
recognized that sovereign power had an obligation to protect the people under its rule, as a 
two-way street through, loyalty in return for order and protection (Luck, 2009, pp. 13-14). 
 
Human beings interact within a normative space. Only humans represent their 
actions among themselves as conforming or failing to conform to normative standards 
(Gauthier, 2019, p. 3). The right to punish is an essential attribute of sovereignty, but the end 
of punishment must be beneficial to the members of society (2019, p. 9 and p. 14). Yet, to 
interpret Hobbes’ absolutism as a right for sovereigns to act as they prefer towards their 
people, is a severe misunderstanding. Sovereignty is absolute only within its proper domain, 
the domain where the sovereign protects the subjects from each other and from foreign 
threats. With reference to Chapter XXI in Leviathan, Berkowitz states that the obligation of 
subjects to the sovereign is limited. Sovereigns can lose, squander, or destroy the domain, if 
they do not deliver protection (Berkowitz, 2008, pp. 18-19). Glanville (2011, pp. 238-239) 
underlines the same point. Since the end of the obedience to the sovereign is protection, to 
fail to provide protection implies losing the authority. 
 
Like all masterpieces of political philosophy, even Leviathan is rife with ambiguities 
and tensions (Berkowitz, 2008, p. 20). In an article from 1956, Morton A. Kaplan discussed 





84 Hobbes was not a democrat, but he was open for the possibility that the sovereign need not be one person. 
He preferred a monarch, but he could accept an assembly. 
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“Man is enjoined by reason to act for his good, except that he is not to act for his 
detriment. He authorizes the sovereign to do good, except that he does not authorize the 
sovereign to injure him. Clearly, the sovereign cannot do injury in his capacity of 
representative of all because he only acts in his representative capacity when he does good”. 
 
(Kaplan, 1956, p. 398). 
 
The will of the sovereign can only be a will to implement the good, which implies to 
make good laws (1956, p. 404). Yet, as pointed to by Berkowitz (2008, pp. 17-19), disputes 
over policy issues can, in Hobbes’ world, not justify disobedience, but direct threats to life 
can. Governments that commit mass atrocities can no longer claim sovereign power. 
Berkowitz discusses the implications this have for current debates about the responsibility to 
protect, with these interesting words: 
 
“From Hobbes’ perspective, there is nothing in principle to bar one nation from 
coming to the aide of another people who have been so grossly brutalized by their 
government, or brutalized by a natural disaster85, that they find themselves thrown into the 
natural condition of mankind, without a sovereign to protect them. In these circumstances, a 
nation that came to their rescue would not violate sovereignty but operate in a vacuum 
created by sovereignty’s dissolution”. 
(Berkowitz, 2008, p. 18). 
 
The imagination of a vacuum is interesting. Hobbes claimed that sovereignty can be 
destroyed, but not alienated (Morris, 2019, p. 92). Other states become free to intervene 
when rulers surrender their right to govern, but not under a shield of sovereignty. According 
to Berkowitz (2008, pp. 19-20), other states may from Hobbes’s perspective have self- 
interests in intervening, but they do not have a responsibility to protect populations outside 
their own territories. Sovereigns’ responsibilities do not stretch beyond their subjects who 
have authorized them. Transformation of sovereignty to someone who has not authorized it, 
is not an option. Yet, sovereigns cannot treat non-subjects as they please. For providing 
protection and security for subjects, they are obliged to seek peace with non-subjects. As I 
understand my sources, here particularly Gauthier (2019, pp. 17-19), Hobbes saw this as a 
prerequisite for escaping the natural condition of war between states. 
 
From Hobbes’ perspective, the civilization that takes place domestically when 
sovereign power establishes, has no counterpart among states in the international sphere. 
The anarchic condition remains there. International anarchy represents the first of the three 
competing traditions in the English School triad. According to Hedley Bull (1977, pp. 23-24), 
this tradition, often named Hobbesian, describes international relations as a struggle where 
 
85 Although not directly relevant for R2P, Hobbes included natural disasters into what might bring subjects back 
to a state of nature where sovereignty is non-existent. 
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each state is pitted against every other, and free to pursue its goals without legal or moral 
restrictions. From the Hobbesian point of view, law and morality is valid only in the context 





Some authors question if the British philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) had a 
theory of sovereignty. His most important work, The Second Treatise of Government, 
published in 1690, has no frequent use of the word ‘sovereignty’ (Uzzell, 2010, pp. 96-97). 
Yet, Locke discusses in detail questions about why governments exist. He derived his 
arguments from the principle that all human beings are born free. Legitimate government 
was for Locke based on the consent of free people who renounce some natural rights to 
secure other more fundamental ones (Hammond, 2009, pp. 195-196). Locke understood 
power to be complemented by right, and commands had to be based upon a contract that 
determines what is due, as ‘receivables’ and ‘payables’ to use the words of Bedri Gencer 
(2010, p. 326). From Locke’s perspective, the only purpose by creating government is to 
guarantee the security of those rights already possessed by all human beings simply by 
virtue of their humanity (natural rights). Political authority must therefore always be limited 
and dedicated to this task (Hammond, 2009, p. 197). 
 
Locke draw an important distinction between a king86 and a tyrant, where the first 
bounds his power to the laws, with the good of the public as the end of government. 
Tyranny, on the other hand, is the exercise of power beyond right, which is not legitimate. 
Sovereign power cannot justify killing, enslaving, or plundering of the citizens87. Locke 
admitted subjects the right to rebel against tyrannical rule, and eventually to establish a new 
government among themselves. 
 
Locke understood sovereign power being externally independent (Sing, 1959, p. 328). 
However, it is not directly easy to find out what he meant about humanitarian interventions. 
Locke presented a vision for moral standards as basis for international agreement, but he did 
not deal systematically with normative content of international morality. Lee Ward (2006, p. 
702) writes: “In order to develop a Lockean reading of the ethics of intervention, we must 
piece together various aspects of his argument about international society”. Locke conceived 
of international society as a society without government. The constituent units’ have the 
right to exist, but no central authority can interpret and enforce laws. Justice is uncertain. He 
did not foresee any important role for international institutions. The overarching moral 
 
 
86 Locke was open for the possibility of sovereign power located as popular sovereignty, but he preferred the 
sovereign to be a monarch. 
87 Tuckness, Alex. 2020. Lockes’ political Philosophy. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edvard N. 
Zalta. www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political 
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purpose of each society is security and welfare for its own people. A moral duty to intervene 
can only be imperfect and involves danger. Yet, as I read Ward (2006, p. 703), it seems that 
Locke could endorse a temporary suspension of the non-intervention principle confronted 
with rare and severe humanitarian crisis. 
 
Seen from an English School perspective, a rudimentary form of social life is better 
than none, as an analogy to modern international society. In relation to English School 
thinking, Ward (2006, p. 702) places Locke somewhere between a pluralist and a solidarist 
position. Bull (1977, pp. 46-47) found Locke’s conception of international relations more 
promising compared to the Hobbesian view. He also argued that because states are very 






My presentation of Kant draws on three main sources, Franceshet (2002), Flikschuh 
(2010), and Weinrib (2019). Particularly Weinrib refers heavily to Kant’s original works. 
 
The Preussian philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) insisted that freedom, 
understood as independence from being constrained by other’s choice, was the only original 
right, belonging to every individual, simply by being human. According to Jacob Weinrib 
(2019, p. 25), this forms the backbone of Kant’s political philosophy. In the state of nature, 
individuals cannot interact on terms of equal freedom. Only a state can provide for a 
common set of norms that differentiate between prohibited, permitted, and required 
conduct. Anarchy stood for Kant as the antithesis of freedom, and he saw sovereignty as a 
necessity to escape from it. The sovereign became the answer to how one person’s freedom 
can coexist with the similar freedom of others, by subjection to a will that speaks for all 
(Franceshet, 2002, p. 50, O’Brian jr., 2019, p. 48). 
 
Sovereignty plays a problematic and possibly contradictory role in the thinking of 
Kant. His concern for justice, both domestically and internationally, made him to view 
sovereignty on the one side as a necessary cause of justice, but on the other side also as a 
major cause of injustice (Franceshet, 2002, pp. 43-44). Sovereignty divides human beings 
into those who rule, and those ruled. It is from Kant’s perspective the necessity of a 
sovereign that justifies its right to rule. Even absolute and unlimited sovereignty was for him 
better than no sovereignty at all. Interaction on terms of equal freedom needs the presence 
of a legislative institution to establish the common standards, and an executive institution to 
enforce them. Since controversies around how to interpret the standards may arise, an 
impartial juridical institution with the authority to judge is also required. Together these 
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authorities form for Kant the sovereign to whom individuals must submit themselves 
(Weinrib, 2019, pp. 26-28). 
 
The sovereign state established the condition where human beings could enjoy their 
rights in relation to one another. Without sovereignty, individuals unavoidably raise 
legitimate claims against one another, but they simultaneously lack legitimate authority over 
one another. Therefore, non-sovereign individuals require the state as a sovereign enforcer 
of everyone’s rights (Flikschuh, 2010, p. 478). Individuals have in Kant’s understanding no 
right to oppose an existing sovereign, because that would be to oppose the condition that 
made the enjoyment of rights possible. Resistance to public laws is therefore not permitted, 
neither against unjust laws (Weinrib, 2019, p. 29). Here, Kant seems to be more restrictive 
than Hobbes, and particularly more restrictive than Locke, about what subjects might do or 
not if sovereigns misuse their power. Yet, this is only one side of the coin. Kant considered 
sovereigns having a duty to reconcile their authority with the freedom of the subjects. With 
reference to one of Kant’s most famous books, Towards Perpetual Peace from 1795, Weinrib 
(2019, p. 34) writes: 
 
“An exercise of public authority adheres to the terms of its justification to the extent 
that it is directed at bringing the existing legal order into the deepest possible conformity 
with its own internal moral standard. Insofar as the right to rule presupposes the right of 
each person subject to it to freedom, government cannot deny the right of persons to 
freedom without thereby undermining the justificatory basis of its own authority”. 
 
Reforms were for Kant the receipt for the realization of justice. Sovereigns are 
obliged to reform unjust arrangements. Unless this happens, sovereignty itself may cease to 
exist, because an arrangement incompatible with the enjoyment of individual rights cannot 
be authoritative. To deny the right to freedom undermines its own justificatory basis. Kant 
called such arrangements barbarian (2019, p. 29). I do not know to what extent the authors 
of the ICISS-report more than 200 years later were inspired by Kant on this point, but Kant’s 
view seems to me to have much in common with the view that state leaders who do not 
protect their subjects from mass atrocities, have lost the right to claim sovereignty. 
 
For Kant, the conditions for justice at the domestic and at the international level 
were closely interrelated. The existence of unmitigated anarchy88 among states had negative 
consequences for domestic security. International anarchy needed transformation. The best 
instrument for Kant in reconciling the domestic dimension with the state’s exercise of 
external relations, was the republican constitution89. Reforming all sovereign states 
everywhere would improve their internal conditions and change the effects of the anarchic 
 
88 International anarchy is the imagination of an international sphere where no authority exists above state 
level. 
89 Kant’s republics had representative institutions, but they were not democracies in our understanding. 
88  
condition among them. The establishment of republican constitutions made sovereigns 
responsive to the ends of the citizens at home, but also cautious about their external 
conduct, gradually breaking up anarchy by creating a lawful civil union of states (Franceshet, 
2002, pp. 45-50). 
 
Kant considered sovereign states as bearers of international obligations. He talked 
about juridical sovereignty based on an underlying normative justification, demarcating the 
difference between legitimate and illegitimate exercise of state power. Law-governed 
human agency makes the production of a moral order possible, but Kant was interested in 
the general conceivability of global justice, much less about how to solve actual global 
problems. He had relatively little to say about specific policy recommendations, but he 
understood both individuals and states as moral agents, with wills that give them moral 
status. Yet, individuals and states are not the same kind of agents. Individual’s wills are non- 
sovereign, whereas state’s wills are sovereign, with juridical immunity making it 
impermissible to compel them. They must compel themselves (Flikschuh, 2010, pp. 471-474 
and 492). 
 
Kant argued that relations between states must be non-coercive, but as moral equals 
they can create associations. To claim sovereignty is to oblige to use the sovereign power in 
accordance with principles of right, but it follows from Kant’s argumentation that if a state 
fails to do so, no other state, community of states, or other international authority can 
lawfully compel it. To abuse sovereign authority is morally wrong, but coercive interference 
is no less wrongful. However, Kant did not expect that states in the real world would always 
act in accordance with his principles. As Flikschuh (2010, p. 489) formulates it: “This 
injunction against intervention can become extremely demanding especially in the context 
of state’s abuse of their powers in relation to their own populations”. 
 
The relevance for R2P’s third pillar is not difficult to see. Yet, when we read the 
classical thinkers, we must keep in mind how the world around them appeared. Kant did not 
live to see the 1815 Congress of Vienna form a treaty-based framework for European 
international relations after the Napoleon Wars. Anything like the UN Security Council did of 
course not exist in Kant’s era. We do not know if Kant would have concluded differently had 
it existed, but his arguments are, as far as I understand him through my sources, at odds 
with action or preparedness for action by any external authorities in situations where state 
governments fail to protect their subjects. 
 
While Hobbes represents for Bull an extreme position about the essential nature of 
international relations, so does Kant, but in the other end of the scale. Instead of focusing on 
conflicts among states, the Kantian tradition, the third one in the English School triad, 
highlights the transnational social bonds that link individual human beings who are the 
subjects or citizens of states. Potentially these bonds exist across the whole community of 
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mankind, although they may not do so actually. Kant recognized moral imperatives in the 
field of international relations limiting actions of states. Yet, more than paving way for inter- 
state cooperation, Kant saw these imperatives pointing towards the replacement of the 
states-system by a cosmopolitan society, a view the pluralist tradition within the English 
School opposes. However, according to Stanley Hoffmann (1986, p. 189), Kant was not as 
cosmopolitan and universalist as Bull suggested. For instance, he never advocated 
something like a world state or a global government. 
 
 
7.3.7 Other voices before the 20th Century 
 
Political philosophers had no monopoly on thinking about the connection between 
sovereign authority and responsibility. The French monarch Louis XIV (1638-1715), the 
longest ruling monarch ever in the history of Europe (72 years on the throne), is by many 
considered the absolute sovereign pr. se. He acknowledged his responsibilities to God and 
for his subjects. With reference to Rowen and to Lossky90, Glanville (2011, p. 239) writes that 
Louis XIV accepted sovereigns being responsible for the people, but they were not 
accountable to them. The reason for giving laws, and the only acceptable use of sovereign 
power, was the people’s advantage and happiness. The sovereign himself stood above the 
law. European monarchs draw on Louis’ famous words L’Etat, c’est moi, to assert their 
authority over, and control of, feudal princes, in the construction of modern territorial states 
(Deng, 2010a, p. 356). 
 
While sovereignty in early modern Europe was generally located in the person or the 
office of a hereditary ruler, the 18th Century showed an increasing acceptance for 
sovereignty located more broadly in the state (Glanville, 2011, p. 240). By the end of the 
century, protection of individual human rights became central aspects of the American and 
the French revolutions. Sovereignty took the form of popular sovereignty. In the American 
version, a legitimate government derived power from the consent of the people and stayed 
legitimate only so long it secured the rights of the individuals. The thinking of John Locke was 
an important source of inspiration. The 1789 French Revolution also began from an 
individualist perspective, as reflected in the National Assembly’s approval of the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Yet gradually, another philosopher influenced the French, 
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and his notion of the ‘general will’, an idea of a unity of 
collective interests. The main attention shifted, from the individual to the nation, inviting 
sovereigns to prioritize the recognition of the whole nation before the individual members 
who composed it. This view of sovereignty ended dynastic rule all over Europe, but it also 
 
 
90 Rowen, H.H. 1980. The King’s State: Proprietarity Dynasticism in Early Modern France. Piscataway, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press. 
Lossky, A. 1968. The nature of political power according to Louis XIV. In The Responsibility of Power: 
Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn, eds. L. Krieger and F. Stern. London: Macmillan. 
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paved way for a variety of struggles for self-determination, including violent nationalism. 
Luke Glanville writes: 
 
“The American and French Revolutionaries had placed the liberty and equality of 
individuals at the heart of their justifications for popular sovereignty. However, it was the 
right of nations to govern themselves, not the rights of the individuals within these nations, 
that came to dominate the understanding of the sovereignty of the people in the 19th and 
20th Century Europe”. 
(Glanville, 2011, p. 242) 
 
 
7.3.8 The early 20th Century 
 
The 1919 Versailles conference confirmed national self-determination as the 
accepted determinant for membership in the international society, although granted only to 
a selection of new states, particularly former European members of the Habsburg and 
Ottoman Empires. The League of Nations, established 10 January 1920, built on this 
principle. The contract parties accepted obligations not to resort to war, and the member 
states had some formal protection under the Covenant article 10: 
 
“The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression and the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of 
the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such 
aggression the council shall advice upon the means by which this obligation shall be 
fulfilled”91. 
 
The mandate system, another ‘product’ of World War 1, also reflects sovereignty as 
responsibility. Much is possible to say about colonialism, but the European imperial powers 
understood that colonization entailed some form of responsibility for the protection of 
people under their authority. The earlier General Act of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) 
also describes this responsibility (article VI). Yet, the mandate system did more. It confirmed 
the responsibility of states to protect people under trust. It also established the idea that if 
these states failed to protect, the burden of responsibility shifted to the international 
community. With reference to Bain92, Glanville mentions that the General Act established 
that treatment of natives was a legitimate matter of international concern. He exemplifies 
this with the international condemnation and diplomatic demands directed at Belgium 
under King Leopold II for mass atrocities in Congo. Glanville (2011, p. 245) understands this 
 
 
91 The Covenant of the League of Nations. The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. Yale 
Law School: Lillian Goldman Law Library. 
92 Bain, William. 2003. Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
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as antecedents of contemporary R2P. The establishment of the principle of self- 
determination at Versailles after World War 1 was complemented by a regime for the 
protection of minority rights. Expectations to new sovereign states to respect the rights of 
first religious, later national minorities, had however existed in some form since the 17th 
Century (2011, p. 248). 
 
Although it might be only one among many possible examples, I have chosen to 
describe a particular case I find interesting because it belongs to another era, but still 
addresses questions of relevance today, including relevance for R2P debates. The case in 
question is the dispute over the Island of Palmas in 1928, between USA and the Netherlands. 
The case, heard by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Haag, declared the island being 
part of the Netherlands East Indies. Today it belongs to Indonesia. Arbitrator was the Swiss 
scholar, Max Huber. I cite from the Court’s report signed by him: 
 
“Territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a state. 
This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of 
other states, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability on peace and war, together 
with the rights that each state must claim for its nationals in foreign territory. Without 
manifesting its territorial sovereignty in a manner corresponding to circumstances, the state 
cannot fulfil this duty. Territorial sovereignty cannot limit itself to its negative side, i.e. to 
excluding the activities of other states; for it serves to divide between nations the space 
upon which human activities are employed, in order to assure them at all points the 
minimum of protection of which international law is the guardian”. 
 
(Huber, 1928, p. 839) 
 
I see more than one reason for the relevance of this text related to my discussions in 
the cover-article. The text is not about mass atrocities, but it quite clearly states that 
sovereignty entails obligations connected to protection, in this case for civilians residing on 
foreign territory. Although not said directly in the text, one must assume that this obligation 
towards other states adds to the obligation to protect the state’s own citizens. Something 
else would be rather strange. The guardian is international law. Although international law 
was poorer developed in 1928 compared with today, even then it was possible to decide 
upon a dispute by a recognized judiciary body, based on consensus about that issues 
concerned with protection belonged above state level. It is a recognition that international 
law gives premises for acceptable state behavior. As a following sequence in the same 
document explains, international law cannot be presumed to reduce a right such as 
territorial sovereignty to the category of an abstract right, without concrete manifestations 
(1928, p. 839). 
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7.3.9 After World War 2 
 
The bipolar world order during the Cold War did not allow broad focus on the 
tensions between human rights issues and the principle of non-intervention. A non- 
interventionist conception of sovereignty dominated, although not totally. An exception was 
the willingness of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on the racist regimes in South 
Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) (Glanville, 2011, pp. 249-251). Yet, it was not before 
the Cold War ended that a space opened making it possible for the international community 
to deal with the inherent contradictions embedded in the concept of state sovereignty. 
Alternative perspectives entered the arenas, generated broader debates, and stimulated 
new ones. Among those who particularly inspired ICISS to adopt the vision of sovereignty as 
responsibility was the Sudanese scholar and diplomat Francis Deng93. For his work with 
people internally displaced he probably is the single person most to honor for getting the 
concept of sovereignty as responsibility accepted by the international community. The 
founder of ICISS, Lloyd Axworthy, former Canadian minister of foreign affairs, recognized the 
connection between sovereignty and responsibility as a fundamental building block for R2P. 




7.3.10 My conclusion so far 
 
My conclusion so far is that the connection between sovereignty and responsibility 
stands on solid historical ground. The political philosophers I have taken a closer look at is of 
course a selection among those who have engaged themselves with the question, but it 
includes some of the most prominent thinkers within western philosophy. All of them argues 
that sovereigns are responsible for the protection of their subjects. The described cases 
further underpin the argument. R2P’s first pillar can draw on this broad support, but there 
are different views about to what extent subjects can legitimately rebel against sovereigns 
that do not provide for protection, and if they can, against which threshold. Kant does not 
grant any right for subjects to resist a sovereign. Still, from his perspective, sovereignty may 
cease to exist. It seems to me rather unclear how Kant foresaw this could happen without 
any active opposition from the subjects. 
 
It is more problematic to find historical support to underpin R2P’s second pillar, the 
responsibility that the sovereigns have helping each other to fulfil their responsibilities. 
None of the philosophers I have consulted seems to have engaged themselves with this 
question. They simply do not address it. Yet, both asking for and offering help belongs to the 
repertoire of sovereign acts. However, if sovereigns have a responsibility to help other 
 
93 Francis Deng served as the UN Secretary General’s Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide from 2007 
to 2012. 
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sovereigns with this task, to refuse to provide help when asked is not an option. The transfer 
of responsibility from the national to the international level when the national level fails, in 
accordance with R2P’s third pillar, is controversial today, and has been so through history. 
Anyhow, some support for this idea is possible to find, with reservations. Within the R2P 
framework, this pillar is in the hands of the UN Security Council, but international 
organizations like the UN did not exist when my selected philosophers worked. Neither was 
it possible to foresee them coming into existence. 
 
I will also argue that the examples I have used from the 20th Century, although it is a 
limited selection, show that sovereignty were never disconnected from responsibility. It was 
possible to call for responsible behavior through international law in the 1920s. Perhaps the 
Cold War represented a backlash, but even then, there were limits for what the international 
community were willing to tolerate from sovereign authorities’ treatment of their subjects. 
 
 
7.4 Critical voices 
 
Some authors are critical to understand state sovereignty in terms of responsibility 
because it may have unpreferable implications. My discussion now proceeds to focus on 
how some selected critical voices in current debates argue. Thereafter, I will give my 
responses to these arguments, generally, and informed by the English School theoretical 





Amitai Etzioni writes: “A concept of sovereignty as responsibility that includes both 
the duty to protect and the duty to prevent has broad appeal across the political spectrum” 
(Etzioni, 2006, p. 76). The idea of filling sovereignty not only with rights, but also with 
obligations, held up against an alternative of sovereignty decoupled from responsibilities, is 
attractive. However, and despite the historical connections discussed in the former section, 
there is not unison embracement of the idea among scholars, at least not without 
reservations. I have chosen five articles, from five different authors, representing critical 
voices. I will now present the content of their critics in accordance with my understanding of 
their texts. The last part of the chapter (sub-sections 7.4.6 and 7.4.7) is dedicated to my 
comments. 
 
I found the articles through google-search, but the choice is not random. I have tried 
to find scholars who criticizes the imagination of sovereignty as responsibility from different 
angles. Together these authors represent a time span from shortly before the 2005 UN 
General Assembly adoption of R2P, until recently. The chosen articles are Nolte 
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(2005), Etzioni (2006), Moses (2013), Pandiaraj (2016) and Getachew (2019). The reference 
list gives further details. 
 
To structure the presentation, I have chosen to separate the main arguments 
presented in the articles into four groups. To do so is somewhat complicated. The groups are 
not isolated categories, rather interlinked in several ways. I considered instead a 
presentation of each author separately. However, since some of them engage in more than 
one debate, I decided not to do that to avoid unnecessary repetitions. The main arguments, 
based on how I read the chosen articles, are the following: 
 
a) There are many ambiguities connected both to the imagination of sovereignty as 
responsibility and to R2P. The imagination renders sovereignty conditional, making it 
difficult to know precisely what sovereignty as responsibility means in an R2P 
context. It may also trigger not preferred practices. 
b) To divide sovereignty between the national and the international level is 
problematic, particularly so from a realist point of view. 
c) There are severe democratic challenges when the responsibility to protect 
internationalizes. 
d) To understand sovereignty as responsibility erodes the moral and political 
significance of sovereignty. 
 
 
7.4.2 Main argument a) 
 
This category contains several specific arguments connected to ambiguities. Since the 
arguments partly overlap, I have chosen to put them into the same category. The authors 
are Nolte, Etzioni and Pandiaraj. 
 
Georg Nolte94 (2005, p. 391) accepts that sovereignty entails not only rights, but also 
obligations. Yet, he finds the concept of sovereignty as responsibility being ‘highly 
ambiguous’. The problem for him is that this understanding invites states not to recognize 
the sovereignty of a particular state if that state, in the opinion of other states, has not 
properly exercised its responsibilities derived from sovereignty. He considers this as 
particularly problematic when it leads to enforcement mechanisms beyond what 
international law provides. Sovereignty then risks serving antihuman purposes. Nolte 
mentions the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the 2003 US intervention in Iraq, as 
examples deemed illegal under international law95. Therefore, he states very clear that 
 
 
94 Georg Nolte is professor of public international law at Humbolt University, Berlin, and member of the UN’s 
Law Commission. 
95 The Kosovo intervention quite often justifies on moral grounds despite its problematic relation to 
international law. 
95  
interventions for humanitarian purposes need proper legal authorization by the competent 
international body, which is the UN Security Council. He adds that this will only remain the 
rule if “here is no legal passepartout (or carte blance) enabling any state to justify its 
intervention if its government thinks that another state is not fulfilling the responsibilities 
under its sovereignty” (Nolte, 2005, pp. 391-392). 
 
Nolte (2005, p. 391) refers to the Island of Palmas case described in section 7.3.8, but 
he sees the outcome of that case as a contrast to the concept launched by ICISS. While 
Huber wanted to explain the existence of a comparatively precise set of rules and remedies 
for a limited area, a general concept of sovereignty as responsibility risks, from Nolte’s 
perspective, to break down distinctions, not least the one between rules and remedies. 
 
Amitai Etzioni96 (2006, p. 72) argues that to formulate sovereignty as responsibility in 
effect renders sovereignty conditional. When expected to adhere to evolving norms about 
what the international community considers legitimate, states are no longer free agents. 
Sovereignty as responsibility becomes, from this perspective, an attempt to legitimize a 
fundamental shift in the international community’s role related to states’ internal affairs. He 
understands this shift as a challenge to the Westphalian notion of independent, sovereign 
states. The UN Security Council did authorize interventions in the past, Etzioni mentions 
Somalia and Haiti, but this was ad hoc decisions of a rare kind, not based on a general 
degrading of national sovereignty. From his point of view, the concept of sovereignty as 
responsibility lowers the legitimacy of independence and increases that of intervention. 
With sovereignty as an internationally shared responsibility, national sovereignty becomes a 
privilege dependent on the fulfillment of responsibilities (2006, p. 74). 
 
For S. Pandiaraj97 (2016, pp. 807-808) it becomes difficult to understand exactly what 
sovereignty as responsibility means when connected to R2P, because of ongoing uncertainty 
related to R2P’s actual scope and implications. His article is much about the legal status of 
R2P, but he also focuses on what he sees as serious ambiguities because the 2005 Outcome 
Document did not fully develop R2P. 
 
His first point is the lack of agreement about how to apply R2P. Most urgent is the 
question about what will happen when the Security Council is unable or unwilling to act in 
given situations. So far, no good answer exists. His second point relates to the words ‘timely 
and decisive manner’ occurring in §139 of the Outcome Document, a formulation he means 
creates serious ambiguity. He writes: 
 
“If the collective action is to be timely, decisive, and meaningful, it stands to reason 
that it includes actions to prevent the commission of these crimes. This understanding 
 
96 Amitai Etzioni is professor of international relations at George Washington University in Washington D.C. 
97 S. Pandiaraj is Senior Legal Officer at the Asian-African Consultative Organization (AALCO) in New Delhi, India. 
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clearly goes against the requirement of the manifest failure of national authorities embodied 
in the very same paragraph”. 
(Pandiaraj, 2016, p. 807). 
 
Thirdly, §139 refers to different chapters in the UN Charter, but does not address in 
specific ways the employment of the measures embodied in the chapters. Pandiaraj’s fourth 
point is that the Outcome Document is silent on the types of assistance offered to national 
authorities to help them to prevent mass atrocities. 
 
Etzioni (2006, pp. 79-80) also pays attention to a particular ambiguity, the question of 
thresholds. Both a too low and a too high threshold is problematic. A too low one may lead 
to further lowering, expanding the scope of grounds used to legitimate interventions. The 
risk is a rising number of armed international conflicts. This may in turn challenge the 
requirements of interventions, that their basis is humanitarian intentions solely, as the last 
resort only, with no more use of force than what is strictly necessary, and with reasonable 
prospects for success. However, if the threshold is set too high, it will function as a barrier 
making it very difficult for the international community to stop mass atrocities. The rebuild 
component of R2P may also function as a threshold too high because this component may 
involve costly and complex nation-building efforts where the perspectives of failure are 
substantial. As an example, Etzioni refers to a 2001 Washington Post article by Henry 
Kissinger where the former US Secretary of State strongly warned against involving US 
military troops in a nation-building project in Afghanistan98. 
 
 
7.4.3 Main argument b) 
 
Scholars within the realist theoretical tradition of international relations do not 
accept sovereignty to locate more than one place. Jeremy Moses99 presents a realist critique 
of R2P. Drawing on philosophers / scholars like Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmidt, and Hans 
Joachim Morgenthau, he distinguishes between two strands of theorizing about sovereignty, 
using the Latin terms de jure and de facto. De jure (by law) describes legally recognized 
practices, regardless of whether these exist or not in the real world. De facto (in fact) is 
practices that exist in the real world, without having been officially recognized by laws. 
Moses (2013, p. 114) further describes a key distinction between those who view 
sovereignty as an ‘empty signifier’ redefined through processes of social interaction and 
discourse, and the realists who see a timeless feature of social and political organization, 





98 The article entitled ‘Where Do We Go From Here?’ was published in Washington Post 6 November, 2001. 
99 Jeremy Moses is senior lecturer in political science at University of Canterbury, New Zealand. 
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The distinction relates to two parallel, but different discourses of sovereignty. Moses 
underlines that to understand sovereignty and its implications, one must consider them 
both. The first view, theoretically connected to internationalism or cosmopolitanism, see 
sovereignty as a contingent, rule-based concept possible to judge, grant and withdraw, in 
accordance with certain criteria. These may vary from one historical context to another, and 
so will the behavioral implications. On the other hand, realists understand sovereignty as de 
facto power, as a quality exhibited by certain institutions at certain times. According to 
Moses, realists accept that maintenance of sovereignty includes responsibilities as a 
premise. The difference connects to the domain of these responsibilities: “What is at issue is 
not whether sovereigns should responsibly manage their own domains, but whether these 
responsibilities are enforceable by outside powers” (Moses, 2013, p. 115). 
 
R2P leans on a normative understanding of sovereignty. Realists offer an empirical 
definition with little focus on rules, but much on material power (2013, p. 119). From this 
perspective, the rights of states derive from their capacities to enforce, not from a set of 
rules established among other states. The establishment of sovereign power comes first, 
followed by law and rules, but not the other way around. The sovereign power is, as the 
supreme authority, defined unrestrained. If abuses of human rights take place orchestrated 
by a sovereign, this is an illustration of de facto power. Moses refers to Morgenthau100 as the 
scholar defining sovereignty strictly as the ability to exercise decisive force when required 
for making the final decision (2013, p. 134). A view of sovereignty as responsibility on two 
levels is not unifiable with this position. For realists, sovereignty is indivisible. A state cannot 
allow imposed legal restraints to affect its lawgiving and law enforcement authority. Binding 
to restraints must be voluntary. The outside world may respond to atrocities by intervening, 
but if they do, they establish themselves as the new sovereign of the territory (2013, pp. 
123-125). The de facto essence of sovereignty does not change. An important implication is 
that power to decide on issues of interventions remains in the hands of powerful states. For 
weak states, sovereignty represents their last line of defense. R2P therefore removes the 
‘sovereign immunity’ of weaker states, but not of the powerful. 
 
Prevention often communicates as R2P’s most important action component, for 
reasons explained earlier in the cover-article as well as in my R2P articles. Moses (2013, p. 
132) sees preventive efforts as both possible and regularly occurring in a world of sovereign 
states. To grant entrance to humanitarian aid and peacekeepers is an exercise of state 
sovereignty, but if forced to accept aid or the presence of peacekeepers, the state becomes 
subject to exercise of sovereign power by another authority. Sovereignty as responsibility 
therefore obscures fundamental relations of power. Since understanding who holds the 
power sufficient to resolve extreme crisis is vital to understand how political and social units 
held together, R2P does not solve the problem by changing language from ‘right to 
 
100 Hans Joachim Morgenthau (1904-1980) is the most famous among the classical IR theory realists from the 
1940s and 50s. His most important work is ‘Politics among Nations’ first published in 1948. 
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intervene’ to ‘responsibility to protect’. However, Moses also clearly states that although his 
article emphasizes the importance realist IR scholars lay on power, he does not deny that 
norms and laws generate important constraints on the exercise of that same power. He sees 
a stark contrast between those who view sovereignty as normative and those who view it as 
de facto power. He concludes that the evils of genocide or ethnic cleansing are not caused 
by sovereignty. Sovereign power may be used to both good and evil ends (2013, p. 135). 
 
 
7.4.4. Main argument c) 
 
Sovereignty as responsibility related to democracy is another issue that occupies 
Etzioni. He sees a democratic deficit one cannot ignore. When a state acts irresponsibly, an 
international body may call for corrective intervention. Yet, by moving policymaking in 
critical matters from the national government to an international forum, the affected 
population lose the opportunity to influence this forum’s judgement (Etzioni, 2006, p. 82). 
 
The international forum was limited to the UN Security Council through the 2005 R2P 
adoption, where the state in question, in most cases, is without representation101. Council 
members other than the concerned state will make the judgements. This casts doubt about 
the legitimacy of their rulings, even more so since any of the five permanent members can 
veto all judgements they dislike. Although reforms to make the Council more representative 
exist as suggestions, they are far from anything which may resemble implementation (2006, 
pp. 82-83). 
 
Pandiaraj (2016 pp. 803-805) addresses the same challenge. He clearly states that 
R2P needs to develop within the understanding that use of force without Security Council 
authorization is illegal under international law. The Council alone has the mandate and 
authority to use force on behalf of the international community, in accordance with Article 
42 of the UN Charter. The promotion of human rights is one of the purposes of the UN, but 
this does not give any single state the right unilaterally to use force to remedy a situation in 
another state. However, he also underlines that: 
 
“If the international community is to take human suffering seriously and address it 
with timely and effective collective action, democratization of the Security Council should 
take place as a matter of urgent priority”. 
(Pandiaraj, 2016, p. 795). 
 
According to Pandiaraj (2016, p. 815), it is the provision of veto the five permanent 
members enjoy, combined with the lack of transparency in the working of the Council, that 
 
101 If the state in question serves a two-year period as non-permanent member, it will be present at the table 
with a certain influence. 
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seriously undermines its general legitimacy and the legitimacy of its decisions. He 
emphasizes especially that the veto-powers must waive their veto rights in situations of 
mass atrocities. Yet, the Council has so far ignored such a ‘code of conduct’ for the 
permanent members. 
 
Related questions concern Moses too. Realists start to ask about power, about who 
has sufficient power to be capable of taking responsibility. We may recognize the UN 
Security Council as the sovereign power to decide upon when the use of force for human 
protection purposes is legitimate. Yet, we do not escape the problem of ‘irresponsible 
power’, because there will not exist any higher power to hold the Security Council to 
account. As states can abuse its power, we cannot exclude the possibility that so will the 
Security Council, even when considered as the ‘right authority’ (Moses, 2013, p. 129). The 
composition, and the behavior dominated by great power vetoes, does not guarantee good 
behavior. Since no higher power can interfere, the veto powers simply avoid being subject to 
enforcement of their own sovereign responsibilities. Realists tend to explain a growing 
amount of humanitarian interventions after the Cold War primarily as an expression of 
imbalanced power. Moses describes the sovereignty of the ‘international community’ as 
lacking form and clarity. 
 
 
7.4.5. Main argument d) 
 
For Adom Getachew the 2011 Libya intervention was a testing ground for R2P, 
because the ways the intervention soon turned into regime change raised critical questions 
about the scope of the principle. When focus is on reforms, like strengthening the 
preventive R2P dimension and clarifying criterions for military interventions, the limits of 
R2P emerges from translation of theory into practice. The problem of misuse and 
misapplication invites not to connect overreach to sovereignty as responsibility, but to 
consider other and better means of R2P implementation. According to Getachew (2019, p. 
228), the relationship between principles and practices is misunderstood. 
 
Getachew (2019, p. 226) offers an alternative understanding of what the problem is. 
According to her, the limits of R2P embed in the very redefinition of sovereignty as 
responsibility. This understanding of sovereignty erodes and undermines its moral and 
political significance. She argues that, if one first elaborates and agrees upon norms and 
implement them in practice afterwards, the underlying idea of sovereignty as responsibility 
escapes scrutiny. Treating principles as if they were formulas easily detached from their 
context, is misleading because they emerge from political questions and practices rather 
than from antecedent normative commitments, for later application to political problems. 
Principles are themselves what she calls ‘forms of political action’ when they, among other 
things, provide legal authorization and confer agency (2019, pp. 227-228). This created the 
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conditions of possibility in which the Libya intervention unfolded. One needs to ask which 
actors this redefinition of sovereignty empowers and disempowers, and what kinds of 
authority and action it legitimizes. Her main argument, as I understand her, is that if state 
sovereignty defines as responsibility, it renders sovereignty instrumental, paternalist, and 
conditional, or more precise, sovereignty for some becomes conditional. This paves the 
ground for new forms of international hierarchy. It becomes possible for non-state actors 
and international organizations to perform sovereign functions. Particularly, it empowers the 
UN Security Council, dominated by the permanent veto-powers (2019, pp. 226-229). 
 
From Getachev’s perspective, a severe problem with sovereignty as responsibility is 
its contribution to the reproduction and the legitimization of these changes. The pitfall of 
the Libyan intervention is therefore not the misapplication of a principle, but the 
entailments of the diminution of sovereignty (2019, p. 231). Particularly states with a 
colonial past have no reason for welcoming this development. It represents a contrast to 
how anti-colonial nationalists understood sovereignty as claims for domestic democratic 
self-government, and non-domination internationally. Getachew (2019, pp. 231-232) refers 
to the Ghanian political leader Kwame Nkrumah for whom independence and self- 
government were prerequisites of human rights, because they created the conditions for the 
realization of these rights. However, she admits that Nkrumah’s optimism of the 1960’s is 
difficult to share today. She writes: 
 
“Indeed, the principle of the responsibility to protect and other contemporary efforts 
to rethink sovereignty are responses to the humanitarian crisis that have arisen from the 
ways in which the politics of citizenship and the statehood has failed to coincide with the 
protection of individual human rights”. 
(Getachew, 2019, p. 232). 
 
Yet, she insists that sovereignty as responsibility, implying that a state’s claim to 
sovereignty depends on its willingness and capacity to fulfil its responsibilities to the subjects 
and to the international community, contrasts with the requirement of self-governance in a 
context of international non-domination. By locating the primary responsibility at the state 
level, one risks that particularly weak states must carry the burden of responsibility for 
political, economic, and humanitarian crisis that are not fully of their own making, but at 
least partly rooted in the inequitable international distribution of power. The way forward, 
as Getachew (2019, pp. 234-236) sees it, is undoing the hierarchical political and economic 
relations that structure an international order that fuels domination. The rise of 
international institutions and international human rights law since 1945 has limited and 
constrained the exercise of sovereignty. However, by turning focus towards international 
structures, Getachew envisages the opening of a critical space to deal with sovereign 
inequality and international hierarchy. 
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7.4.6 My general comments 
 
Nolte’s article dates from March / April 2005. He obviously bases his arguments on 
the suggestions presented in the ICISS report launched in December 2001. The UN General 
Assembly’s World Summit took place in September 2005. Therefore, Nolte cannot have been 
familiar with the R2P version adopted by the international community. It is true that ICISS 
left open the question if the Security Council should always be the only authority on 
measures connected to R2P’s international dimension. However, the World Summit 
narrowed the scope. I have pointed to this earlier in the cover-article, and I describe the 
content of this in my third and fourth R2P articles (article 3, pp. 39-42; article 4, p. 79). The 
requirement of Security Council approval for international action against the will of a 
government, made consensus possible in 2005. The references to this in my articles are 
particularly Alex J. Bellamy and Mark Schack. 
 
Nolte focused on possible consequences when sovereignty as responsibility applies to 
real-world cases. The ambiguity he talks about seems for me most urgent when rules about 
who shall decide what and when are unclear and in flux. In early 2005, before the R2P 
adoption and with the ICISS report as the basic document, there was more confusion around 
the question of legitimate authority. Nolte may absolutely be correct that such 
circumstances can stimulate not preferred practices. The World Summit answered to this 
dilemma by anchoring R2P’s international dimension to the Security Council, deciding this 
being the only legitimate decision-making body. 
 
However, other ambiguities continued to exist, and still do, with the challenges this 
represent. The lack of clarity around the criterions for when action is relevant and when to 
use which of the available measures, discussed from different angles by both Nolte, Etzioni, 
and Pandiaraj, was pushed into the future by summit participants. As I describe quite 
detailed in my articles 3 and 4, such loose ties between policy and implementation were 
exactly what Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Widavsky warned about, based on their 
observations connected to the late 1960s job-creation program in Oakland, California. To 
repeat a citation from them I use in R2P article 3: “There is no point in having good ideas if 
they cannot be carried out” (article 3, p. 41)102. 
 
Pandiaraj wrote his article in 2016. He therefore had a decade of more experience to 
draw on for the development of his four points of ambiguities, compared to Nolte and 
Etzioni. As I have discussed both earlier in the cover-article and in my R2P articles 3 and 4, 
and in accordance with the loose ties described above, it is always easier to obtain 
consensus across political and other dividing lines when one allows for concretization around 
the most controversial issues to wait. One adopts a text addressing them only in general and 
 
102 Pressman, Jeffrey and Wildavsky, Aaron. 1973/1984. Implementation. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, p. 143. 
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rather vague terms (article 3, pp. 39-41; article 4, pp. 81-82). As I understand the authors, 
the most fruitful way to deal with the challenges expected in the aftermath, is to work 
continually to develop better clarifications, to improve the practical application of R2P, and 
thereby reducing the risk that other enforcement mechanisms pop up as practical realities. 
 
Improved clarifications were one of the ambitions with the Brazilian initiative from 
November 2011, called Responsibility while protecting (RwP), an attempt to bring more 
control to decision makers on behalf of implementing actors. The background was 
dissatisfaction with how the military operations against Libya had developed the same year. I 
discuss this initiative in article 3, 4 and 5 (article 3, pp. 52-53; article 4, p. 88; article 5, p. 5). 
Yet, to eliminate ambiguities is not an easy task. It is not surprising that none of the articles I 
scrutinize here contain specified details about how to obtain the demanding clarifications, or 
what the concrete content of them ought to be. Etzioni’s concern for thresholds illustrates 
some of the complexity. I will return to Getachew’s suggestion of another way forward. 
 
The selected article by Etzione dates to early 2006. I assume that he too wrote the 
article before the 2005 R2P adoption by the UN General Assembly. I am not able to verify 
that, but as I have experienced with my own published articles, there is usually a time-lag, 
often several months, between the writing of an article and its eventual publishing. I find no 
references in the article to the adoption process in the UN or to the R2P paragraphs in the 
Outcome Document. This strengthens my assumption. On the other hand, there are several 
references to the ICISS report. His discussion also draws heavily on ICISS’ deliberations about 
sovereignty, but not to the more restricted adopted version which lacks direct references to 
the term ‘sovereignty’. 
 
I agree with Etzioni that the question of thresholds represents challenges calling for 
serious treatment. The Security Council can in principle decide thresholds on behalf of the 
international community. The main reason I see that this will probably not happen, is the 
complexity of the task, even if the discussion is held at the general level without connections 
to situations where member states’ national interests may prevent enlightened discussions. I 
may illustrate this complexity with an example from a related context. War is difficult to 
define. War involves organized military violence, but it is not clear how much violence there 
has to be before the term ‘war’ is justified (Garnett, 2005, p. 83). The difficulties connected 
to choosing a meaningful threshold makes the choice arbitrary. The influential definition by 
Singer and Small, referred to by Michael Sheehan (2011, p. 218), requires a war to involve at 
least 1000 battle deaths per year. Yet, it is not easy to argue for why the relevant number is 
1000, but not for instance 900, 1500, or something else. 
 
The atrocity categories addressed by R2P is probably more complex to handle in 
connection with thresholds. War crimes take place in all wars, but it is not always easy to 
determine if the scale is massive. Neither relevant conventions nor the R2P paragraphs in 
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the Outcome Document are very helpful to clarify this. In addition, the list of which acts that 
count as war crimes, codified in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, the 1945 Nuremberg 
principles, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, is long103. To define thresholds connected to 
the category ‘crimes against humanity’ is perhaps, but I underline perhaps, somewhat easier. 
Unlike war crimes, this category does not describe isolated acts committed by individuals. 
Crimes against humanity are acts purposedly committed as part of a governments’ policy, or 
part of a practice of atrocities tolerated by the same. Such acts directed at civilians might 
take place both in war and peace104. 
 
The category ‘genocide’ is more complicated than what a first look might indicate, 
because it includes not only killing. In accordance with Article 2 in the present Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, genocide also means any of four 
additional acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial, or religious group. These are causing serious bodily or mental harm to group- 
members, deliberately inflicting on life conditions to bring about physical destruction in 
whole or in part, imposing measures with the intent to prevent births within the group, and 
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group105. 
 
The US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken pointed to efforts of trying to destroy the 
identity and the culture of the Uighur minority when he in March 2021 accused the Chinese 
government of committing genocide as well as crimes against humanity. There are about 12 
million Uighurs, mostly Muslims, living in the northwestern region of Xinjian. About 1 million 
Uighurs are detained at camps. Allegations exist of forced labor, torture, and sexual abuse. 
The Canadian minister of Foreign Affairs, Marc Garneau, called the treatment systematic, 
state-led human rights violations, and the UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab spoke about 
appalling violations of the most basic human rights, calling for the international community 
to hold those responsible accountable106. Not very surprisingly, China denied and continues 
to deny the allegations. The Chinese government does not deny that the camps exist, but 
their version is that these are ‘re-education-facilities’ directed at combatting separatism and 
militant Islamist activity in the region. 
 
Sanctions on Chinese officials were imposed by several western states. These 
included travel bands and the freezing of assets upon senior officials in the Xinjiang province. 
The sanctions were a coordinated effort by the EU, UK, US, and Canada107. Yet, although 
these are powerful actors in world politics, they represent themselves, not the whole 




105 UN Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/ 
106 BBC News 26 March 2021 www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22278037 
107 BBC News 22 March 2021 www.bbc/com/nes/world-europe-56487162 , Dagbladet 27 March 2021, 
Aftenposten 30 March 2021 (Norwegian newspapers). 
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hardly possible to foresee, given that China is one of the permanent members with a veto. 
Neither can one expect any resolution addressing this case at all. In the Security Council 
there exist no agreement that the Chinese treatment of the Uighurs is an atrocity case. To 
get a better understanding of such challenges, I recommend my R2P articles 3 and 4. They 
both deal with implementation of R2P objectives through the Council. Yet, before it gives 
any meaning to talk about thresholds, a common understanding must establish that the 
situation under scrutiny is a possible atrocity situation. If governments in the respective 
states are to define themselves, whether they have or have not a protection problem, one 
risks the thresholds, in so far as they are possible to define, being set too high. This may, as 
pointed to by Etzioni (2006, p. 79), function as a barrier to prevent international 
interference, because the many requirements placed on intervening parties of finding out to 
what extent the situation meets the test, will make them reluctant to act. 
 
The democratic deficit discussed by both Etzioni and Pandiaraj is relevant and 
interesting. To a large extent independent of which definition of democracy one choses to 
lean on, the UN Security Council does not appear as a striking democratic body. Etzioni is 
also right that transferring responsibility to this body when the state fails to provide 
protection, implies that the affected population lose the possibility to influence the 
judgements. I find this aspect under-communicated in current R2P debates. However, one 
also must ask how important this influence is for the affected population in situations where 
help from the international community might be their only way to escape mass atrocities. All 
members of the UN are states. When signing for UN membership, state leaders accept that 
promotion of human rights is one of the purposes of the organization (UN Charter, Chapter 1 
article 1), and they accept that the UN Security Council, with its current composition and 
way of functioning, can use force on behalf of the international community (UN Charter, 
Chapter 7 article 42). I do not see this as a removal of the fact that the democratic deficit is 
problematic, but it makes it more acceptable to live with the problem, because when states 
sign the UN Charter, the sovereigns perform a sovereign act, on behalf of their subjects. 
 
The Security Council is a powerful body, but it is not a world government. As pointed 
to by Moses (2013, p. 129), we cannot exclude the possibility of power abuse, and if this 
happens, the Council will not be accountable to any higher authority. This was a main reason 
for why Kant did not suggest a government for the whole world, as it is for adherents of ‘thin 
cosmopolitanism’ which I discuss in my first R2P article (article 1, p. 125)108. The questions of 
Security Council reforms and ‘codes of conduct’ pointed to by Pandiaraj (2016, p. 795), I will 





108 As described in article 1 (p. 125), only a marginal branch of cosmopolitanism argues for the replacement of 
all states by a single global government, in a radical version tracing back to the 18th Century Prussian political 
thinker Baron de Cloots. 
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Moses presents the contradiction between two alternative understandings of 
sovereignty, de jure and de facto. R2P leans on the first one, where sovereignty can redefine 
through social interaction and discourse. Scholars who call themselves realists understand 
sovereignty as de facto power, performed primarily by coercion. 
 
The term ‘primarily’ as Moses (2013, p. 114) uses when defining sovereignty in terms 
of coercive power, is not the same as ‘only’. Primarily leaves a room, although a limited one, 
to other concerns. According to Moses, realists accept responsibilities as a premise. 
Although they have little focus on rules, and much more on material power, they accept 
voluntary binding to restraints. Restraints imposed by outside powers is not possible to 
accept because it crosses the domain of sovereignty. If responsibilities are accepted, the 
next question is where these come from. Since they hardy develop in a vacuum, the 
sovereign powers must either develop them themselves, or more likely, as a contract 
between themselves and the subjects. Import from the outside world is also a possibility 
insofar as it takes place voluntarily, not by imposition. Yet, one still must ask if it is possible 
for a sovereign, from a realist perspective, to abstain totally from binding to any kind of 
responsibility. I cannot see that Moses offer any clear answer to this question, but I suppose 
the answer will be yes if sovereign rights derive from the capacity to enforce only. Yet, if this 
is what realists mean, it seems somewhat strange to build the arguments with reference to 
Hobbes. At best it seems like a rather selective reading of him. Hobbes’ notion of absolute 
sovereignty attracts realists, but Hobbes also clearly stated that absolutism came with limits. 
Sovereignty in Hobbes’ version, as discussed in section 7.3.4 in the cover-article, was 
absolute only when the sovereigns protected the subjects from each other and from foreign 
threats. Sovereignty from the Hobbesian perspective may even be lost, not because 
sovereigns lose the ability to enforce, but because they fail to provide the expected 
protection (Berkowitz, 2008, pp. 18-19; Glanville, 2011, pp. 238-239). 
 
The question of interventions for humanitarian reasons is the most controversial 
aspect of the R2P principle. As Sebastian von Einsiedel and Louise Bosetti (2016, p. 372) 
formulated it, consensus around the sharp end, those cases where one must consider tough 
measures, has always been frail. I use this statement in my R2P article 3 (p. 39). Realists’ 
reluctance to accept any outside interference beyond the voluntary into states’ internal 
affairs, is logical from the point of view that sovereignty can only locate one place. Since 
realism represents a state-centric approach to international relations, the location must be 
at state level. An intervention from outside for protection purposes against the will of the 
government in question, means from this position either to take over sovereign power, or to 
operate within a sphere where no sovereignty exists. None of this is acceptable for realists 
since it undermines the whole vision of a state-centric world order. Realists can find support 
beyond their own ‘founding fathers’. To some extent, they can also draw on Kant who 
argued against outside interference even when the sovereigns abuse their power, although 
based on a different set of arguments connected to what is morally right and wrong. Yet, 
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apart from this special view on interventions, realists do not have much in common with 
Kant. 
 
There is a limited discussion of how to understand state sovereignty and the non- 
intervention norm in the ICISS-report (2001, pp. 12-13). The authors admit that the UN deals 
with a dilemma in the conceptual language of two notions of sovereignty, one vesting in the 
state, the other one in the people and in individuals. As I understand the arguments in the 
report, the two notions unify when a state voluntarily signs the Charter of the UN. When 
they do, they accept the responsibilities that follow from the signatures. By granting 
membership of the UN, the international community welcomes the signatory state, not just 
as a member of the community of nations, but in addition as a responsible member. This 
thinking of sovereignty in responsibility terms does, from ICISS’ perspective, not imply any 
transfer or dilution of state sovereignty (2001, p.13). The report also has a quite 
comprehensive discussion about the reaction component of R2P, the responsibility put on 
the international community to react to situations of compelling need for human protection 
(2001, pp. 29-39). However, the report gives no clear answer to where sovereignty locates, if 
anywhere, when it is no longer present at state level. 
 
Getachew’s article goes, as I read it, right into the so-called agent-structure debate. 
The relationship between agents and structures is a fundamental philosophical issue within 
the social sciences. According to Alexander Wendt (1987, pp. 337-338), the issue originates 
from two truisms about social life. The first one is that human beings and their organizations 
are purposeful actors whose actions help reproducing and transforming society. Yet, society 
also consists of relationships, which structure the interactions between the actors, or, as 
Colin Wight (2005, p. 24) notes, the problem is about the relationship between active and 
self-reflecting agents and the structural context in which their activities take place. Brown 
(2019, p. 62) describes the debate to be centered on whether agency, the actions of actors 
or their capacity to act, or structure, such as international anarchy or international society, is 
the key determinant of the social world. Structures are abstract formulations whose effects 
are possible to perceive. They function as enablers and constraints, but the structures 
themselves are not observable entities. About the room for agency within the constraints of 
structure, Brown (2019, p. 65) explains: “Structure create the possibility of agency, but does 
not dictate it, in the same way as language create the possibility of speech, but cannot cause 
any particular conversation”. 
 
Getachew (2019, pp. 228-229) understands principles to emerge from political 
questions and practices. They are themselves forms of political action. They provide legal 
authorization, confer authority and agency, and allocate and redistribute power among 
differently positioned actors. They engender certain kinds of practice while foreclosing and 
displacing others. This in turn produces new institutionalized contexts and conditions in a 
continuing process. The speed may increase or slow down, but the process never ends. 
107  
 
If sovereignty as responsibility is collectively recognized as a structural feature of the 
international order, this will generate consequences for how actors, in this context the states 
and more precisely the state leaders acting on behalf of them, understand the limits of 
acceptable behavior, and which strategies are acceptable to achieve objectives. Getachew’s 
main problem with this seems to be its reproduction and legitimization of an unjust 
international order, a structure where sovereignty, particularly for the weaker states, is 
contingent. She argues for incorporating problematical features of this order into the 
analysis, which may challenge established views of where responsibility ought to be located 
and influence our thinking about sovereignty more broadly. I recognize that these arguments 
have relevance. She may also be right that unfortunate and unjust structures stimulate the 
creation of domestic elites, increasing the possibilities that discontent by those not 
privileged will lead to domestic conflicts. 
 
However, my understanding of Getachew’s article is that she views sovereignty as 
responsibility to permit the existence of an unjust international order, characterized by legal, 
economic, and political hierarchies between states. I find it more problematic to accept this. 
Yet, she offers a quite comprehensive discussion where she addresses how to overcome the 
problem she defines. As described above, among her suggestions is to look at how 
anticolonial nationalists in the early phases of decolonization understood sovereignty. They 
claimed democratic self-government domestically and non-domination internationally. A 
society of free citizens with equal rights to participate in the making of decisions was 
expected to be a society that protects human rights in general. R2P locates sovereignty at 
state level. Getachew finds this problematic from the perspective of domestic self- 
governance and international non-dominance. Her alternative is to think bottom up, 
emphasizing popular sovereignty, to articulate demands through collective politics. Yet, she 
recognizes that the real world is rife with obstacles for the realization of the preferred 
conditions (2019, pp. 232-234). 
 
Getachew suggests building down the hierarchical economic and political relations 
that structure the current international order. She foresees that an anticolonial account of 
sovereignty can reorient contemporary debates by drawing attention to sovereign 
inequality. Yet, she admits that focusing on structures does not provide us with any straight- 
forward answer to what we should do when a crisis calls for immediate response (2019, p. 
236). Delivering such answers was not the ambition with her article. Neither does she 
suggest that structures should be our only focus in dealing with atrocity crimes. 
 
My problem with the recommendation to build down unjust structures, especially at 
the international level, is a fear that if this becomes the dominant focus, it may confuse who 
the responsible actors are when mass atrocity crimes occur, a possible receipt for passivity. 
Structures are, by definition, conditions that are relatively stable over time. To build down 
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structures can be extremely difficult. There are huge challenges connected to defining the 
problems, agreeing about the necessity to deal with them, finding out how to do so in a 
proper way, to decide who shall be responsible for doing what at which levels etc. In a short 
time-perspective, when an emerging situation calls for immediate action, a focus on 
structures is hardly a relevant option. I will argue that bringing structures into the picture is 
most relevant for R2Ps preventive dimension, especially when the address is root-causes of 
conflicts and their connections to various contexts. Both the ICISS report and several of the 
yearly R2P reports of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly describes such 
efforts, although these documents mainly focus on root-causes embedded in domestic 
environments, less so in international structures. To work for structural changes at the local 
and the national level may include efforts to strengthen local and national capacity to deal 
with conflicts that have a potential to escalate, for instance by building up inclusive 
institutions. This is a task for the longer perspective, but in many conflict-torn areas often 
not an easy one. Getachew also points to such efforts in her article, although she mainly 
focuses on the international and the global level. 
 
Keeping focus on structures seems to me much less relevant when a crisis involving 
mass atrocities calls for immediate and rapid response. Unjust structures, at different levels, 
may have contributed to create a context favorable for the evolvement of the crisis. The 
long-term response will be to address these weaknesses, but the immediate task is to save 
human lives here and now. In doing that, I cannot see how focusing on structural features 
can be fruitful. I am more prone to agree with Gilley (2009, p. 73) who argues that although 
states are not in entire control of their performances, they are mainly in control, and states 
are responsible for what happens inside their borders. The time to change unjust structures 
is not the moment when mass atrocities occur or is imminent in an immediate threat. In 
such situations it is important to avoid structures perceived unjust to produce frustration 
that can become an excuse for doing little or nothing. 
 
Proponents of structuralism109 will probably argue that the structure of a system is 
more important than the behavior of individual members (Burnham and Jones, 1996, p. 
480). I do not share this view when we deal with mass atrocities. Neither do I argue for 
methodological individualism110. I recognize that actors operate within contexts that 
influence them. However, I do not accept that mass atrocities ever occur as unintended 
products of structures. Human agency is always not just present, but the decisive element. 
Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing, are consciously 
initiated acts, designed and operated by human agents, although unfavorable contexts may 
inspire them. Mass atrocities always involve decisions by human beings, individually or on 
 
109 Structural inquiry has deep roots in Western thought and traces back to the work of Plato and Aristotle. 
Modern structuralism as a distinct epistemology began with the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Sassure (1857- 
1913) (Burnham and Jones, 1996, pp. 480-481). 
110 Methodological individualism is the view that social phenomena is possible to explain entirely by reference 
to motives and actions of individuals. 
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behalf of states, decisions that could have been otherwise. The commitment of mass 
atrocities is not possible without the actions of human perpetrators who could have chosen 
not to perform those cruel acts111. Therefore, the correct address for rapid response must 
from my perspective necessarily be those who commit the crimes on the ground. 
 
To change international structures intentionally is probably only possible if numerous 
influential actors in the international sphere join their forces towards this task. However, 
even international structures do change. These changes are not always the result of human 
intentions, but sometimes they are. The United Nations did not pop up by itself. It was 
established through conscious design by politicians with the ambition to create a better 
world. The UN Security Council was equipped with its prerogative to upheld international 
peace and security, not as a coincidence, but because powerful actors agreed to create this 
arrangement, based on former experiences with the League of Nations lacking a similar 
body. Yet, to deal with the change of structures from an analytical perspective will demand 
that connected categories, for instance a term such as ‘hierarchy of states’, is possible to 
operationalize in a meaningful way. Getachew’s text is not rife with answers, but her article 
may inspire to more research around such challenges. 
 
The real world is far from ideal. It is not controversial to say that injustices exist on all 
levels, from the local to the global, although opinions vary about the content as well as the 
influence on outcomes in different settings. The struggle between order and justice is 
permanently prevalent. Selective responses from the international community to 
humanitarian crisis is one result of this struggle. I have discussed that dilemma quite detailed 
in my R2P articles 3 (pp. 43-45) and 4 (p. 83). There may be a call for international R2P 
response to a crisis in Darfur, but due to the composition and the functioning of the UN 
Security Council, China does not risk sanctions from the Council for its treatment of the 
Uighur minority. Yet, one may ask, as I also do in article 3 (p. 44) with reference to Alex 




7.4.7 My comments enlightened by the English School theoretical approach to IR 
 
It was not an alternative I considered, but when I read Moses’ article, I received 
several supportive arguments for not having chosen realism as the cover-article’s preferred 






111 To deny obeying an order can under certain circumstances have fatal consequences for the individual in 
question. Yet, I insist that even such situations include an element of choice. 
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thinkers like Thukydides112, Sun Tzu113, Machiavelli114, and Hobbes. It is not one single 
theory, rather a ‘house’ for several theories with differences, although they share some 
basic assumptions. Realism is good to explain different issues connected to international 
security and power politics, but a discussion about sovereignty as responsibility needs an 
analytical tool that encompasses more than unitary states pursuing their national interests in 
an anarchic atmosphere. To discuss R2P without including the UN as an important 
international actor, is rather meaningless. Yet, realists in general do not recognize 
international organizations as much more than arenas where states continue their struggle 
for power. In article 2 (p. 52) I refer to Jack Donnely’s statement where he portraits the 
realist view on international organizations115 as being at best intervening variables that can 
be expected to have independent effects only in minor issue areas far removed from the 
struggle for power116. Realists understand sovereignty primarily as an attribute of the state. 
However, to talk about sovereignty in terms of legitimacy becomes more relevant if we 
consider sovereignty not as an attribute, but as attributed to the state by other states or by 
the international community. Yet, this opens a space for ambiguities and contingency, as 
pointed to by Nolte, Etzioni and Pandiaraj. As explained by Janice Thomson (1995, p. 228), 
external recognition as a sovereign state is contingent on some set of criteria. The question 
is how those who do the recognizing define the criteria, and their definitions may change. 
 
International anarchy is present in English School thinking, as one of the elements in 
Wights’ triad. States pursue national interests, but they are not occupied doing this all the 
time. International anarchy coexists with societal elements. Bull’s ‘anarchical society’ does 
not have any global government, but it is, to use his words, a world where states conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another. They 
also work together within the frameworks of common institutions (Bull, 1997, p. 13). Yet, 
like realism, the pluralist position within the English School that Bull represented is clearly 
state-centric117. Bull was particularly occupied with the maintenance of international order. 
He did not place primary emphasis upon international law or international organizations. 
Order can exist and has existed independently of both. However, order depends on the 
existence of rules. Rules can, but do not need to, have the status of international law. Bull 
recognized that the UN and its specialized agencies played an important role for the 
maintenance of order in contemporary world politics, but in his view this role was best 
understood not in terms of official objectives and aspirations, but in terms of the 
 
112 The Greek general and author Thukydides (460-400 BC) is most known for ‘The Pelopponesian War’, 
considered as one of the great works in world literature. 
113 Sun Tzu (about 500 BC), a Chinese general and author of ‘The Art of War’, about military strategy. 
114 Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) was an Italian diplomat, philosopher, and author. His most famous book, 
about advices to state leaders, ‘The Prince’, was published in 1532 five years after his death. 
115 Donnelly uses the word ‘institutions’. 
116 Donnelly, Jack. 2005. Realism. In Theories of International Relations, eds. Burchill et.al, p. 47. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
117 The solidarist position is less state-centric, but even this one sees states as the most important international 
actors. 
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contribution they make to the work of the more basic institutions. Bull even has a comment 
where he indicates that the UN, because of the great mass of documentation it engenders, 
has been overstudied, and that this has drawn scholarly attention away from more 
fundamental sources of international order, like the role of great powers, the balance of 
power, international law, and diplomacy (Bull, 1977, Introduction pp. xxxiv-xxxv). 
 
Skepticism to humanitarian interventions is not a realist prerogative. In Bull’s 
international society, general protection cannot be expected, only protection which is 
selective in character. Often human rights abuses will not activate international reactions 
(1977, p. 85), but sometimes they will. In chapter 6, the theory chapter, I described how R. J. 
Vincent strived with this issue. As the English School scholar who most detailed has 
addressed issues of interventions, he saw the sovereign equality of states as fundamental, 
and he was concerned about possible non-humanitarian motives among intervening actors. 
Many states are reluctant to weaken the principle of non-intervention by making it 
contingent on the fulfillment of responsibilities, because they fear misuse by mightier states. 
I have included this point in all my five R2P articles (article 1, p. 132; article 2, p. 54; article 3, 
p. 46; article 4, pp. 84-85; article 5, p. 10). Jarat Chopra118 is my main reference in the 
articles, but many other scholars have dealt with the same puzzle. Focusing on developing 
countries and with reference to Gareth Evans, Camilla Pupparo writes: 
 
“The non-intervention international law principle has enjoyed much adherence and 
support, especially from developing countries, due to the fact that after de-colonization, the 
new - and therefore weaker - states, saw it as their only defense against more powerful 
international actors they felt threatened by”. 
(Pupparo, 2015, pp. 2-3) 
 
If interventions for humanitarian reasons are to be accepted, one must accept to live 
with uncertainty connected to motives. However, during his academic career Vincent moved 
from a position of rigorous adherence to non-intervention to a more flexible one, arguing 
that the survival of the international society of states is possible only when nurtured by 
progress. Without progress it will degenerate to great power dominance (Griffiths et.al., 
2009, pp. 237-239). 
 
The English School can play on a larger register than many other theoretical 
approaches to IR in explaining the motives behind state action. Their scholars see the 
international sphere as a genuine human one. Just human beings have motives. A state’s 
motives must have a connection to human thinking. Human beings are not equally visible 
internationally within realism in general, but as a broad tradition of thinking there are room 
for some variety. Moses does not address this variety in his article, but it is relevant if we 
 
118 Chopra, Jarat. 1994. The Obsolence of Intervention under International Law. In Marianne Heiberg Subduing 
Sovereignty, pp. 33-62. London: Pinter Publishers. 
112  
extend the discussion of de facto sovereignty to include motives behind the practice of 
power, not primarily towards domestic subjects, but in the international realm among other 
sovereigns. Kenneth Waltz’ neorealism omits leader’s motivations for international 
outcomes except for the minimal assumptions that states seek to survive (Elmer, 2008, p. 
709). However, the most prominent scholar within classical realism, Hans Joachim 
Morgenthau119, rejected the equation of political realism with immorality. He leaved a room 
for statecraft. According to him, state leaders had a strong moral dignity to the national 
interest demanding great caution in the exercise of power (Bew, 2016, p. 212). Neoclassical 
realism, a more recent version, although keeping capabilities and the distribution of power 
as starting points in accordance with neorealism, insists that leader’s views of how power 
should be used intervene between structural constraints and behavior (Elmer, 2008, pp. 711- 
712). Vincent defined humanitarian intervention as an act of power, which included taking 
sides. Yet, as demonstrated by the conflicts in the Middle East, it is not always easy to find 
the right actor to support. I have used this argument in my R2P-article 1 with reference to 
Chris Brown120 (article 1, p. 129). 
 
The English School view of IR as a genuine human world is highly relevant also for the 
discussion of human agency in relation to Getachew’s article. International relations are, 
from the English School perspective, a special branch of human relations which involves 
rules, norms, and values (Jackson and Sørensen, 2003, p. 141). Even when mass atrocities 
take place, those thinking, and acting, are human beings. States cannot act without human 
beings acting on behalf of them. Structures can neither act, although they form a context 
that influences human thinking and acting. Structures also affect what human actors see as 
the realm of possibilities. To understand modern international society both at the ideational 
and at the concrete level, as the English School invites us to do, implies, as Buzan (2014, p. 
22) explains, to incorporate the consciousness and the moral character of the actors. I take it 
for granted that this pertains even to societies where mass atrocities occur, and under 
circumstances where structures, at the local, the regional, or the global level, contribute to 
produce outcomes that are widely considered being unjust. 
 
It is also possible to see shared ideas, beliefs, and values, as themselves having 
structural characteristics, and as such exerting powerful influence on social and political 
action. The existence of structures then becomes dependent on practicing actors. This, 
however, is more a constructivist view than a position of the English School, although it is a 
view that probably will appeal to scholars connected to the world society position. 
Constructivism121 as a theoretical perspective on IR see the world as a project under 
 
 
119 Morgenthau’s classical realism has some similarities with the pluralist position within the English School. 
120 Brown, Chris. 2002. Sovereignty, Rights and Justice – International Political Theory Today. Cambridge / 
Oxford: Polity Press, p. 152. 
121 There exist different variants of constructivism. Here I refer to so-called conventional constructivism. This 
perspective recognizes some foundations for knowledge. The constructed reality is limited to the social world 
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construction, as becoming rather than being (Adler, 2002, p. 95). To some extent, this is 
unifiable with a solidarist English School position who see a development where shared 
norms and rules progressively weakens and delegitimizes the role of power and coercion 
(Grieco et.al., 2019, p. 86). Pluralist oriented scholars are more occupied with the limitations 
connected to what is possible to construct. They do not believe that construction is the 
answer to the dynamics of power and competition, which will not disappear. Within IR 
theory, Kenneth Waltz’ neorealism is probably the approach that most heavily lean on 
structures to explain outcomes, leaving little or no room for agency. I use this as one of the 
selected theories in R2P article 2 where I discuss conditions for cooperation and joint action 
under international anarchy (article 2, p. 47, pp. 51-52, p. 54 and p. 56). 
 
Getachev suggested to build down unjust structures that dominates the current 
international order, particularly existing hierarchical economic and political relations. From a 
pluralist English School position this is a project connected to high risk, for mainly the same 
reasons as I discussed in section 7.3.6. Changing unjust structures to more just ones is very 
often a complex task at the local level, although there exist many suggestions connected to 
the preventive dimension of R2P, especially efforts addressed at root-causes. To change 
global structures is probably required from an English School world society position, but the 
scholars are much better to tell what they wish to achieve compared with how to achieve it. 
Neither does Getachew offer any receipt in her article. Apart from at the ideational level, 
Bull considered a world society based on a common good as non-existing. 
 
A just order is of course to prefer compared to an unjust one. Yet, even an unjust 
order is an order, and as such better than no order or chaos. Justice was for Bull (1977, p. 83) 
only possible to realize in the context of order. Therefore, Bull’s general advice was to 
prioritize order over justice, but he did not postulate this as a rule without any exceptions. 
He was open for considerations related to the cases in question (1977, p. 93). From an 
English School solidarist position, this is not sufficient. For solidarists human rights are, as 
described in chapter 6, a floor beneath, not a ceiling above states. Among the scholars who 
adhere to this view is Alex J. Bellamy, one of the most prominent R2P researchers. 
 
My third and fourth R2P articles discuss challenges connected to the implementation 
of R2P objectives through the UN Security Council. The articles point to some measures 
which is supposed to improve implementation, like more clear criterions for what to do and 
how to do it in different situations. However, the articles do not discuss reforms of the 
Council. This itself is a large debate, and a deeper engagement with it lies outside the scope 
of my cover-article. Yet, in my discussion in article 5 about India’s position on R2P (article 5, 
pp. 13-14), I mention one possible reform which could, if implemented, at least to some 
extent meet the requirements for democratization pointed to by Etzioni, Pandiaraj, 
 
and the concepts we use to describe it, in contrast to postmodern variants who understand the whole world as 
imaginations and talk. 
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and Moses. India’s political leadership frequently argue for a permanent Security Council 
seat, using arguments about democracy and size. India is often called the world’s largest 
democracy encompassing about 16% of the world’s population. They are not alone in their 
effort. Brazil, Germany, and Japan also seek permanent seats, and this group of four (G4) 
back each other. A reform of the Council by extending the number of permanent members 
would mirror today’s world better than what the current composition of the Council does, a 
system Joseph Swartzberg (2013, p. 65) calls anachronistic, of decreasing representativeness 
and legitimacy with the passage of time. One would also have to decide if or not new 
permanent members should be equipped with a veto like the current ones. Even an 
extension with permanent members without veto would need approval from the existing 
veto powers. So far, the G4 has not been able to gain sufficient support. That China opposes 
the Indian claim, is hardly a surprise, given the tense relationship that exists between these 
two rising Asian powers. 
 
Another suggestion, I mention it in article 5 (p. 14), does not imply any organizational 
reform. It is the plead from former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon not to use veto- 
power in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations related to R2P (Ban, 2009, pp. 26- 
27). R2P is a normative standard and a moral imperative of the international community. 
Therefore, how the permanent council members use their vetoes is a concern for the same 
community (Stojkovski, 2017, p. 88). Yet, it is hard to see any mutual understanding around 
this among these members. I mention in article 5 the frequent vetoes by Russia and China on 
drafted resolutions related to the Syrian civil war to underpin the argument, although it also 
belongs to the picture that UK and France have expressed some support for the Secretary- 
General’s plead. 
 
The resistance against reforming the Security Council and the unwillingness to restrict 
the use of vetoes, suits very well into how pluralists within the English School view 
international relations. The normative aspect of Bull’s anarchical society is visible, but so is 
indeed also power politics. If these suggestions could function as a test for the degree of 
solidarism that may exist in the international spere, I suppose the answers do not please 
solidarist oriented English School scholars. On the other hand, if we extend the timeline back 
to the end of the Second World War, things look more optimistic from a solidarist position. 
Buzan (2014, pp. 158-159) points to the norm of human equality embedded in the UN 
Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the later UN human rights 
conventions, and the Human Rights Council, as examples of how solidarism has advanced in 
a state-centric international order. The rhetorical aspect shall not be ignored, but even 
rhetorical adherence to a norm is a signal that it is not indifferent, as indicated by Mervin 
Frost’ argument that states nearly always communicate their actions to the wider world in 
ethical terms because engagement with ethics is a precondition for legitimate 
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participation122. I refer to Frost in four of my five R2P articles (article 1, p. 129; article 2, p. 
53; article 3, p. 41; article 5, p. 12). 
 
It is possible to describe the period after World War 2 as a development where 
human rights have acquired legitimacy as basis for policy and appeal for international action. 
I find it plausible to add the paragraphs on R2P in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document to the list. The principle was adopted with consensus by the UN General 
Assembly, although the negotiated text represented a more restricted R2P version than the 
original one suggested by ICISS. I will also argue that including R2P not just expands the list 
of documents quantitatively. It is also a qualitative improvement. Other human rights 
documents also set standards for legitimate behavior, but most of them do not involve the 
international community in following up these standards to the degree R2P does through 
pillar two and three. From the perspective of English School scholars, it seems to me possible 
to interpret this as a step towards more solidarity in the international sphere, not a large 
step perhaps, given the frustration that often accompany the follow up in real world 







































Chapter 8 Final remarks 
 
The cover-article is, as the name says, a cover, for five R2P articles I have published 
between 2016 and 2021. It consists of two main parts. Part 1 introduces R2P for the reader, 
which I also do in all my articles. After this introduction follows a discussion of the language 
used about R2P. I have chosen to include this discussion in the cover-article because it 
signals how we understand R2P, and this understanding has important consequences. 
Thereafter I give a brief presentation of the articles, before I discuss the methodological 
approach and methodological challenges connected to my work with the articles and with 
the cover-article. The methodology chapter ends part 1. 
 
Part 2 first outlines a context for the main discussion through explaining some central 
concepts. My selected analytical tool, the English School approach to international relations 
(IR), is then presented. The main discussion, informed by this approach, is about sovereignty 
as responsibility. I chose to forward this topic because it is an underlying assumption in all 
my articles that sovereignty entails responsibilities. The articles do not discuss in detail what 
this means. The cover-article discusses the imagination through both history and current 
debates, including a presentation of some critical voices followed by my comments. 
 
The cover-article encompasses many issues. It is hardly meaningful to unite them all 
within one single conclusion. Working with R2P through many years has given me a better 
understanding of how complex the international sphere is. Catherine Renshaw (June 2, 
2021)123 calls R2P an idea whose time never comes. R2P was meant to stop atrocities, but 
has, according to her, become an empty mantra that will sit on the annual agenda of the UN 
General Assembly as a recurrent sign of the noble reach, but limited grasp of the United 
Nations. Yes, there are many obstacles challenging successful implementation of R2P 
objectives. I have discussed these challenges in all my R2P articles, with focus particularly on 
the Security Council in articles 3 and 4. However, I prefer to look for the positive signs. 
Possibilities exist, some of which are not yet explored, perhaps not even discovered. In 
article 2 (p. 56) I refer to a statement by former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Navanethem Pillay (2009, p. 4), where she says: “The full potential of the protection norm is 
far from being realized”. She expressed this in 2009, but as I see it, the relevance has not 
diminished as time has passed. I therefore would like to end the cover-article by adopting 









123 The Interpreter, published daily by the Lowy Institute, an international policy think tank in Sydney, Australia. 
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keynote-speech on June 1, at the 2021 virtual R2P in Theory and Practice Conference124, he 
dedicated these optimistic words, as I remember them125, to students around the world: 
 
Ideas, norms, and principles matter. All the places where there are conflicts, there are also 












































124 This international conference was arranged virtually due to the covid pandemic. The International Justice 
and Human Rights Unit at Edge Hill University, Liverpool, hosted the conference in collaboration with the 
University of Ljubljana, the European Center for the Responsibility to Protect (ECR2P) in Leeds, and the British 
International Studies Association’s Working Group on Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. 
125 I am of course aware of that this is not a source possible to control since it is not published in any public 
document. I therefore take the full responsibility if there should be something with the statement that I have 
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In 2005, the UN World Summit adopted the principle known as
"Responsibility to Protect" (R2P). This article asks how selected theoretical
perspectives on international relations might explain and reduce the gap
between the application of R2P in the real world and the requirements of
a "thin cosmopolitan" imagination. Thin cosmopolitanism, which views
humanity as a singular moral community, represents an imagination of a
world free from mass atrocities, in which R2P seems well suited; humanity
would benefit from a reduction in the gap between this imagination and
reality. Although thin cosmopolitanism represents ideal theory, it prescribes
standards that can serve as goals of political change in a non-ideal world.1
R2P
The 2005 United Nations General Assembly World Summit in New
York hosted the largest gathering of state leaders ever up to that point.
On September 16, 2005, R2P was included in the General Assembly's
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Outcome Document, which obliges each individual state to provide
protection from mass atrocities, defined as "genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity." 2 Within this framework, the
international community assists states in the exercise of their R2P obli-
gation, and failures call for "appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and
other peaceful means in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII" of the
UN Charter. Should peaceful measures be inadequate, the UN Security
Council is prepared to take collective action, citing Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional
organizations. The Security Council adopted R2P in 2006.' In 2009, the
General Assembly reaffirmed its support with a new resolution,4 and R2P
has since been endorsed in following reports of the UN Secretary-General.
R2P entered international vocabulary in the 2001 report from The
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).5
The ICISS, initiated by the government of Canada, was a response to chal-
lenges raised by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Citing the principles
of the UN Charter, Annan asked world leaders to oblige themselves on
behalf of humanity, referring to the recent UN failures: Rwanda (1994),
Srebrenica in Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999). The mandate for the UN
mission in Sudan (2006) was the first invocation of R2P for a particular
conflict.6 When the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 on Libya in
March of 2011, it was the first time the UN authorized the use of military
force for human protection purposes against a functioning government.7
More recent UN resolutions also refer to R2P, and remind state leaders
of their responsibilities. Yet, it has been very difficult to achieve Security
Council agreement for collective action since 2011, despite massive human
suffering in ongoing conflicts.
R2P is a comprehensive approach. Military response as a compo-
nent of R2P is the last resort, for use only when other alternatives have
proved insufficient or are no longer relevant. Of the responsibilities ICISS
discusses as critical to R2P, this article focuses on prevention and reaction.
COSMOPOLITANISM
The Tradition
In the 4 'h century B.C.E., when the Greek philosopher Diogenes
of Sinope was asked where he came from, he answered kosmopolitks. He
considered himself a "citizen of the world."8 This was a strange answer
then, and even today probably not the answer one expects if posing the
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same question. Cosmopolitanism encompasses a variation of thoughts, in
which the human being is the ultimate unit of moral concern. The central
cosmopolitan idea is to treat humanity as a single moral community with
priority over national and subnational communities.9 This requires justice
to be applied on a global scope. While cosmopolitan philosophy is occu-
pied with the theoretical justification of cosmopolitan principles, cosmo-
politanism is also a political project committed to establishing supportive
political institutions.
That said, there is no general agreement about the exact character
of suitable global governance.1" A marginal branch of cosmopolitanism
argues for the replacement of all states by a single global government, in a
radical version tracing back to the 18' century Prussian political thinker,
Baron de Cloots." However, most cosmopolitans today are more familiar
with the thinking of another Prussian, the great Enlightenment philoso-
pher Immanuel Kant. Kant stands as the greatest source of inspiration for a
number of modern cosmopolitan approaches. He feared that a global state,
if possible to create, would lead to tyranny, instead proposing the federa-
tion of republican states that did not include coercive global institutions.
Yet, both in the Enlightenment and today, human beings are inextricably
connected and cannot live independent of one another. Violations are felt
everywhere. 12
Ancient Greek philosophy argues that human beings are able to
identify with political community beyond the closed polis, or city-state.
13
This line of thinking developed further throughout the rise of the Roman
Empire. However, as described by Gerard Delanty, cosmopolitanism is not
a genuine western project.1 4 The origins of universalistic principles with
an inclusive vision of human commu-
nity come from the emergence of
many different civilizations and tradi-
tions, such as Greek, Chinese, Hindu,
Islamic, and Christian; for example,
the Roman Empire itself embraced a
great variety of Mediterranean cultures.
However, cosmopolitanism should
not be confused with globalization.
While the latter is not a recent phenom-
enon, cosmopolitanism is still much
older. In fact, cosmopolitan solutions
Cosmopolitanism extends
the unit of analysis beyond
national frameworks and
borders, raising debate
on how best to approach
the effects ofglobalization
methodologically.
can perhaps answer some of the challenges caused by globalization processes
in an interconnected world. Delanty sees cosmopolitanism as one of the
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key dynamics of modernity. It represents ongoing, dynamic, and creative
processes opening normative questions, not stable conditions or concrete
identities.15 Cosmopolitanism extends the unit of analysis beyond national
frameworks and borders, raising debate on how best to approach the effects
of globalization methodologically.'6
Thin Cosmopolitanism
All cosmopolitans envision attachment to and responsibilities at
the global level in one form or another, but "thick" and "thin" cosmo-
politanism differ in their interpretation of these. "Thick" cosmopolitanism
insists that any attention to others must include all of humanity. No room
exists for special attention to any particular person or group. However, thin
cosmopolitanism, the framework for this article, accepts different spheres
of moral responsibility, allowing for greater degrees of attachment o close
others.
Three interlinked concepts compose thin cosmopolitanism. The
first is the human being as the ultimate entity entitled to universal human
rights: rights are inherent simply in being a member of humanity. This
forms a basic premise for this discussion. As Richard Shapcott expresses,
"If there is one issue in international relations today which most directly
speaks to the concern of a thin cosmopolitanism, it is the idea of universal
human rights."17 States and other associations are valued only insofar as they
respect these human rights. The second concept is that of open, inclusive
debates across cultures and civilizations. Dialogue and consent are central
for the thin cosmopolitan project.'8 Thirdly, as stated by Andrew Linklater,
no loyalties are absolute in a cosmopolitan political community,9 which in
turn has implications for our understanding of state sovereignty.
Selected Theoretical Perspectives
Relevant theoretical perspectives to R2P in a cosmopolitan context
are the English School, constructivism, and critical theory. Although the
English School is a normative, not a cosmopolitan perspective, its focus on
the extent that values and norms guide international action is relevant in a
discussion of the gap between R2P in the real world and R2P within a thin
cosmopolitan framework. Constructivism does not rely on any particular
philosophy, but frames the concepts we use to describe the social world
as interpreted constructions, which gives us an alternate lens to under-
stand certain norms and structures. Constructivism's ontological position
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of mutual constitution between actors and structures challenges identities,
and may change practice. Finally, critical theory embraces a cosmopolitan
vision of the world and questions borders from a moral perspective. As a
normative approach, critical theory attempts to identify how the interna-
tional order can better develop.
R2P, THIN COSMOPOLITANISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
While human rights praxis around the globe is hardly impressive,
the formal recognition of human rights as an international issue of utter
importance is difficult to deny. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights2° is the most important normative document in UN history. The
UN Charter lists respect for human
rights among its main purposes.21 The
largest international conference ever to
discuss human rights issues, the 1993
UN World Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna, treated the universal
nature of all human rights as beyond
22any question. Because mass atrocities
are human rights violations on a large
scale, the principle of R2P is very much
about human rights. R2P offers preven-
tive and halting tools for atrocities, and
it is consistent with the expectations of
R2P offers preventive and
halting toolsfor atrocities,
and it is consistent with
the expectations of a thin
cosmopolitan community
for an applied moral
universalism beyond the
morality of states.
a thin cosmopolitan community for an applied moral universalism beyond
the morality of states.
On the other hand, the English School23-as most prominently
represented by Hedley Bull writing during the Cold War-offers a "society
of states" as the alternative to an international anarchy dominated by calcu-
lative behavior,24 rather than a cosmopolitan community. Bull explains this
framework thus:
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group
of states, conscious of certain interests and common values, form
a society in the sense that they conceive themselves bound by a
common set of rules in their relations with one another, and in share
in the working of common institutions.2 5
From the English School perspective, the conditions for R2P in the real
world do not match the requirements of thin cosmopolitanism because the
above society of states is realized only to some degree, despite a huge body
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of signed human rights documents and relevant international organizations
at all geographical levels. Bull called the international order he observed an
"anarchical society," where anarchy coexists with values, norms, mutual
trust, and hope. Although this order is vulnerable, it is possible to culti-
vate its societal features, with a normative understanding of international
relations as a landscape of human experience. However, while individuals
acting on behalf of their states grapple with difficult moral choices, inter-
national organizations are limited in their autonomy and ability to act by
their member states.
Similarly, although a "society of states" implies that states are bound
together by mutually accepted laws in a form of order, order is not enough
for dedicated cosmopolitans. While Bull considered order the condition
for the realization of other values-because "not only is order in world
politics valuable, there is also a sense in which it is prior to other goals, such
as justice"26 -this does not imply a preference for order over other norms.
Shapcott states that "the commitment to human rights suggests that states,
as well as individuals, have obligations and duties to humankind that are
superior to the obligations they have to maintain order.
27
From both the English School perspective and a dedicated cosmo-
politan point of view, it would be desirable to call R2P an established inter-
national norm. However, the literature is not always precise: R2P has been
called a concept, principle, and norm, with different implications for each
term. A "concept" implies an idea that may not be concretely applied, and
requires further elaboration on R2P's role. "An emerging principle," the
formulation used by ICISS,28 indicates a certain common understanding
of R2P's meaning and validity. A "norm" further specifies expected and
acceptable actions: it is prescriptive in nature. Thus, the choice of term
matters, as the language used may influence the status of R2P.
29
From a constructivist perspective, which studies whether and how
norms matter,30 the development of international human rights stan-
dards illustrates the relationship between actors and structure as mutu-
ally constituted and continually changing. State representatives formulate
principles, norms, rules, and procedures. Debates and modifications entail
temporal agreement. It is possible to understand the adoption of R2P as
structural improvement, which indicates an appropriate response from the
international community to certain circumstances. While norms regulate
behavior, constructivists also posit that they challenge the way states define
their interests-and if common norms become the model for international
behavior, this closes the gap between imagination and reality mentioned
above. Michael Barnett, however, reminds us that this transformation is
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not a given: "Although many international norms have a taken-for-granted
quality, they have to come from somewhere and their path to acceptance
is almost always rough and rocky."'' The constructivist perspective shows
relevant processes, but cannot predict concrete outcomes.
Mervyn Frost argues that states nearly always communicate their
actions to the wider world in ethical terms because engagement with ethics
is a precondition for participation.32 When Resolution 1973 on Libya
passed the Security Council, five members abstained from voting. Most
interesting was the lack of no-votes. Confronted with a probable massacre
in Benghazi, responsible international actors would have found it difficult
to defend voting no. In contrast, the current disagreement around Syria
reaches beyond the most appropriate way forward. There is no consensus
about the nature of the problem.33 Meaningful discussion about measures,
among them the possible intervention by military force, presupposes
Security Council agreement of R2P relevance. The English School theorist
Raymond J. Vincent defined "intervention" as an "activity undertaken by a
state, a group within a state, a group of states, or an international organiza-
tion which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state.."
34
Effective humanitarian intervention is an act of power. It includes taking
sides,33 but as demonstrated by the conflicts in the Middle East, choosing
which actor to support is not always easy.
Critical international relations theorists argue that traditional theory
fails to question the morally arbitrary significance of geographical borders.
36
By establishing boundaries between "us" and "them," states promote exclu-
sion. However, to treat the internal and external domains as two separate
spheres of moral obligations is unjust because it undermines the idea of
human fellowship. Universal human rights give human beings equal worth
independent of nationality, race, gender, religion, or other differences. No
variant of cosmopolitanism questions that. The move from rights to obli-
gations, however, severely increases complexity, bringing in a discussion of
positive and negative duties in cosmopolitan obligations. Negative duties
imply that the person on whom they are imposed must refrain from an
action. Positive duties are duties to act, which include general duties to
create a just social order and to aid those in need and who suffer unneces-
sarily. These moral duties are not charity provisions: to refrain from acting
would be morally wrong. Yet, while the scope of cosmopolitan obligation
is in principle universal, there is no single answer among contemporary
cosmopolitans about what positive duties require from different inter-
national actors. This idea of a positive duty, although difficult to define
clearly, underlies the concept of R2P.
37
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Membership in a common humanity is a thin type of bind.38
According to David Held, the literature on cosmopolitan obligations distin-
guishes between two broad positions. "Thick" cosmopolitanism insists that
all moral principles must be directly universal. Special relationships, for
instance, to family, friends, kin, nation, or religious group, can only be
justified insofar as they nurture or honor the cosmopolitan interest. "Thin"
cosmopolitanism, however, accepts two different sets of obligations. One
treats all human beings as equal regardless of relationship, while another is
restricted to those closest.39 International obligations are compatible with
this division, since states can extend their web of social relations and induce
a variety of international practices.4 ° However, bringing those who suffer
close enough to generate action in the cosmopolitan framework is a severe
challenge for R2P in the real world, just as it is a challenge for critical theo-
rists to suggest realizable solutions from a thin cosmopolitan perspective.
Neither set of obligations allows for selective responses to humani-
tarian crises. While states holding veto power can block any Security
Council proposition they dislike, a world where the need for help is
trumped by other considerations is not cosmopolitan. This dilemma repre-
sents a serious challenge for any attempt to infuse the real world with the
requirements of a cosmopolitan ethos. Selective response may be better
than no response at all-but if this is the best case scenario, R2P becomes a
soft international norm vulnerable to manipulation, where some perpetra-
tors are targeted and others are not. The result is a subordination of law to
the dictates of power.4'
R2P, THIN COSMOPOLITANISM, AND OPEN INCLUSIVE DEBATES
The second theme characterizing thin cosmopolitanism is the call for
open, inclusive debates, but there is a gap in execution between these and
real-world debates.
English School theorists emphasize "diplomatic dialogue," where
states and people discuss how to restrain force, promote mutual under-
standing between cultures, and explore the prospects of cooperation.42
These dialogues include the conduct of foreign policy as well as claims
about rights and obligations. Because the anarchical society is a society of
states, participants will be state representatives.
On the other hand, a state-centric position does not satisfy cosmopol-
itan theorists. Open, inclusive debates must involve a much broader scope
of international actors that in turn must account for their beliefs in terms
intelligible to others.43 Mutual understanding evolves through open, non-
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exclusionary dialogues that include all individuals and groups affected by
the principle, norm, or institution under deliberation.4 As Thomas Pogge
explains, "Persons have a right to an institutional order under which those
significantly and legitimately affected by a political decision have a roughly
equal opportunity to influence the making of this decision."45 Similarly,
Richard Shapcott calls thin cosmopolitanism a "dialogical universal moral
community."46 Yet, cosmopolitans do not value dialogue primarily for its
own sake. Dialogues should produce just outcomes in which the strong
cannot impose principles and norms over the weak.
To illustrate this, the work of ICISS included regional round-table
conferences and other consultations with broad participation from govern-
ment agencies, representatives of academia, and various relevant organiza-
tions.4 7 The 2009 General Assembly debate about R2P reportedly was one
of the liveliest among member-states ever,48 but not all those affected had
a voice. United Nations members include only states, and the crucial deci-
sion-making body for R2P, the Security Council, is an even less inclusive
arena, and its decisions often only reflect the imperatives of the permanent
members.49
The UN Protection Force in Bosnia (1992-95) marked the full
application of the right to intervene on humanitarian grounds, but was
nonetheless restricted by its mandate of self-defense and protection of
humanitarian workers-a mandate that did not include any actions to
stop the fighting.5 As ICISS was fully aware, such a mandate could have
been risky; humanitarian-based interventions have the potential to make
matters worse because of unexpected consequences.51 However, it is easy
to criticize humanitarian interventions in hindsight: for example, when we
criticize the UN for having done too little too late in Rwanda, we do this
with knowledge we did not possess before the genocide, despite many signs
of an evolving catastrophe.
Successful use of peaceful means leaves hypotheticals around what
might have happened, but effective prevention will generate fewer situ-
ations where state leaders must choose to mobilize military force or do
nothing.52 Within R2P, then, there are compelling reasons for prioritizing
the preventive dimension, since it is "better than cure, almost always easier,
and morally more defensible.."53 Armed conflict generally is linked to root
causes in poverty, political repression, and uneven distribution of resources,
and early warning is essential to understand the fragility of the situation.
In an ideal situation, early warning allows us to account for the associated
risks of intervention, judge which policy measures can make a difference,
and mobilize political willingness to apply those measures.
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In the real world, however, ICISS describes the early warning praxis
they observed as ad hoc and unstructured,54 and UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-Moon admits the need to strengthen UN prevention capacities.55
For cosmopolitans, understanding and responding to early warning signals
requires good dialogue accompanied by institutionalized communication-
channels. Neville Dastoor proposes that the Security Council to establish
a special committee dedicated to identifying trouble spots and to suggest
measures.56 Committee members should represent the collective interna-
tional consciousness, not the national interests of their respective states.
While this reflects the spirit of cosmopolitanism, it proves challenging to
execute in a world with dominant state interests.
R2P, THIN COSMOPOLITANISM, AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Loyalties, understood as never absolute, compose the third and final
theme of thin cosmopolitanism for this discussion. State sovereignty, as
discussed here, is a fundamental institution of loyalty in world politics, but
is connected to responsibility. This suits a thin cosmopolitan imagination,
but competes with the traditional alternative. The mutual recognition that
each state possesses the exclusive right to give and to enforce laws within
its defined borders has traditionally been understood as a right with few, if
any, limits to deal with domestic affairs. The keyword-non-intervention
-is enshrined into the United Nations Charter.57
Traditionally associated with realism, the traditional position of
sovereignty still has staunch defenders among many in the international
realm. Some try to hide a doubtful human rights practice by invoking
sovereignty. Still, many small states consider non-intervention as the ulti-
mate protection against the ambitions of more powerful states, which
might be cloaked in a humanitarian umbrella. As Jarat Chopra explains,
"sovereignty provides finality and determinacy in the international system.
In other words, it creates order."58 This presents a dilemma-how to
prevent powerful states from covering less ideal motives using humani-
tarian arguments-that is not new, and requires trust to solve. Without
trust among players in the international system, a claim to use force for
humanitarian reasons is difficult to separate from national interests in
disguise. Interventions not mandated by the Security Council are most
problematic: any state with the power to intervene independent of the UN
may be suspected of self-interest.59 Kofi Annan connects this dilemma to
R2P thus: "The emerging global convention of a 'Responsibility to Protect'
was conceived as a universal principle of protecting fundamental human
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rights-not a license to make war in the name of peace."'6
Nowadays, non-intervention is the starting point, and military action
is reserved for the extreme and exceptional circumstances.61 Yet, resistance
against internationalizing responsibility for internal problems may be
grounded in the fear that this threshold of non-intervention is susceptible
to interpretation and change; the rise in humanitarian action may signal
that the threshold is even lower than before. Within a country, rebel groups
may even try to extend a war because outside help is most likely when
human suffering continues. Some critics argue that advocacy for R2P alone
implies that war is more acceptable, and that R2P must adopt a more direct
focus on peaceful alternatives, with the "Responsibility to Peace" accompa-
nying the imperative protection
62
Although R2P is not opposed to state sovereignty, some have invoked
the obligation to protect civilians as superseding sovereignty regardless.
ICISS, however, approaches the question differently: responsibility is an
aspect of sovereignty itself.63 Where
legitimate sovereignty does 
not exist,
neither can it be violated. The norm The norm of R2P shifts
of R2P shifts focus from control to focusfrom control to
responsibility.64  State responsibility responsibility. State
accompanies an external responsibility
to the international community. responsibility accompanies an
Re-interpretation is always external responsibility to the
possible. State sovereignty interpreted international community.
as non-interference is for constructiv-..........................
ists only meaningful when this is the
dominant collective understanding, and thin cosmopolitanism derives
sovereignty from universal human rights and responsibilities. When Kofi
Annan reminds the present day UN Charter reader of its purpose to protect
human beings, not the abusers,65 the Charter has not received a new text;
this is an attempt to reinterpret the old one. An international reaction
when a state fails to fulfill its responsibility to protect its own citizens does
not suspend, but rather protects and promotes sovereignty. Dr. Francis
Deng, former UN Special Advisor on the Prevention on Genocide, clearly
agrees, framing sovereignty as a positive obligation rather than "a negative
concept enabling [states] to barricade [themselves] against the world."66
Sovereignty as responsibility is not solely a cosmopolitan idea, and
responsibility needs an additional international anchor. By signing the
World Summit Outcome Document, world leaders formally accepted
an expanded scope of justice beyond the border of each individual state.
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Cosmopolitans demand this scope in one way or another to be global.
Legitimate sovereignty in a cosmopolitan framework promotes individual
human rights. Although written in 1982, almost 20 years before the intro-
duction of R2P, critical IR scholar Andrew Linklater touched the core of
the recent debate: "By adopting an external concept of obligation, the state
accepts that its rights are negotiated, and must ultimately be subject to
renegotiation if necessary, by the whole society of states.67 Linklater recog-
nizes that the existence of states should not obstruct justice across their
borders. He anticipates a thin cosmopolitan framework of sovereign states
embedded in structures of global governance, with shared and institution-
alized political and moral norms.
CONCLUSION
This article has discussed how selected theoretical perspectives on
international relations can explain, and suggest ways to reduce, the gap
between R2P in the real world and the requirements of a "thin cosmo-
politan" imagination.
We can expect the English School to explain the gap through the
existence of an international sphere with a society of states realized only
to a limited extent. Greater integration of state society, which means more
The practice of R2P must
also expand the scope of
participants involved in
international debates
and decisions, and locate
sovereignty on different levels
in a revised global structure,
where boundaries no longer
decide who can expect
protection and who cannot.
other. Challenged identities and
adherence by states to shared moral
norms and principles, does not fully
satisfy the requirements of thin cosmo-
politanism. Still, it will bring the two
closer, even though real-world norms
and principles compete with self-inter-
ests and calculations, because state and
individual actors in international affairs
still possess the capability to let moral
considerations guide their decisions.
Constructivism does not favor
any particular political order, but
constructivists show us possibilities for
change through processes where actors
and structures mutually constitute each
dominant interpretations may undergo
changes and pave way for a possible new praxis where state sovereignty,
connected to responsibility, no longer impedes R2P.
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Finally, critical international relations theorists have a cosmopolitan
vision for the world. For R2P in the international sphere, the general agree-
ment around the principle must materialize to better protect human rights
;n all settings and enable the international community to take action when
necessary. The practice of R2P must also expand the scope of participants
involved in international debates and decisions, and locate sovereignty on
different levels in a revised global structure, where boundaries no longer
decide who can expect protection and who cannot.f
ENDNOTES
1 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979), 156.
2 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 16 September 2005, §138 and 139.
3 UN Security Council Resolution 1674, June 28, 2006.
4 UN General Assembly Resolution 63/308, September 15, 2009.
5 ICISS: The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa Canada, December 2001.
6 UN Security Council Resolution 1706, August 31, 2006.
7 Comparable missions took place with government consent or with no central govern-
ment operative in past cases.
8 Diogenes Laertius, The Lives ofEminent Philosophers, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1925), Vol 1: Book VI, passage 63.
9 Richard Shapcott, "International Ethics," in The Globalization of World Politics, ed.
John Baylis et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 200.
10 Holli Thomas, "Cosmopolitanism," in Encyclopedia of International Relations and
GlobalPolitics, ed. Martin Griffiths (London: Routledge, 2008), 140-141.
11 Baron Anacharsis de Cloots was a significant figure during the French Revolution,
executed by Robespierre in 1794. Visions about a world state is described in his "Bases
Constitutionnelles de la Republique Du Genre Humain" (1793).
12 Garreth W Brown, Grounding Cosmopolitanism-From Kant to the Idea of a
Cosmopolitan Constitution (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 1.
13 Particularly, but not exclusively, stoicism.
14 Gerard Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), 9-29.
15 Ibid
16 Zlatko Skrbis and Ian Woodward, Cosmopolitanism-Uses ofthe Idea (London: Sage,
2013), 3.
17 Richard Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 225.
18 Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory", in Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott
Burchill et al. (Basingstoke / New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2009), 178.
19 Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of
the Post- Westphalian Era, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 56.
20 UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A, December 10, 1948.
21 The UN Charter Chap. 1 Articles 1.3, 13.1 and 55c.
22 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, June 25,1993.
23 Developed mainly at London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
VOL.40:2 SUMMER 2016
136 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS
24 International anarchy denotes absence of authority above state level, not chaos or lack
of any order. For realists it is a basic premise, but not for the theoretical perspectives
selected for this article.
25 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (Basingstoke / New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd.,
1977), 13.
26 Ibid., 93.
27 Richard Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations, 225.
28 ICISS chap. 2.25.
29 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect-The Global Efforts to End Mass Atrocities
(Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press, 2009), 4.
30 Amitav Acharya, "The R2P and Norm Diffusion: Towards a Framework of Norm
Circulation", Global Responsibility to Protect 5 (2013), 466.
31 Michael Barnett, "Social Constructivism", in The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 161.
32 Mervyn Frost, Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations (London /
New York: Routledge 2009), 19.
33 Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, "Principles, Politics and Prudence: Libya, the
Responsibility to Protect and the Use of Military Force", Global Governance 18(3)
(2012), 289.
34 R. J. Vincent, Non-Intervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1974), 13.
35 Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice-International Political Theory Today
(Cambridge / Oxford: Polity Press, 2002), 152.
36 Critical IR-theory is rooted in the Frankfurt School of the 1920s and 1930s, with links
to the Italian socialist philosopher Antonio Gramsci and the German social theorist
Jiurgen Habermas. The most cited critical IR-theorist today is Andrew Linklater.
37 Richard Shapcott, "International Ethics", 203.
38 Andrew Dobson, "Thick Cosmopolitanism", Political Studies 54(1) (2006), 167-168.
39 David Held, "Principles of Cosmopolitan Order", in The Political Philosophy of
Cosmopolitanism, ed. Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 17.
40 Andrew Linldater, Men and Citizens in the Theory oflnternational Relations (New York:
Palgrave, 1982), 46.
41 Mahmood Mamdani, "Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?", Journal of
Intervention and Statebuilding 4(1) (2010), 62.
42 Andrew Linklater, "The English School", in Theories of international Relations, ed.
Scott Burchill et al. (Basingstoke / New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2009), 109.
43 The ideal is the Habermasian discourse ethics model.
44 Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory", 179.
45 Thomas W Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and
Reforms (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 190.
46 Richard Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue in IR, 225.
47 ICISS appendix B.
48 Serena Sharma, "Towards a Global Responsibility to Protect: Setbacks on the Path to
Implementation", Global Governance 16(1) (2010), 132-133.
49 Chris Abbott, "Rights and Responsibilities: The Dilemma of Humanitarian
Intervention", GlobalDialogue 7(1-2) (2005), 5.
50 Ibid., 3.
VOL.40:2 SUMMER 2016
RZP AND THE "THIN COSMOPOLITAN" IMAGINATION
51 Simon Caney, "Cosmopolitanism", in Ethics and World Politics, ed. Duncan Bell
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 154.
52 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, 4.
53 Eli Stamnes, "Operationalizing the Preventive Aspect of R2P", NUPI Report 1
(2008):9.
54 ICISS chap.3.9 and 3.12.
55 The report from the Secretary-General to the General Assembly 12 January 2009 is
entitled "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect."
56 Neville Dastoor, "The Responsibility to Refine: The Need for a Security Council
Committee on the Responsibility to Protect", Harvard Human Rights Journal 22 (1)
(2009):30-31.
57 UN Charter chap. 1, articles 2.4 and 2.7.
58 Jarat Chopra, "The Obsolence of Interventions under International Law", in Subduing
Sovereignty, ed. Marianne Heiberg (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 40.
59 Abbott, "Rights and Responsibilities", 4.
60 Kofi Annan (with Nader Mousavizadeh), Interventions-A Life in War and Peace (New
York: The Penguin Press, 2012), 119.
61 ICISS chap. 4.10 and 4.11.
62 Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Responsibility to Peace: A Critique of R2P", Journal of
Intervention and Statebuilding 4 (1) (2010):48.
63 ICISS chap. 2.14 and 2.15.
64 Emma McClean, "The Responsibility to Protect: The Role of International Human
Rights Law", Journal of Conflict & Security Law 13 (1) (2008): 126.
65 Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty", The Economist vol.352 (1999):49.
66 Interview by Aidan Hehir with Dr. Francis Deng, "JISB Interview: The Responsibility
to Protect", Conducted 08/20/2009, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 4(1)
(2010):83.
67 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens, 196.
VOL.40:2 SUMMER 2016
138 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS
VOL.40:2 SUMMER 2016
DATE DOWNLOADED: Mon Aug  2 06:20:27 2021
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
			                                                                
Tor Dahl-Eriksen, International Anarchy, Cooperation, and Joint Action, 41 FLETCHER
F. WORLD AFF. 45 (2017).                                                             
ALWD 6th ed.                                                                         
Dahl-Eriksen, T. ., International anarchy, cooperation, and joint action, 41(2)
Fletcher F. World Aff. 45 (2017).                                                    
APA 7th ed.                                                                          
Dahl-Eriksen, T. (2017). International anarchy, cooperation, and joint action.
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 41(2), 45-58.                                       
Chicago 17th ed.                                                                     
Tor Dahl-Eriksen, "International Anarchy, Cooperation, and Joint Action," Fletcher
Forum of World Affairs 41, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 45-58                                
McGill Guide 9th ed.                                                                 
Tor Dahl-Eriksen, "International Anarchy, Cooperation, and Joint Action" (2017) 41:2
Fletcher F World Aff 45.                                                             
AGLC 4th ed.                                                                         
Tor Dahl-Eriksen, 'International Anarchy, Cooperation, and Joint Action' (2017) 41(2)
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 45.                                                  
MLA 8th ed.                                                                          
Dahl-Eriksen, Tor. "International Anarchy, Cooperation, and Joint Action." Fletcher
Forum of World Affairs, vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 2017, p. 45-58. HeinOnline.           
OSCOLA 4th ed.                                                                       
Tor Dahl-Eriksen, 'International Anarchy, Cooperation, and Joint Action' (2017) 41
Fletcher F World Aff 45
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
   Conditions of the license agreement available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from  uncorrected OCR text.




Cooperation, and Joint Action





To what extent can Responsibility to Protect (R2P) objectives be success-
fully implemented through cooperation and joint action?
The framework comprises four selected theoretical perspectives
on International Relations (IR): neorealism, neoliberalism, the English
School, and constructivism. Neorealism represents the most pessimistic
view. Neoliberalism is somewhat more optimistic. The English school is
positive with reservations, while constructivism opens up new and often
ignored possibilities. The sections are an R2P introduction with an expla-
nation of key concepts, a presentation of the selected perspectives, and a
discussion connecting general insights to real-world R2P implementation
challenges.
Tor Dahl-Eriksen, born in 1956, is senior lecturer in political science at UiT the
Arctic University of Norway, Tromso, the northernmost university in the world. He
develops study programs and courses within the international relations department,
in addition to teaching and supervising students. R2P is his present research focus,
but his research interests also include human rights, security at different levels, and
international ethics and justice more broadly.
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R2P AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) refers to the political doctrine that
states are obligated to prevent mass atrocities defined as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. The UN General
Assembly endorsed R2P by consensus in September 2005, in what was then
the largest gathering of state leaders at the New York World Summit. § 138
and 139 of the Outcome Document' places the responsibility to protect first
upon individual member states. UN member states agree to help each other,
but if a state manifestly fails to fulfill its responsibilities, the international
community will act collectively through the UN Security Council and in
cooperation with relevant regional organizations. The General Assembly
reaffirmed its support with.a new resolution in 2009.2 The Security Council
expressed its support for R2P with a declaratory resolution in 2006.3
R2P represents a broad approach to human crisis, with three 'pillars'
or action components: preventing, reacting, and rebuilding. Military force
is among the measures the Security Council can decide to use as a last resort.
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) report introduced the term R2P in 2001. ICISS was originally
a Canadian government initiative responding to a plea to world leaders
toward humanitarian obligation from then UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan, spurred by recent UN failures to prevent mass atrocities in Rwanda,
Srebrenica, and Kosovo. ICISS inspired the adoption of the more restricted
2005 Outcome Document text. R2P was first invoked for a particular
conflict in Sudan (2006).' However, the Security Council remained passive
to "credible allegations" of mass atrocities in Sri Lanka in 2008 and 2009.6
On Libya in 2011, the Council, for the first time ever, authorized the use
of military force against a functioning government for the primary purpose
of protecting a civilian population.' Since 2011, a lack of agreement has too
often rendered the Council unable to deal with the most severe atrocities.
Yet, R2P informs many of its resolutions, and certain noticeable successes
in the 'prevention' pillar were listed in the UN Secretary-General's imple-
mentation report in 2015.8 Most UN peace operations incorporate R2P
directly in the mandates as calls for protection of civilians.'
In everyday conversation, 'anarchy' often connotes violence, turbu-
lence, chaos, and lawlessness, but the concept of international anarchy
merely denotes a system without a central authority above the state level. Yet,
substantial order may exist despite 'anarchy'. Most scholars today regard inter-
national institutions as sets of rules meant to govern international behavior."o
An international organization is an institution, but the concept also includes
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institutionalized international cooperation without specific designed orga-
nizations. National interests refer to the basic determinants that guide state
policy in relation to the external environment." The concept is difficult to
define with conceptual clarity suited for scholarly analysis. However, political
use is common, because, to cite Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan:
"To claim that a particular foreign policy is in the national interest imparts a
degree of authority and legitimacy to that policy."'2
SELECTED THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Neorealism
Neorealism, developed mainly in the 1970s and, embedded in the
broad realist tradition, emphasizes the importance of national security
concerns where power generates security and sovereign states are the only
important international actors. Unlike the realism of the former decades,
neorealism does not explain state behavior with references to human
nature. Neorealists, sometimes referred to as structural realists, offer a
purely systemic account of world politics. The international system consists
of relationships between individual units (states) with unequal power. This
power balance can change, but the basic character of the system cannot,
rendering the international sphere permanently anarchical. In the words of
Shannon Brincat: "Under the dominance of the realist mantra, IR theory
has become preoccupied with system reproduction rather than the possi-
bilities of social transformation"." There is always a possibility that some
will use force to advance interests. Yet, to cite the most profiled neorealist
scholar, Kenneth Waltz: "States strive to secure their survival." 14 System
adaptation is the measure best suited for this aim. Since there is always
a possibility that some will use force to advance interests, adaption to
the system is the only choice states have. The neorealist world is a system
without mutual trust. Calculations guide actions, and the coercive priority
of national interests makes cooperative arrangements limited and fragile.
Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism (neoliberal institutionalism) in IR theory is a variant
of liberalism addressing the many issues in our era transcending political
boundaries. States are not the only international actors, but still the most
important ones. However, their ability to affect outcomes by themselves
has declined with a general increase in linkages and channels of interac-
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tion." Security involves more than pure military issues, encapsulating a
broader perspective on international cooperation. 16 Neoliberalism accepts
the basic condition of international anarchy, but posits that anarchy stimu-
lates the establishment of institutions, which help states to realize common
advantages. Cooperation and joint action under anarchy becomes possible
because certain state interests are most effectively realized through coopera-
tion. Mutual beneficial institutions receive loyalty and resources.
Moral considerations are not crucial in the neoliberal world.
According to the American academics and founders of the neoliberal
school of IR, Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, neoliberals see institu-
tions as the mediator and the means to achieve the unification of national
and common international interests. Institutions help to set the interna-
tional agenda, act as catalysts for coalition formation, and serve as arenas
for political initiatives.17 State leaders discuss motives and intentions and
reduce misunderstandings, making cooperation and joint action easier.
Institutions also perform the surveillance necessary to ensure that states
behave according to agreements, making it less attractive to satisfy imme-
diate needs that might be counterproductive to national interests in a
longer term perspective. By offering both information and stability, insti-
tutions promote cooperation by ameliorating states' fears that they will be
taken advantage of when trying to solve international problems.
The English School
The English School adds values and norms to the discussion. Citizens
acting on behalf of their states rely on a broader repertoire of arguments for
possible cooperation and joint action. They can evaluate alternatives before
making decisions, and they can choose to let moral concerns prevail. The
English School is a normative approach, which understands international
relations as a realm of human experiences. Often seen as a bridge-builder
between realism and liberalism, it has roots in the tradition from the Dutch
philosopher Hugo Grotius, a pioneer in analyzing international order system-
atically as an international sphere based on laws, rules, and agreements, where
self-interest is not the only basis for states' actions and relations."
The most prominent English School scholar is Hedley Bull. Writing
during the Cold War, he discussed whether the features of a society of states
were internationally recognizable. A 'society of states' is an alternative to
a 'system of states,' where consciousness of certain common interests and
values exist, and where rules guide relations between states." A society of
states is an analytical category. Bull used the term 'anarchical society' to
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denote what he observed in the real world, an unsafe and vulnerable order.
Anarchy constitutes one of the basic premises, but interests, ambitions,
and fear coexist with values, norms, mutual trust, and hope. Dialogue
promotes mutual understanding, restrains the use of force, and may pave
way for cooperation and joint action.
Constructivism
With Nicholas Onuf's 1989 book The World of Our Making and the
1992 article Anarchy is What States Make of It by German political scien-
tist and prominent social constructivist Alexander Wendt, IR entered a
socially constructed world, where all concepts need interpretation. Since
dominant interpretations are always possible to challenge and eventually be
replaced by alternatives, we will never end up with permanent agreements.
Constructivists may interpret international anarchy as a self-help system, or
state sovereignty as prohibiting interference into a state's domestic affairs,
but only as long as these concepts coincide with the collective under-
standing. This article relies on what Antje Wiener labels conventional or
modern constructivism20, the one most IR analysis uses.
Constructivism does not necessarily predict favorable conditions for
international cooperation and joint action. This will depend on how actors
understand themselves and the respective contexts. Identity is a central
concern for constructivists, and as with everything else, it is possible to
develop and change. The ontological position of the relationship between
actors and structure as mutually constituted and continually changing
illustrates the dynamics of the perspective, a contrast to the methodolog-
ical individualism represented by neorealism and neoliberalism. According
to constructivists, we cannot understand how institutions function by
focusing exclusively on decisions made by individual actors.
DISCUSSION
Theoretical perspectives are abstractions. Through the sections
'prevention,' 'collective action,' and 'international order,' the selected
analytical lenses will enlighten real-world challenges for successful imple-
mentation of R2P objectives. However, it is important not to confuse the
term 'implementation' with effects or results. Successful implementation
of R2P means realization of policy objectives, but implementation may
instead produce unintended or unwanted results.
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Prevention
Prevention is a cornerstone of R2P, because to prevent a conflict from
developing into a manmade catastrophe is normally less politically controver-
sial and less costly compared to the use of measures under the reactive pillar.
Successful prevention generates fewer cases where state leaders must choose
between mobilizing military forces or doing nothing.2 1 In fragile situations,
it is important to understand which policy measures are capable of making a
difference and to have the political willingness to apply them. Early warning is
essential, but ICISS describes the process in past cases as ad hoc and unstruc-
tured.22 According to the Secretary General, the capacity of various actors to
identify risk factors and develop preven-
tive strategies has improved considerably
To prevent a conflict from over recent years,23 although this trend
developing into a manmade has still not sufficiently translated into
catastrophe is normally less concrete support.24
politically controversial and The ICISS report and the annual
less costly compared to the R2P reports from the Secretary General
use of measures under the suggest many possible 
preventive efforts.
Some address root causes meant to make
reactive pillar. future occurrence of violent conflicts less
probable, like building stable and inclu-
sive institutions, eradicating corruption, and creating good education and job
opportunities. The space for dialogue is normally widest in the early stages of
a crisis, which calls for united messages from the international community.25
Efforts directed at intercommunal dialogue should include local voices, like
community leaders, religious leaders, and representatives from women's orga-
nizations.26 There is also a need for more immediate efforts. Atrocity crimes
require military, financial, and technical means. Expanded cooperation to
restrict access to small arms and illicit financing is therefore important, and
armed conflicts should be under constant monitoring. Changes in dynamics
might lead protagonists on either side to engage in atrocity crimes.2 7
Each state is responsible for protecting its population against mass atroc-
ities. In addition to mutual assistance among states, governments can coop-
erate with non-state actors, regional organizations, and relevant UN bodies.
As they are present on the ground almost everywhere, and often observe the
early signals of a crisis, NGOS28 can play a significant role. Some, like the
International Crisis Group (ICG), 29 have an explicit focus on early warning.0
They inform governments and media about urgent need for preventive action.
Although most NGOs lack the resources for comprehensive crisis engage-
ment, their contributions can mobilize more influential actors.
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Neorealism treats states as unitary actors; a state secure against foreign
threats means a secure population. Yet, the real world shows that a govern-
ment may be the persecutor of its own population. For neoliberals, too,
states pursue national interests, but mass atrocities have effects beyond state
borders, such as unwanted influxes of refugees and the spread of weapons
to criminal or other violent actors. Mutual assistance to prevent atrocities
serves both national and collective interests. Contrary to the English School
perspective, however, neoliberals cannot explain cooperation primarily
guided by ethical values. States will cooperate only when there is something
to gain for themselves-or at a minimum-nothing to lose.
For neorealists and neoliberals alike, state interests are exogenously
determined. Theorists do not question where preferences come from, only
how states pursue them strategically. Yet, for constructivists it is important
to understand how interests form and develop. According to Wendt, iden-
tities are the basis of interests,31 and Australian scholar and fellow construc-
tivist Christian Reus-Smit explains that "constructivists are not opposed to
the idea that actors might be 'self-interested,' but they argue that this tells
us nothing unless we understand how they define their 'selves' and how this
informs their 'interests.'3 2 The willingness of state leaders to seek assistance
might be a question of identity. Viewed from a constructivist position,
both identity itself and derived interests are social constructions, always
open for possible new interpretations.
Collective Action
The UN Security Council represents a real-world modification of
international anarchy. The Security Council can make decisions binding
UN members, although practical enforcement often relies on the goodwill
of those states. The World Summit was very clear: collective international
action when states manifestly fail to protect their populations legitimately
takes place only through a Security Council mandate. R2P calls for collec-
tive action to protect populations through existing laws and institutions,
not through the alternative procedures discussed in the ICISS report.33 This
clarification made consensus on R2P possible among UN member states.3 1
In accordance with the themes of R2P, the Security Council autho-
rized the use of military force to protect civilians in Libya with Resolution
1973.35 This contrasts how the Council has approached the civil war in
Syria, with vetoes by Russia and China against proposed resolutions despite
continuing reports about crimes qualifying as mass atrocities. Former
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has underlined the permanent members'
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particular responsibility to demonstrate leadership, where one concrete step
is to exercise restraint in the use of veto when atrocity crimes are involved."
In his 2016 report on R2P to the General Assembly, he asked for the collec-
tive will to protect our shared humanity. The alternative world is one where
discord, paralysis, and narrow self-interest prevails. However, the Security
Council veto powers often prioritize their national interests, reflecting their
domestic and global imperatives, making timely action likely only when
interests and humanitarian needs occasionally coincide.
For neorealists, this is how anarchy shapes world politics. A word
like 'international community' hardly exists in their terminology. National
interests guide expectations and actions, and international institutions
most often merely express the interests of the powerful and their struggle
for more power. The title of a 1994 article by noted realist scholar John
Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," is quite
telling, or, to cite Jack Donnelly about the realist view on institutions: "they
are at best intervening variables that can be expected to have independent
effects only in minor issue areas far removed from the struggle for power.""
Most cases calling for collective action to protect populations will prob-
ably not fall into this minor issue category, making the Security Council's
inability to mobilize joint efforts more the rule than the exception. R2P
will be what Mahmood Mamdani calls a "soft and vulnerable international
........................................... norm ."3 9  Som e perpetrators will be m et
National interests guide by joint action, but most will not.
On the other hand, it is possible to
expectations and actions, and argue that in an imperfect world selec-
international institutions tive response must be preferable if the
most often merely express the alternative is no response. Complaints
interests of the powerful and about double standards do not elimi-
their struggle for more power. nate political realities, 
and R2P pushes
the Security Council into new tern-
40 One may further add, as argued
by Princeton professor Charles Beitz, that an ideal does not undermine simply
because it is not achievable at present. In a longer term perspective, it depends
on to what extent impediments to change are capable of modification over
time." R2P is not without value even if it is never fully realized, because it
gives an aspirational goal of political change in a non-ideal world.
Although not treating international institutions as fully independent,
the English School sees state leaders as actors who can prioritize beyond
national interests. In certain cases, moral considerations can triumph over
'pure' interests. Security Council Resolution 1973 gained ten yes-votes.
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Five members abstained, among them two veto powers. From a neorealist
perspective, probably no direct national interests were at stake. Neoliberals
mostly agree, but argue that institutional frameworks facilitated the search
for common ground where interests and humanitarian needs can coincide.
In addition, although the ethical aspects are not their main concern, it
would hardly serve national interests to stand in the aftermath as the one
who blocked mobilization to halt mass atrocities. However, when the UN
Secretary General urges world leaders to act on behalf of humanity, one
normally hears this request as deeming inaction morally unacceptable.
The English School normative approach is able to incorporate this.
From their perspective, the international sphere is capable of developing
into a society or community with references to common norms, or at least
to social relations beyond the concerns and interests of each unit. Scholars
have different opinions about the definition of a 'community,'42 but it is
hardly a fruitful discussion unless there are references to common norms.
Neoliberals are probably more confident with an alternative explanation.
Security Council members would avoid standing afterwards as the one
who blocked mobilization to halt mass atrocities, when it still was possible.
Yet, according to Mervyn Frost, Head of the Department of War at King's
College, London, state leaders frequently use ethical terms to explain their
states' behavior to an international audience, but the ethical aspects need
not be their main concern. Rather, it might simply be an expectation, more
or less a prerequisite for legitimate participation.
Constructivists try to elaborate more on these questions. In explana-
tions of state behavior, they hold that ideational and normative structures
are just as important as material ones. Systems of shared ideas, beliefs, and
values form structures that shape the identities of political actors and influ-
ence political action.44 The international development of human rights
standards illustrates the constructivist ontology well. Representatives of
states formulate and agree on principles, norms, rules, and procedures. The
adoption of R2P built on this structure, indicating appropriate behavior
from national and international actors under defined circumstances.
A focus on the structuring power of norms and their influence helps to
understand how different processes are stimulated, such as how state iden-
tities integrating responsibilities beyond borders develop.
International Order
Todays' global order based on state sovereignty is a 20' century
phenomenon, based on the principle that states have the exclusive right to
make and enforce laws within their territory. Neorealists treat sovereignty
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from the traditional position when they describe the international system.
Today, constitutional independence is enshrined in UN Charter Chapter
1, articles 2.1, 2.4, and 2.7, as the principles of sovereign equality of all UN
members and of non-intervention.
States can voluntarily agree to abide by rules, but the traditional
understanding of sovereignty has been as a limitless right to deal exclu-
sively with domestic affairs.4 1 Many players and policy makers operating
in the international realm are
as traditionally understood, not
States can voluntarily agree
to abide by rules, but the
traditional understanding
ofsovereignty has been as
a limitless right to deal
exclusively with domestic
affairs.
staunch defenders of state sovereignty
just those trying to justify their lack of
respect for human rights. Small states
with defensive security agendas often
consider non-intervention the ultimate
protection against ambitions of the
powerful, perhaps under a humani-
tarian pretext.
The risk that humanitarian argu-
ments will be used to justify interven-
tions with ulterior motives is not new
and perhaps impossible to eliminate.
Most problematic are interventions
without a Security Council mandate, because it is easy to suspect any state
with the power to intervene independently of the UN of having interests
extending beyond the liberation of the oppressed." Former Secretary General
Kofi Annan addressed this dilemma directly with these words: "The emer-
gence of a global convention of a 'Responsibility to Protect' was conceived as a
universal principle of protecting fundamental human rights-not as a license
to make war in the name of peace.""
Former UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Dr.
Francis Deng, used these words: "I don't see sovereignty as a negative
concept enabling you to barricade yourself against the world."4 In line with
this, ICISS promoted an understanding where responsibility becomes an
aspect of state sovereignty, unifying protection at the national and the inter-
national level. Only governments who provide protection for their popula-
tions can legitimately claim the protection of sovereignty. This idea draws on
deep historical roots about what constitutes legitimate rule. If accepted, the
controlling aspects of sovereignty subordinates to the norm of protection.0
Neorealism embraces the traditional view, with no exception for
populations at risk, as best suited for states striving to survive in the anar-
chical international sphere. On the other hand, responsibility as an aspect
of sovereignty increases the possibility that states will join their efforts for
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protective purposes. Order, and the relationship between order and justice,
is central for English School thinking. The society of states rests on certain
pillars where interactions can occur beyond pure interest-based calcula-
tion, based on social features of the order, such as when state leaders enter
into dialogue with each other about values, ideas, and beliefs. Hedley Bull
underlines the importance of international order viewed from the English
School perspective with these words: "Not only is order in world politics
valuable, there is also a sense in which it is prior to other goals."" This is a
general statement about order as an underlying premise, making the real-
ization of goals like justice possible.
To react against a government failing in its responsibilities is not
to suspend sovereignty, but to promote it, because, according to Kofi
Annan, the present-day reader of the UN Charter will understand its
purpose: to protect human beings, not abusers.52 Constructivists will
see an old text re-interpreted to be meaningful in a civilized world. To
what extent ICISS' suggestion has gained support in the UN and among
the member states is an open question. Carsten Stahn, Professor of
International Criminal Law & Global Justice at Leiden University " and
Alex Bellamy, Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University
of Queensland,4 both talk about a growing acceptance of sovereignty
as including responsibility, but the agreed scope is unclear. However, if
sovereignty-as-responsibility is the UN-endorsed interpretation, while
premises for cooperation and joint action continue to be based upon
the traditional view of sovereignty, the situation resembles what Nils
Brunsson" calls "organizational hypocrisy."6 Broad agreement is easier
to achieve when concrete discussions about how to implement the prin-
ciple can wait. Responses to demands for politics at certain periods and
action at others might explain the 2005 R2P consensus, but the collective
ability in the aftermath to produce joint action will suffer. The relation-
ship between the Security Council and the civil war in Syria illustrates
this quite well. Former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon voiced his
concern about the possible undermining effect this may have. He writes:
"Unless the gap between member states' commitment and the reality
confronted by vulnerable populations is addressed, people will lose faith
in the institutions and the values we seek to uphold."57
CONCLUSION
R2P represents an attempt to free humanity from mass atrocities. One
must at least assume that world leaders who adopted R2P by consensus in
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September 2005 carried this ambition. However, ambitions are one thing,
what is possible to manifest as political realities is yet another. In 2009,
former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay,
wrote about R2P: "The full potential of the protection norm is far from
being realized."" Unfortunately, those words still ring true today. More
than a decade after the adoption of R2P, millions of civilians still face the
ugly threat of mass atrocities.
ICISS feared that their work would end up merely as "food" for
academic discussions. Although they surely wished to stimulate international
debates, their main ambition was to generate action.9 This article asked to
what extent R2P objectives can be realized through cooperation and joint
action. Four theoretical perspectives on IR were selected as analytical lenses.
The perspectives paint different pictures on how international anarchy influ-
ences outcomes by shaping conditions for cooperative arrangements.
The neorealist description of the world has very little room for cooper-
ation and joint action. The entrance of R2P will not make much difference.
Neoliberals share with neorealists the basic assumptions of an anarchical
sphere where states pursue their national interests. However, in their view,
this stimulates the creation of common institutions followed by common
work through these institutions. To cooperate and to join efforts in order
to realize R2P objectives becomes possible in situations where national and
common interests can unite. Initiatives to cooperate and to join efforts in
favor of R2P implementation on moral grounds is possible if we under-
stand the international sphere as an anarchical society, in line with English
School thinking. Human beings make
decisions on behalf of their units.
Confronted with mass atrocities they
efforts in order to realize can choose to let pure interests play a
R2P objectives becomes secondary role. Constructivism does
possible in situations where not have any particular answer to the
national and common question this article discusses, but the
perspective shows us what may happen
when R2P enters a socially constructed
.............................. world. Impediments to the realization
of R2P objectives continue to be impediments as long as dominant inter-
pretations say they are. Such dominance is often hard to change in the real
world. It is, however, possible, to redefine state sovereignty to a concept
which includes responsibility. By developing alternative interpretations,
and by showing relevant processes for responsible actors to engage in, we
can discover new ways forward for the realization of R2P objectives.f
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Sammendrag
Artikkelen handler om den internasjonale dimensjonen ved ansvaret for å beskytte befolkninger mot forbrytelser
av massivt omfang: folkemord, forbrytelser mot menneskeheten, krigsforbrytelser og fordrivelse på etnisk grunnlag.
Denne dimensjonen forvaltes av FNs sikkerhetsråd og aktiveres når det nasjonale ansvaret, som er det primære, ikke
fungerer. Beskyttelsesansvaret (R2P) ble vedtatt ved konsensus som del av slutterklæringen fra FNs verdenstoppmøte
i 2005. Forankringen av den internasjonale dimensjonen i Sikkerhetsrådet var nødvendig for å gjøre konsensus mulig.
Det var imidlertid ikke oppskriften på enkel iverksettelse. Artikkelen drøfter årsaker til iverksettingsproblemene
gjennom fokus på politikkinnholdet, på Sikkerhetsrådets sammensetning og karaktertrekk, samt på de iverksettende
aktørene og deres relasjon til beslutningstakerne. Analytisk drar den veksler på en klassisk iverksettingsstudie og teo-
retisk innsikt om hvordan komplekse organisasjoner opptrer.
Nøkkelord
R2P, internasjonalt beskyttelsesansvar, FNs Sikkerhetsråd, iverksettelse, selektiv respons, organisert hykleri
Abstract
The article discusses the international dimension of the responsibility to protect (R2P) populations from mass-
atrocities: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. It activates when states, the primary
protectors, manifestly fail to provide protection. The UN World Summit adopted R2P in 2005, with the internatio-
nal dimension anchored in the UN Security Council, a prerequisite to obtain consensus. Yet, it was not a receipt for
smooth implementation. The article discusses why implementation through the Security Council is problematic, by
focusing on the content of the policy, how the Security Council is composed and how it functions, and on the imple-
menting actors and their relations to the decision makers. Analytically, the article draws upon a classic study of imp-
lementation and theoretical insights about how complex organizations operate.
Key words
R2P, international responsibility, UN Security Council, implementation, selective response, organized hypocrisy
Innledning
Bruk av militær makt for å beskytte sivile i konfliktområder er ingen enkel affære, heller
ikke når det i utgangspunktet skjer med verdenssamfunnets velsignelse. Det vises tydelig
gjennom den tidvis bitre debatten i etterkant av den militære intervensjonen i Libya i 2011.
De massive overgrepene mot sivile som verden har vært vitne til i den syriske borgerkri-
gen, begått av det syriske regimet, av diverse motstandsgrupper, og med særlig grusomhet
av terrororganisasjonen IS, forteller også hvor fryktelig galt det kan gå når det internasjonale
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samfunnet ikke makter å sette i verk tilstrekkelige tiltak tidsnok. Artikkelen plasserer seg i
denne konteksten, en virkelighet der noen konflikter møtes med handlingslammelse fra det
beslutningsorgan verdens ledere har bemyndiget til å ta nødvendige grep.
Beskyttelse av sivile mot forbrytelser av massivt omfang, spesifisert som folkemord, for-
brytelser mot menneskeheten, krigsforbrytelser og fordrivelse på etnisk grunnlag (R2P)1 er
både et nasjonalt og et internasjonalt ansvar. Artikkelen retter søkelyset mot den interna-
sjonale dimensjonen som forvaltes gjennom mandater fra FNs sikkerhetsråd, hvor bruk av
militær makt er et mulig virkemiddel. Spørsmålet som stilles er: Hvorfor er iverksettelse av
det internasjonale beskyttelsesansvaret gjennom Sikkerhetsrådet problematisk?
Det ligger implisitt i spørsmålet at iverksettelsen faktisk er problematisk. Gyldigheten av
denne forutsetningen fremtrer imidlertid rimelig klar ved et blikk på hva Sikkerhetsrådet
har foretatt seg de senere år for å beskytte sivile i konfliktene i Syria, i Yemen og flere steder i
det sentrale Afrika. En finner noe positivt, men dessverre alt for lite i forhold til omfanget av
de menneskelige lidelsene. For den internasjonale komponenten av R2P har Sikkerhetsrådet
vist seg å være en upålitelig ‘alliert’, spesielt overfor tilfeller der skarpe virkemidler vurderes.
Artikkelen tar sikte på å være et norsk-språklig bidrag til de akademiske diskusjonene
rundt R2P innenfor fagdisipliner som internasjonal politikk, internasjonal sikkerhet, og
freds- og konfliktstudier. Først gis en kort beskrivelse av hvordan R2P ble del av det interna-
sjonale vokabularet. Deretter presenteres det analytiske rammeverket som består av innsikt
fra en berømt klassisk iverksettingsstudie og av teori om hvordan komplekse organisasjoner
fungerer. Valget av analyseverktøy er ikke tilfeldig. En av ambisjonene med artikkelen er å
vise at teoretisk innsikt utviklet i en annen tid og for andre formål enn det herværende, kan
være både relevant og nyttig for bedre å forstå viktige utfordringer knyttet til vår egen tid.
Diskusjonen faller i tre hoveddeler. Først diskuteres politikkinnholdet med fokus mot
tydelighet. Deretter vurderes iverksettelse av R2P i lys av Sikkerhetsrådet som beslutnings-
arena gjennom to adskilte avsnitt, et med hovedvekt på rådets sammensetning, og et som er
viet organisert hykleri, et vel kjent fenomen knyttet til komplekse organisasjoner. Diskusjo-
nen avrundes med fokus mot aktørene som iverksetter Sikkerhetsrådets beslutninger. Kon-
klusjon knytter sammen trådene fra diskusjonen relatert til spørsmålet artikkelen stiller.
R2P
R2P ble lansert gjennom ICISS-rapporten i 2001. ICISS2 var en flernasjonal kommisjon ini-
tiert av Canadas regjering, som svar på gjentatte sterke oppfordringer fra FNs daværende
generalsekretær Kofi Annan til verdens statsledere om å ta et kollektivt og forpliktende
beskyttelsesansvar. Bakgrunnen var verdenssamfunnets svikt under de menneskeskapte
humanitære katastrofene i Rwanda og på Balkan på 1990-tallet, men i 2001 og de nærmeste
årene etter fikk terrorangrepene og oppmerksomheten rundt terrorbekjempelse det meste
av oppmerksomheten. R2P ble løftet opp på den internasjonale dagsorden under FNs gene-
ralforsamlings såkalte Verdenstoppmøte høsten 2005. Mer enn 160 medlemsstater var repre-
sentert ved sine statsoverhoder eller regjeringssjefer (Hehir & Pattison 2016: 141). Det skal
være den største samling av statsledere noensinne.
Etter omfattende diskusjoner ble statslederne enige om å ta R2P inn i sluttdokumentet fra
Verdenstoppmøtet, godkjent ved konsensus 16.september 20053. FNs sikkerhetsråd vedtok
1. Akronymet R2P brukes som forkortelse for ‘Responsibility to protect’.
2. ICISS = International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
3. Generalforsamlingsresolusjon 60/1, §138 og 139
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en støtteresolusjon 28.juni 20064 og Generalforsamlingen gjentok sin støtte til R2P med
en ny resolusjon 15.september 20095. Generalsekretæren gir årlige R2P-rapporter til Gene-
ralforsamlingen. Artikkelen har flere referanser til disse.
Med utgangspunkt i det ICISS lanserte, var det en nedstrippet versjon av R2P Verden-
stoppmøtet vedtok. R2P er først og fremst et nasjonalt beskyttelsesansvar. Det er når en stats
myndigheter åpenbart feiler med å gi nødvendig beskyttelse at det internasjonale ansvaret
aktiveres. Slik teksten i sluttdokumentet er utformet, skal verdenssamfunnet da være forbe-
redt på kollektiv handling gjennom Sikkerhetsrådet. Det står ikke at rådet forplikter seg til
å handle i hvert enkelt tilfelle. Det er fullt mulig å uttrykke at man er forberedt på noe uten
at det omsettes i handling. Det er imidlertid den klare forankringen i Sikkerhetsrådet som
representerer den største forskjellen i forhold til ICISS-versjonen av R2P. ICISS var åpen for
muligheten av å benytte alternative prosedyrer gjennom Generalforsamlingen dersom Sik-
kerhetsrådet viser seg handlingslammet, men slike tanker var det ikke mulig å oppnå enighet
om på Verdenstoppmøtet. Det forklarer relevansen av ordet ‘nødvendig’ i artikkelens tittel,
og det har implikasjoner for iverksettelsen.
21.august 2006 vedtok FNs sikkerhetsråd en resolusjon om situasjonen i Darfur6. Der
refererer rådet for første gang til R2P forbundet med en bestemt stat. Forut for resolusjonen
som åpnet for bruk av militærmakt i Libya i 20117 ble det referert hyppig til R2P. Mandat-
teksten nevner rett nok ikke R2P ved navn, men åpner for å beskytte sivile og sivilt befol-
kede områder med alle nødvendige midler unntatt okkupasjon av landet. Det var første gang
Sikkerhetsrådet autoriserte å bruke militær makt av humanitære grunner uten samtykke fra
eksisterende statlige myndigheter8 (Williams og Bellamy 2012: 273). En rekke senere reso-
lusjoner refererer til R2P, de fleste ved å minne statene om eget beskyttelsesansvar, men det
har etter 2011 vist seg svært vanskelig å oppnå enighet i Sikkerhetsrådet rundt mulig bruk
av militær makt som virkemiddel9.
R2P representerer forsøk på å håndtere humanitære kriser ut fra en bred tilnærming
bestående av tre handlingskomponenter; forebygging, reaksjon og gjenoppbygging. Å fore-
bygge kommuniseres ofte som den viktigste fordi preventive tiltak normalt betyr lavere kost-
nader og mindre politisk kontrovers sammenliknet med tiltak i senere stadier av en konflikt.
Det rapporteres om en viss suksess knyttet til denne komponenten10, selv om en aldri vil
kunne vite hva som ville skjedd om en hadde handlet annerledes. Artikkelen fokuserer imid-
lertid på den reaktive komponenten, hvor det internasjonale samfunnet enten står overfor
situasjoner som påkaller umiddelbar handling for å stanse forbrytelser, eller hindre det fra
å bli neste scenario. Bruk av militær makt er ment som siste utvei, når alternativene har vist
seg utilstrekkelige, eller når en konflikt har eskalert til et nivå der andre virkemidler ikke
lenger er relevante. Det skal sitte langt inne å ty til dette midlet, for, som FNs generalsekretær
António Guterres påpeker i sin rapport om R2P til Generalforsamlingen i 2017, så er både
de menneskelige og de finansielle kostnadene knyttet til militær maktbruk ekstremt høye.




7. Sikkerhetsrådsresolusjon 1973, vedtatt 17.mars 2011
8. Ved sammenliknbare tilfeller har enten myndighetene gitt samtykke eller vært ikke-eksisterende.
9. Det var NATO som påtok seg ansvaret med iverksettelsen av Sikkerhetsrådsresolusjon 1973. Senere er vetoretten
aktivt brukt av Kina og Russland som mener NATO strakk Libya- mandatet for langt ved å fremtvinge regime--
skifte. De er ikke alene om den oppfatningen.
10. I 2015-rapporten om R2P til Generalforsamlingen nevner daværende generalsekretær Ban Ki-Moon suksesser på
den preventive komponenten i Kenya, Guinea, Elfenbenskysten og Kirgisistan.
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Analytisk ramme
De amerikanske forskerne Jeffrey L. Pressman og Aaron Wildavsky, pionèrer innen teoriut-
vikling knyttet til iverksettelse, studerte på 1960-tallet et statlig program i USA som i regi
av organisasjonen EDA11 lanserte hjelpepakker for økonomisk stimulans og jobbskapning
rettet mot urbane strøk med høy arbeidsledighet, spesielt blant minoriteter. Første motta-
ker av hjelp var byen Oakland i California, men etter fire år med diverse målrettede tiltak
var konklusjonen åpenbar mangel på samsvar mellom intensjoner og resultater. Pressman
og Wildavsky studerte dette prosjektet i detalj. Artikkelen benytter viktig innsikt fra denne
studien som analyseverktøy. Den klassiske teksten er fra 1973, men artikkelen legger til
grunn den utvidede bokutgaven fra 1984 som i tillegg inneholder en ny innledning og noen
supplerende kapitler signert Angela Browne og Aaron Wildavsky12.
Alle moderne organisasjoner er i større eller mindre grad komplekse. FNs spesielle
rolle som verdensorganisasjon med ansvar for internasjonal fred og sikkerhet minsker
ikke relevansen av generell teoretisk innsikt. Tilsvarende kan sies om Sikkerhetsrådet
som en kompleks organisasjon i organisasjonen. Analytisk drar artikkelen veksler på den
svenske organisasjonsforskeren Nils Brunssons studier av hvordan komplekse organisasjo-
ner opptrer. De to utvalgte bøkene er begge analytiske verk basert på omfattende empiriske
studier13. Få, om overhodet noen, har studert fenomenet ‘organisert hykleri’, et kjent trekk
ved komplekse organisasjoner, mere inngående enn Brunsson.
R2P Politisk innhold
Språk har betydning, for status og for forståelse. Det er derfor ikke likegyldig hva R2P beteg-
nes som, men både i offisielle dokumenter og i den akademiske litteraturen varierer ordval-
get betydelig, ofte uten eksplisitt forklaring. ‘Doktrine’ brukes en del i betydningen kollektivt
fastlagte retningslinjer14 (NAOB 2017). Det ligger nokså tett opp til hva vi forstår med et
‘prinsipp’ som er den foretrukne betegnelsen i denne artikkelen. Et prinsipp er mer enn
en idé ettersom det inkluderer høyere grad av forståelse rundt meningsinnhold og gyldig-
het, men det er svakere enn en norm med hensyn til å spesifisere konsekvenser for aktører
som bryter prinsippet. Det Globale Senter for R2P, lokalisert i Genève og New York15,
snakker imidlertid både om et globalt prinsipp og om en internasjonal norm. ICISS brukte
betegnelsen ‘en norm i utvikling’, men det er ikke lett å redegjøre presist for hva R2P skal
utvikles til. Som Marc Schack påpeker i sin doktorgradsavhandling fra 2016 kan det dog ikke
være tale om en ny rettslig norm. Statslederne som i 2005 ble enige om å ta R2P inn i slutt-
erklæringen fra Verdenstoppmøtet, hadde ikke intensjoner om å skape nye bindende retts-
regler (Schack 2016: 76). §139 i sluttdokumentet er da også tydelig på at kollektiv handling
gjennom Sikkerhetsrådet skal skje i henhold til FN-pakten, altså innenfor rammen av eksis-
terende internasjonal rett. Det var dette som, ifølge Alex Bellamy, gjorde konsensus mulig,
at man verken endret, eller endog forsøkte å endre grunnleggende internasjonale regler for
bruk av makt (Bellamy 2015: 14).
11. ‘The Economic Development Administration’ (EDA) ble opprettet på initiativ fra Kongressen i 1965.
12. Bokens tittel er ‘Implementation’.
13. Bøkenes titler er ‘The Organization of Hypocrisy’ og ‘Mechanisms of Hope’ fra henholdsvis 1989/2006 og 2006.
14. Det latinske ordet er ‘doctrina’ som kan oversettes med læresetning.
15. Det Globale Senter ble etablert i 2008 og er ment både som et verdensledende forskningssenter og som et ressurs-
senter for statlige myndigheter, internasjonale organisasjoner og NGOer. Formålet er å fremme universell aksept
for og effektiv iverksettelse av R2P.
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I en artikkel 16.mars 1969 ble resultatene av EDA-prosjektet omtalt som katastrofalt
dårlige av avisen Los Angeles Times16. Antallet nyetablerte arbeidsplasser lå langt unna
ambisjonene. Gjennom sin studie av prosjektet avdekket Pressman og Wildavsky en rekke
problematiske forhold som på ulike vis bidro til den svake måloppnåelsen. Før iverkset-
telse kan finne sted må det nødvendigvis eksistere et politisk innhold som er ment iverk-
satt. Normalt vil det være tale om noen spesifiserte mål og en beskrivelse av virkemidler som
anses egnet for måloppnåelse. Ifølge Pressman og Wildavsky kan det nok for visse formål
være nyttig å skille politikkinnhold fra iverksettelse, men her var ambisjonen det motsatte,
å få til tettere kobling mellom det å utforme mål og å iverksette dem i form av en gjen-
sidig interaksjonsprosess (Pressman og Wildavsky 1973/1984: innledning). Planleggerne i
Oakland oppdaget imidlertid at konteksten de opererte innenfor viste seg å være adskil-
lig mere kompleks enn forventet. Selv det som i utgangspunktet kunne fortone seg nokså
enkelt, ble mere komplisert enn antatt. Forventede aktiviteter ble enten ikke gjennomført
eller det oppstod betydelige forsinkelser. Pressman og Wildavsky advarte derfor sterkt mot
å betrakte iverksettelse som noe som skal skje etter politikkutformingen, mer eller mindre
uavhengig av denne (Ibid: 143). Uten tette bånd fra begynnelsen mellom innhold og iverk-
settelse blir resultatet lett en prosess fylt med hindre. Politikken bør derfor utformes slik at
den tar høyde for disse vanskelighetene. Poenget er å redusere behovet for klargjøring i etter-
tid så mye som mulig, for å hindre at iverksettelsen stopper opp eller forsinkes. Uklare mål og
vage prioriteringer bidrar ikke til smidig iverksettelse. Når politikkinnhold allikevel ofte får
et slikt preg er årsaken at det øker muligheten for bred oppslutning (Browne og Wildavsky
1983b: 213), men som Pressman og Wildavsky sier så forsvinner poenget med gode idéer
dersom de ikke kan gjennomføres (Pressman og Wildavsky 1973/1984: 143). For eksem-
pel kritiserte de en formulering som ‘maksimal mulig sysselsetting’ for å være altfor uklar i
forhold til å spesifisere forpliktelser (Ibid: 30). Manglende samsvar mellom mål og resulta-
ter kan også bringe politikkinnholdet som sådan under lupen (Ibid: innledning). Pressman
og Wildavsky tok høyde for at ambisjonene i EDA-prosjektet kunne ha vært satt for høyt.
De skriver at mislykket iverksettelse kan bli resultatet dersom man overvurderer hva som er
mulig å gjennomføre (Ibid: 136).
Flyttes blikket mot den internasjonale arena og iverksettelse av R2P, ser en at mye av
innsikten generert gjennom EDA-studien er gjenkjennbar. Verdenstoppmøtets adopterte
versjon av R2P er som nevnt innledningsvis adskillig mere diffus enn ICISS-versjonen, ikke
spesielt med hensyn til hva en vil oppnå, men særlig når en spør hvordan det konkret skal
skje. ICISS foreslo en rekke midler for beskyttelse av sivile til anvendelse på ulike stadier av
konflikter, men bortsett fra å understreke Sikkerhetsrådets sentrale rolle er det lite å hente
fra de aktuelle paragrafene i sluttdokumentet (138 og 139) hva iverksettelse angår. Sluttdo-
kumentet har heller ingen direkte referanser til ICISS-rapporten. §138 nevner rett nok pas-
sende og nødvendige midler, men uten nærmere spesifikasjon. §139 er litt mere spesifikk.
Der omtales diplomatiske, humanitære og andre fredelige midler, samt besluttsom kollek-
tiv handling gjennom Sikkerhetsrådet overfor tilfeller der stater ikke gir beskyttelse og hvor
fredelige midler anses inadekvate, men formuleringene er runde og dermed åpne for ulike
og ikke nødvendigvis forenlige fortolkninger. Paragrafene indikerer ikke en tydelig vei frem-
over. Ifølge Noelle Crosley fører det til at nye spørsmål reises og at nye kontroverser sparkes
i gang (Crosley 2018: 419). Dette erkjennes av FNs tidligere generalsekretær Ban Ki-Moon
som i sin 2016-rapport om R2P til Generalforsamlingen forsøkte å reise en diskusjon om
16. Ordene avisen brukte var ‘a pretty big disaster’.
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hva grunnlaget for kollektiv handling og mulig bruk av militær makt skal være (Ban 2016:
7). Det skal naturligvis legges til at spesifikasjon av virkemidler utover det generelle er svært
vanskelig å lage ettersom ethvert tilfelle vil ha sine unike særtrekk. Kanskje er det umulig,
skjønt det kan være mulig å definere noen grenser for bruk av bestemte virkemidler (Schack
2016: 91). Størst synes vanskelighetene å være når situasjonen påkaller mulig bruk av militær
makt (von Einsiedel og Bosetti 2016: 372). Verdenstoppmøtet måtte komme til enighet om
en tekst dersom R2P overhodet skulle få en plass i sluttdokumentet. Det var åpenbart lettest
å få til om de vanskeligste spørsmålene kunne skyves ut i fremtiden. Generelle tekster reflek-
terer derfor ofte grensene for mulig enighet, men de samme grensene tenderer dermed også
til å bli grenser for vellykket iverksettelse.
Det bør her bemerkes at begrepet ‘iverksettelse’ i seg selv ikke sier noe om effekter. Å iverk-
sette innebærer å utføre handlinger som har til hensikt å realisere et bestemt politikkinnhold
(Van Meter og Van Horn 1974: 447). Når det lykkes har iverksettelsen vært en suksess. Iverk-
settelse garanterer imidlertid intet bestemt utfall, men kan meget vel resultere i noe annet
enn forventet, noe uintendert, uønsket eller begge deler.
Ifølge generalsekretær António Guterres er det universell og varig enighet om hensikten
med R2P-prinsippet, inkludert at beskyttelsesansvaret er både nasjonalt og internasjonalt
(Guterres 2017: 3). Det er heller ingen uenighet om at R2P retter seg mot forbrytelser som
skjer i massiv skala, ikke mot enhver krenkelse av menneskerettigheter, men tersklene for hva
som skal regnes som massivt for de typer forbrytelser R2P omhandler, er ikke tydelig spesifi-
sert. Det finns heller ingen spesifikasjon av når en stat har sviktet sitt beskyttelsesansvar i en
slik grad at tiden er inne for verdenssamfunnet til å ta over. Hvor stort rommet for tolknin-
ger er kan sikkert diskuteres, men sett i lys av Sikkerhetsrådets handlingslammelse i forhold
til den humanitære situasjonen i Syria kan man vanskelig si at generalsekretærens optimis-
tiske situasjonsbeskrivelse hva politikkinnholdet angår har sitt motsvar på handlingssiden.
Når det sentrale beslutningsorganet ikke leverer må en forvente at det stilles spørsmål om
politikkinnholdet er for ambisiøst. At retorisk enighet ikke alltid er tilstrekkelig til å utløse
handling fikk også daværende generalsekretær Kofi Annan smertelig erfare. I sitt siste år som
generalsekretær forsøkte han gjentatte ganger å få Sikkerhetsrådet til å gripe inn i situasjonen
i Darfur. Responsen var lunken (Turner 2013: 141) selv om man etter hvert (2006-07) fikk
opprettet en fredsbevarende styrke i samarbeid med Den Afrikanske Union. Av flere grunner
ble den lite effektiv (Holmes 2014: 128).
Sikkerhetsrådet
Sammensetningen
Det tilhører Sikkerhetsrådets doméne å avgjøre når og hvordan det internasjonale beskyt-
telsesansvaret skal aktiveres. Jennifer Welsh, generalsekretærens spesialrådgiver for R2P i
perioden 2013-16, argumenterer for at Sikkerhetsrådet ikke bare har rett til å handle, men at
det også dreier seg om en forpliktelse (Welsh 2009). Dette synspunktet har imidlertid liten
støtte i den akademiske litteraturen. Internasjonale forpliktelser er mere kontroversielle enn
tilsvarende rettigheter (Glanville 2012). Før den endelige teksten i slutterklæringen fra Ver-
denstoppmøtet ble lagt frem, ble det jobbet i kulissene med å svekke formuleringer om for-
pliktelser (Shack 2016: 89).
FNs sikkerhetsråd består av fem permanente og ti roterende medlemsstater. Sistnevnte
velges for to år. De permanente medlemmene kan legge ned veto mot ethvert forslag de
misliker, hvilket hyppig forekommer. De mange som har studert denne beslutningsarenaen,
konkluderer med at vi ikke kan forvente debatter der det bedre argumentet blir avgjørende.
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Vetomaktene prioriterer ofte egne interesser foran beskyttelsesansvaret (Ban 2016: 5). I kon-
flikter hvor disse støtter ulike fraksjoner er det derfor stor fare for handlingslammelse. Sik-
kerhetsrådet er bare handlingskompetent når medlemsstatene er kollektivt enige (Nadin
2014). Det innebærer et flertall som enten inkluderer vetomaktenes stemmer, eller at de
som ikke stemmer for er avholdende, men lar være å bruke vetoretten. Denne enighet har vi
sett lite til i tilfellet Syria, til tross for Ban Ki-Moons sterke påminnelse om at R2P omfatter
alle befolkninger, i alle situasjoner og til alle tider (Ban 2015: 8). Han støttes fra faglig hold.
For eksempel konkluderer Jacinta O’Hagan17 med at R2P er et universelt prinsipp både av
opphav og i innhold. Det er iverksettelsen det er uenighet om (O’Hagan 2015: 303), og denne
uenigheten er tidvis betydelig. Melinda Rankin18 omtaler Sikkerhetsrådets handlingslam-
melse i Syria som et nederlag for statene som adopterte R2P, som testen FN ikke besto. Det
truer legitimiteten til prinsippet (Rankin 2017: 396).
Dilemmaet selektiv respons har vært en gjenganger over tid i diskusjoner om humani-
tært begrunnede intervensjoner, fra lenge før R2P-prinsippet entret arenaen. Martin Binder
understreker imidlertid at Sikkerhetsrådets respons ikke er tilfeldig, men heller ikke kan for-
klares ut fra noen bestemt enkeltfaktor (Binder 2015: 712-726). Når intervensjon på huma-
nitært grunnlag vurderes, og Binder opererer med humanitære intervensjoner som en vid
kategori som omfatter både militære og ikke-militære midler19, er båndene den aktuelle
staten har til en eller flere av vetomaktene en tungtveiende faktor, men ikke den eneste som
kan påvirke utfallet. Det kan også blant annet omfanget av menneskelig lidelse, hvordan
konflikten berører nabostatene, om og hvordan FN tidligere har vært involvert i konflikten,
den motmakt en eventuell intervensjon kan forventes å bli møtt med, samt medieoppmerk-
somheten rundt krisen, men å forutsi hva som kommer til å bli avgjørende stilt overfor et
bestemt scenario, er ingen enkel oppgave. R2Ps ugjenkallelige forankring i Sikkerhetsrådet
gjør prinsippet svært sårbart ettersom det bare vil utløse reell beskyttelse når nevnte fakto-
rer i tilstrekkelig grad går i dets favør. Bellamy beskriver hvordan debattene i Sikkerhetsrå-
det i forkant av Resolusjon 1674 i 2006, hvor rådet ga sin støtte til R2P, avdekket betydelig
uenighet rundt kriteriene for når prinsippet skal aktiveres, en diskusjon som fortsatte da Sik-
kerhetsrådet debatterte beskyttelse av sivile i bredere forstand i juni 2007. Mens noen med-
lemsstater ønsket mere konkrete kriterier, argumenterte andre for at prinsippet heller burde
snevres inn begrunnet med fare for misbruk (Bellamy 2009a: 138-139).
Det kan argumenteres for at selektiv respons er bedre enn ingen respons overhodet,men
for Mahmood Mamdani betyr selektiv respons at R2P-prinsippet svekkes og legges åpent for
manipulasjon. Han kaller det å la retten underordnes maktens diktat (Mamdani 2010: 62).
Susan Harris Rimmer tar det ytterligere et steg og spør om R2P kan ha noen verdi når bare
svake stater kan bli gjenstand for intervensjon (Rimmer 2015: 269). Bellamy ser imidler-
tid noe annerledes på saken. R2P har entret en verden som mangler mye på å være perfekt,
men å ønske seg vekk fra politiske realiteter er lite fruktbart. Å akseptere prinsippet som
sådan løser ikke vanskelige spørsmål knyttet til iverksettelsen, men R2P skyver Sikkerhetsrå-
det fremover. Å forstå hvordan politiske prinsipper fungerer i den virkelige verden gjør det
mulig å beregne både potensialet og begrensningene. Det blir lettere å etablere realistiske
forventninger om hva som er mulig å oppnå, og en vil lettere kunne avdekke hvor innsatsen
må skjerpes (Bellamy 2015: 16-18). Viktigheten av å etablere edruelige forventninger til R2P
17. O’Hagan diskuterer hvorvidt R2P kan sies å være en vestlig idé, hvilket hun bestemt avviser.
18. Rankin refererer til Stuart M. Patrick.
19. Ikke-militære midler kan for eksempel være økonomiske sanksjoner eller fredsbevarende styrker.
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understrekes også av Luke Glanville. Han argumenterer dessuten for at R2P har hatt reell og
observerbar innflytelse på staters adferd, en innflytelse som kan spores selv der Sikkerhets-
rådet ikke har vist handlekraft (Glanville 2016: 184). Prinsippet har dessuten satt dype spor
når det gjelder den internasjonale samtalen rundt beskyttelse og intervensjon på humani-
tært grunnlag. Disse spørsmålene er ikke lenger mulig å diskutere uten å bruke terminologi
som assosieres med R2P (Crossley 2018: 415-416).
Gjennom studien av EDA-prosjektet oppdaget Pressman og Wildavsky at utskifting av
sentrale beslutningstakere skapte problemer for iverksettelsen (Pressman og Wildavsky: inn-
ledning og 107-110). En kunne ikke ta for gitt at det en opprinnelig var blitt enige om, fort-
satt stod ved lag. Avtaler ble gjort til gjenstand for modifisering, og utvidede nettverk gjorde
gjennomføringen av diverse tiltak mere komplisert. Om regelmessig skifte av ikke-perma-
nente medlemmer i Sikkerhetsrådet byr på tilsvarende problemer for iverksettelsen av R2P,
er imidlertid et mere åpent spørsmål. Den generelle innsikten er at når noen aktører forla-
ter arenaen og nye kommer til, så økes kompleksiteten og iverksettingen blir vanskeligere å
gjennomføre (Van Meter og Van Horn 1975: 489), men at nye beslutningstakere bringer med
seg nye premisser til debattene i Sikkerhetsrådet er jo ikke nødvendigvis negativt. Det beror
på hvem disse nye deltakerne er og hvem de erstatter, hvordan de ser på de aktuelle utford-
ringene, og spesielt i denne sammenheng hvor forpliktet statslederne føler seg i forhold til
vedtaket de var med på å fatte i 2005. Risikoen er selvfølgelig til stede for at tidligere enighet
undermineres, med en mere trøblete iverksettelsesprosess som følge. Stater som hevder å
være genuint opptatt av å beskytte sivile, kan dessuten ha interesser som går ut over det rent
humanitære. Som medlemsstat i Sikkerhetsrådet må en også regne med at verdenssamfun-
net legger merke til ens standpunkter i ulike saker. Det kan gi både gunstige og ugunstige
ringvirkninger. For eksempel, selv om det ofte ikke kommuniseres klart og tydelig, så kan det
å vise overfor verden utenfor at man tar beskyttelsesansvaret på alvor, tenkes å inngi respekt
fra andre, samt kanskje i tillegg gi økt selvrespekt.
Organisert hykleri
Fenomenet ‘organisert hykleri’ innebærer at organisasjonen møter noen krav med ord,
andre med beslutninger, og atter andre med handlinger. Dermed blir det, spesielt i kon-
fliktsituasjoner, vanskelig å opptre konsistent. Som følge av at organisasjonsmessige struk-
turer, prosesser og ideologier favner om inkonsistente krav, risikerer en manglende samsvar
mellom hva som kommuniseres at skal gjøres, hva som blir besluttet gjort, og hva som
deretter gjøres (Brunsson 1989/2006: introduksjon). Fenomenet er vanskelig, ja kanskje
umulig, å unngå. Fester vi lit til Stephen Krasner, så er organisert hykleri dessuten mest
utbredt nettopp blant organisasjoner som opererer i den internasjonale sfære, blant annet
grunnet mangel på overstatlige myndighetsorganer som kan løse konflikter autoritativt
(Krasner 2009: 213). Brunsson mener ikke at fenomenet er etterstrebelsesverdig, men
ensidig fordømmelse er heller ikke spesielt fruktbart fordi organisert hykleri faktisk gir orga-
nisasjoner noen ikke helt uvesentlige fordeler. Han fremhever spesielt at det bidrar til å sikre
legitimitet i konfliktfylte omgivelser. Formelt fattede beslutninger tiltrekker seg oppmerk-
somhet fra omgivelsene også i situasjoner hvor de ikke følges opp med handling (Brunsson
2006: 32).
Prinsippet om statlig suverenitet er nedfelt i FNs charter, kapittel 1, artiklene 2.1, 2.4 og
2.7. Tradisjonelt har prinsippet vært forstått som ikke-innblanding i staters interne anlig-
gender. Til forsvarerne av denne forståelsen finner vi stater hvor myndighetene ikke ønsker
omverdenens innsyn i hvordan befolkningen behandles, men som påpekt av Jarat Chopra,
er det også et syn mange små stater slår vakt om, av frykt for hva de mektigere kan finne
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på å foreta seg. Den tradisjonelle forståelsen av suverenitet skaper orden og forutsigbarhet
internasjonalt ved å gjøre det vanskeligere å skjule mindre ideelle motiver under dekke av
humanitære paraplyer (Chopra 1994: 40). Det finns situasjoner hvor bruk av militær makt
er eneste mulighet for å stanse forbrytelser av massivt omfang. Ifølge Justin Morris er imid-
lertid støtten til R2P fra en betydelig del av det internasjonale samfunnet omvendt propor-
sjonal med sannsynligheten for at dette virkemiddelet kommer til anvendelse (Morris 2016:
206).
ICISS valgte å utfordre den tradisjonelle forståelsen for å dreie debatten rundt interven-
sjoner på humanitært grunnlag vekk fra det ‘evige’ spørsmålet om statlig suverenitet kan
tilsidesettes eller ikke. Grepet var å gjøre ansvar for å beskytte befolkningen til et aspekt
ved suvereniteten, slik at kun myndigheter som ivaretar sitt beskyttelsesansvar legitimt, kan
gjøre krav på suverenitet. Uten legitimitet vil der ikke være noen suverenitet å tilsidesette.
Dette var i og for seg ikke nye tanker. Diskusjoner rundt hva som konstituerer legitimt styre,
har dype historiske røtter. Den alternative suverenitetsforståelsen ble imidlertid ikke adop-
tert av verdens ledere sammen med R2P, skjønt heller ikke eksplisitt avvist. Paragrafene 138
og 139 i sluttdokumentet fra Verdenstoppmøtet sier intet om statssuverenitet og refererer
heller ikke til ICISS’ diskusjon.
Både Bellamy (Bellamy 2009b: 170) og Carstehn Stahn (Stahn 2007: 101) taler om
økende aksept innenfor FN for en kobling mellom suverenitet og beskyttelsesansvar, men
omfanget av aksepten er uklar. Muligens er fotfestet sterkest hos FNs toppledelse. Ved flere
anledninger minnet generalsekretær Kofi Annan om at hensikten med FNs charter er å
beskytte menneskers rettigheter, ikke de som forbryter seg mot dem (Annan og Mouzavi-
zadeh 2012: 132), og hans etterfølger Ban Ki-Moon så ikke R2P og suverenitet som mot-
setninger, men som allierte (Ban 2015: 6). Men hvis suverenitet koblet til ansvar ender
opp som snakkeversjonen samtidig som den tradisjonelle forståelsen legger premissene for
handling, likner situasjonen nettopp på hva Brunsson sier kjennetegner organisert hykleri.
Fenomenet legger dessuten til rette for å skille utformingen av et politisk program fra
iverksettelsen tidsmessig. Det var fordelaktig med hensyn til å oppnå nødvendig konsen-
sus rundt R2P i 2005, men det svekker den etterfølgende evnen til å handle i tråd med pro-
grammet.
Sentralt med hensyn til å forbedre iverksettelsen står evnen til, gjennom evaluering, å lære
av fortidens feil. Det forutsetter det Browne og Wildavsky kaller en lærende kultur (Browne
& Wildavsky 1983a: 191), men komplekse organisasjoner preget av organisert hykleri byr
ofte ikke på gode vilkår verken for tilstrekkelig evaluering eller læring. Ifølge Pressman og
Wildavsky er iverksettelse og evaluering to sider av samme sak ettersom noe må være iverk-
satt før det kan evalueres, mens det er gjennom den etterfølgende evalueringen at forstå-
elsen av hendelsesforløpet formes (Pressman og Wildavsky 1973/1984: introduksjon). Det
beste er om evaluering kan gjennomføres, ikke som en enkelthendelse, men som en konti-
nuerlig prosess, fordi det vanligvis gir bedre utsikter til rask respons selv om det å identifi-
sere de mest relevante variable og effektene av dem fortsatt kan by på betydelige utfordringer
(Browne og Wildavsky 1983a: 191). Organisasjonsmessig læring innebærer etablering av nye
regler, forbedrede rutiner etc. Det er en mere kompleks form sammenliknet med læring på
individnivå. Selv om grensen i praksis neppe er sylskarp, så kan vi ifølge Mary Jo Hatch og
Ann L. Cunliffe snakke om to kategorier organisasjonsmessig læring. Den første og enkleste
har et utnyttende preg der formålet er å anvende det man allerede har ervervet av kunn-
skap og ressurser med sikte på å gjøre det samme som før, bare mere effektivt. Alternativet
er den utforskende varianten som aktivt søker etter nye muligheter, gjennom eksperimen-
ter og forskning, og som kan resultere i betydelige organisasjonsmessige endringer (Hatch
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og Cunliffe 2006: 313)20. Denne stiller store krav til en lærende kultur preget av fleksibili-
tet, men ulike individer i organisasjonen tolker ikke nødvendigvis de samme hendelser på
samme måte. Jo mere kompleks organisasjonen er, jo mere sannsynlig er det at den aggre-
gerte læringen i ulike enheter og avdelinger ikke nødvendigvis kan sammenfattes til noe som
er felles for hele organisasjonen. Stort sprik med hensyn til tolkning av erfaringer gjør det da
vanskelig å stake ut en felles kurs fremover. Gjennom studien av EDA-prosjektet observerte
Pressman og Wildavsky at en rekke problemer oppstod av slike grunner. De gikk så langt
som til å hevde at programmet hadde stengt seg ute fra mulighetene for å lære (Pressman
og Wildavsky 1973/1984: 125). Hva R2P angår så har vi i tiden etter 2011 sett hvilken bety-
delig utfordring tilsvarende forhold representerer for iverksettelsen av R2Ps internasjonale
handlingsdimensjon gjennom Sikkerhetsrådet.
Jared Genser understreker at en omfattende evaluering av hvordan Sikkerhetsrådet har
håndtert beskyttelsesansvaret, både av det som har vært vellykket og det som ikke har vært
det, er helt essensiell med sikte på å forbedre iverksettelsen av intensjonene R2P-prinsippet
rommer i årene fremover, men, skrivende vinteren 2018, konstaterer han at ingen uavhen-
gig analyse har funnet sted så langt (Genser 2018: 424-425). Behovet til tross, det er ikke
gitt at noen slik evaluering overhodet kommer. En kan heller ikke uten videre forvente sterk
vilje blant medlemsstatene til å evaluere egne R2P-relaterte erfaringer. En ting er at det vil
legge beslag på tid og oppmerksomhet, knappe goder i konkurranse med annet som opp-
leves mere påtrengende og kanskje mere attraktivt. Brunsson peker imidlertid på en annen
grunn som ikke skal undervurderes. Det er ubehagelig å bli konfrontert med at iverksatte
tiltak kanskje fikk uønskede konsekvenser. Sensitiv informasjon om hva som ble gjort feil,
kan således skade både organisasjoner og andre aktører. Beslutningstakere kan derfor rett
og slett vegre seg for å søke etter slik informasjon (Brunsson 2006: 151-152). Læring er jo
bare mulig når det finnes feil å lære av, men samtidig som lite feil hemmer læring, så er
mange feil en indikasjon på inkompetanse som det ikke er spesielt trivelig å bli forbundet
med (Browne og Wildavsky 1983b: 227). Den norske evalueringen av krigsinnsatsen i Libya
i 2011 kan til en viss grad tjene som eksempel ettersom den i utgangspunktet var omslut-
tet av en lunken holdning blant mange politikere. Rapporten21 kom i september 2018, ble
presentert for Stortinget av utenriksministeren i januar 2019, og deretter debattert i Stortin-
get i månedsskiftet mars-april. Debatten ble mye sentrert rundt konstitusjonelle spørsmål
knyttet til grunnlaget for beslutningen om at Norge skulle delta i de militære operasjonene.
Ikke at det på noen måte er uvesentlig, men viljen var påfallende mindre til å diskutere
spørsmål som forholdet mellom mandatet og iverksettelsen, hvorvidt den militære innsat-
sen faktisk ga beskyttelse til befolkningen, umiddelbart og senere, samt eventuelle motiver
Norge kunne tenkes å ha hatt for sin deltakelse utover de rent humanitære. En rapport som
er såpass mild i kritikken av de aktuelle beslutningstakerne som denne kan neppe forventes å
generere omfattende selvransakelse. Kontrasten er stor til kritikken som ble det britiske poli-
tiske lederskapet til del i den såkalte Chilcot-rapporten fra juli 2016. Denne evaluerte Stor-
britannias deltakelse i Irak-krigen i 200322 og konkluderte blant annet med at Storbritannia
og USA hadde underminert autoriteten til FNs Sikkerhetsråd.
20. Kategoriene, omtalt som ‘exploitation’ og ‘exploration’, er utviklet av den amerikanske sosiologen og organisa-
sjonsforskeren James March.
21. Rapporten fra Libya-utvalget har tittelen ‘Evaluering av norsk deltakelse i Libya-operasjonene i 2011’. Den er
signert Utenriksdepartementet og Forsvarsdepartementet og datert 13.september 2018.
22. Evalueringen, som tok 7 år, var ledet av Sir John Chilcot, tidligere blant annet minister for Nord-Irland.
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Iverksettende aktører
Aktører som iverksetter beslutninger er ofte ikke identiske med beslutningstakerne. Press-
man og Wildavsky advarte imidlertid sterkt mot å gjøre seg avhengig av andre hva iverk-
settelse angår. I EDA-prosjektet så de hvordan nettopp det medførte stadige behov for nye
avklaringer hvor et stort antall deltakere var involvert, omsluttet av mye kontrovers og gjen-
sidig mistenksomhet som i betydelig grad svekket mulighetene for å få tiltak gjennomført
(Pressman og Wildavsky 1973/1984: 107). Aktørene i Oakland var selvfølgelig helt andre
enn dem vi møter på den internasjonale arena23, men relevansen av innsikten de ervervet
er ikke begrenset til en bestemt kontekst. For eksempel merket de seg at enkelte aktører kan
være enige i et forslag på et tidspunkt, for på et senere tidspunkt å enten motarbeide det
eller unnlate å følge det opp med nødvendige midler. Jo flere aktører som er involvert i den
iverksettende fasen, jo flere oppfatninger vil det være som må tas hensyn til, og de er ikke
nødvendigvis sammenfallende. De registrerte også betydelig variasjon med hensyn til hvor
mye tid og innsats ulike aktører var villige til å bruke på prosjektet, i konkurranse med andre
og kanskje mere foretrukne forpliktelser. Dessuten, å være avhengig av aktører som ikke har
det hastverk beslutningstakerne forventer, er ugunstig, men det gjelder også avhengighet av
aktører som nok er entusiastiske hva politikkinnhold angår, men som mangler ressurser til å
kunne bidra nevneverdig i iverksettingsfasen (Pressman og Wildavsky 1973/1984: 101-102).
Sikkerhetsrådet befinner seg i den situasjon Pressman og Wildavsky advarte mot. Rådet
fatter autoritative beslutninger, men har ingen egen iverksettende kapasitet og heller ingen
mulighet til å bygge opp dette. En vellykket iverksettelse av en R2P-basert beslutning er føl-
gelig avhengig av tilstrekkelig dedikerte iverksettende aktører som forstår mandatets rekke-
vidde og begrensninger, er i stand til å mobilisere ressurser, og også villige til å bruke disse
i tråd med mandatteksten. Det er ikke gitt at slike aktører står klare til å bidra. Er det bruk
av militær makt vi snakker om, så vil iverksettende aktører måtte forvente å bli involvert i
operasjoner som medfører betydelig risiko. Politikere kan som regel anføre gode grunner
for ikke å sende soldater og offiserer på slike oppdrag langt fra egne grenser, spesielt ikke
når støtten i den hjemlige opinion er mangelfull og neste valg kanskje nærmer seg. I §139
i slutterklæringen fra Verdenstoppmøtet er samarbeid med relevante regionale organisasjo-
ner spesifikt nevnt for tilfeller der Sikkerhetsrådet skal være forberedt på å handle kollektivt,
men enten iverksettelse skjer gjennom å mobilisere medlemsstater, regionale organisasjoner,
eller begge deler, så er Sikkerhetsrådets operasjonelle kontroll over de iverksettende aktø-
rene sterkt begrenset (Dunne 2015: 100). Disse kan meget vel ha sine egne agendaer, eller
motivene for å bidra kan være flere enn de rent humanitære. Ulike iverksettende aktører har
dessuten ikke alltid sammenfallende oppfatninger av oppgavenes karakter. I EDA-prosjektet
observerte Pressman og Wildavsky hvordan det kan forplante seg til divergerende syn på hva
som er å betrakte som suksess (Ibid: 98). Ifølge Browne og Wildavsky skyldes den manglende
kontrollen at vi har å gjøre med to separate prosesser. I beslutningsfasen formuleres forvent-
ninger og det defineres tiltak som er ment å realisere disse, men under iverksettingen skjer
det svært mye uforutsett som beslutningstakerne ofte ikke har kontroll over (Browne og
Wildavsky 1983b: 217). Det er ikke mulig å forutse alt som kan skje, men når lite iverksettelse
er inkludert i selve politikkinnholdet, så overlates tolkningene knyttet til gjennomføringen
til de iverksettende aktørene. Håndteringen av mandatet gitt ved Sikkerhetsrådsresolusjon
1973 (Libya 2011) indikerer hva det kan føre til. Mandattekster fra Sikkerhetsrådet gir ofte
23. Eksempelvis representanter for regionale og lokale myndigheter, programansatte og grupper med spesialkompe-
tanse knyttet til programmet, offentlige og private arbeidsgivere, sponsororganisasjoner mm.
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betydelig tolkningsrom. Det kan være bevisst utformet, som en avspeiling av det politiske
kompromiss som hadde medlemmenes støtte på et bestemt tidspunkt (Gifkins 2016: 150),
men det kan også være en uintendert følge av at tekstene utformes både under politisk press
og tidspress (Schack 2016: 27). Det er normalt ikke det beste utgangspunktet for en grundig
gjennomgang som kan stramme opp språklig tvetydighet.
Williams og Bellamy har påpekt hvordan både politikk-utformere og militære planleggere
må ty til ad-hocløsninger grunnet manglende ekspertise til å analysere og å forstå hvordan
hendelsesforløp kan påvirkes, i en atmosfære der strategisk tenkning har heller dårlige vilkår
(Williams og Bellamy 2012: 274). Det er, ifølge David Chandler, bred enighet om behovet for
både mere diskusjon rundt og forskning på hva som virker når vi snakker om intervensjoner,
herunder hvordan den internasjonale koordineringen kan forbedres (Chandler 2009: 3)24.
I november 2011 kom det imidlertid et initiativ fra Brasil som den gang var medlem av Sik-
kerhetsrådet (Brockmeier, Tourinho og Stuenkel 2016: 136)25. Ut fra misnøye med hvordan
iverksetterne hadde tolket innholdet i resolusjon 1973, foreslå Brasil tiltak for å sikre tettere
bånd mellom beslutningstakere og iverksettere. Større grad av kontroll i iverksettingsfasen
skulle Sikkerhetsrådet kunne oppnå blant annet ved å innføre kortere mandatperioder og
kontinuerlig debatt når iverksetting av et mandat pågår. Det skulle også øke mulighetene
for enighet blant medlemmene om de veivalgene som fortløpende gjøres (Evans 2015: 36).
Forslaget genererte en viss oppmerksomhet, men de praktiske konsekvensene var lite avklart
(Holmes 2014: 126). Det ser ut til at det forsvant fra radaren sammen med at Brasil forlot
Sikkerhetsrådet ved utgangen av år 2011.
Konklusjon
Spørsmålet artikkelen stilte var: Hvorfor er iverksettelse av det internasjonale beskyttelsesan-
svaret gjennom FNs sikkerhetsråd problematisk? Det er drøftet tredelt, først med fokus mot
det politiske innholdet i R2P-prinsippet, deretter ved å se nærmere på hvordan Sikkerhets-
rådets sammensetning og fenomenet organisert hykleri påvirker iverksettelsen, for avslut-
ningsvis å rette blikket mot de iverksettende aktørene som Sikkerhetsrådet er avhengig av
å mobilisere for at beslutninger skal bli til handling. Innsikt fra en klassisk studie av iverk-
settelse (Pressman og Wildavsky) og teori om hvordan komplekse organisasjoner opptrer
(Brunsson) har utgjort den analytiske rammen for drøftingen.
Forankringen av R2P i Sikkerhetsrådet, trygt innenfor rammen av eksisterende interna-
sjonal rett, var nødvendig for enigheten som inkluderte prinsippet i slutterklæringen fra
Verdenstoppmøtet i 2005, men resultatet er avstand mellom ord og handling. Problemet er
ikke politikkinnholdet i bred forstand, skjønt det lider under tynt spesifiserte terskler. Kob-
lingen mellom politikkinnhold og iverksettelse fremstår dessuten som uklar. Det lettet enig-
heten, men etterlot et betydelig tolkningsrom som synliggjøres når en står overfor konkrete
tilfeller der mobilisering av det internasjonale ansvaret er aktuelt.
Faste medlemmer av Sikkerhetsrådet benytter ofte vetoretten, også når forbrytelser av
massivt omfang kan dokumenteres å finne sted hinsides enhver rimelig tvil. Russland og
Kina har flere ganger etter 2011 lagt ned veto for å stanse resolusjoner de har oppfattet som
ubalansert kritiske i forhold til det sittende regimet i Syria. Artikkelen har drøftet dilemmaet
knyttet til selektiv respons. Det er Sikkerhetsrådets prerogativ å avgjøre når det skal handles
24. Chandler diskuterer intervensjoner i en statsbyggende kontekst.
25. Initiativet gikk under betegnelsen ‘Responsibility while Protecting (RwP)’.
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og med hvilke virkemidler. Tidvis respons er sikkert bedre enn at handling aldri iverksettes.
Kanskje er det også det beste en kan forvente slik verden er skrudd sammen, men når hand-
lingslammelse fra Sikkerhetsrådet, og herunder får en regne tiltak som er åpenbart utilstrek-
kelige i forhold til problemenes karakter, tegner seg som et mønster over tid, da er ikke den
internasjonale dimensjonen ved beskyttelsesansvaret godt ivaretatt. Iverksettelse fremmes
heller ikke av et organisert hykleri som blant annet vises gjennom divergerende oppfatnin-
ger av hvordan en skal forstå statlig suverenitet, eller ved at evalueringer verken igangsettes
eller gjennomføres, med den følge at effektiv læring på organisasjonsnivå hindres i stedet for
å danne grunnlag for forbedret iverksettingspraksis.
Å være et besluttende organ, men samtidig være avhengig av aktører utenfor seg selv for
iverksettelse av beslutningene, byr på kontrollproblemer. Vanskelighetene dette genererte i
EDA-prosjektet som Pressman og Wildavsky studerte, er langt på vei gjenkjennbare med hen-
blikk på realisering av R2P-prinsippets internasjonale dimensjon. Det er ikke gitt at iverk-
settende aktører står klare til å handle når Sikkerhetsrådet kaller til innsats. Rådet kan heller
ikke kontrollere at de som melder seg til tjeneste, kun styres av humanitære motiver. Kun i
begrenset grad har en kontroll over hvordan iverksetterne tolker mandatteksten. Men tekster
kan utformes mere presist og således minske tolkningsrommet, både med hensyn til hvilke
virkemidler det åpnes for å bruke, men også en tydeligere avgrensning av hva mandatet ikke
omfatter. Gevinsten vil kunne bli mindre opprivende strid i etterkant av iverksettingen.
Artikkelen har tatt for seg Sikkerhetsrådets håndtering av det internasjonale beskyttelses-
ansvaret hvor bruk av militær makt tilhører repertoaret av virkemidler, men R2P-prinsippet
favner betydelig videre. Det skal derfor avslutningsvis presiseres at konklusjonene fra denne
diskusjonen ikke uten videre er overførbare til andre aspekter ved R2P.
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Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is the national and international responsibility to 
protect populations against mass atrocities. This article discusses prospects for 
the implementation of R2P objectives in a world where Asian powers rise. It 
focuses not only on prevention and assistance but also decisive action, the most 
controversial aspect of R2P, tied to the UN Security Council where China 
resides as a permanent member with a veto. The Indian R2P position also high-
lights, supplemented with some comments, on selected East Asian states. It con-
cludes that the rise of Asian powers does not threaten the national responsibility 
to protect. Voluntary international assistance is not threatened, but assistance 
with coercive elements might be. Unless more clear criteria are established for 
the possible use of military force, mandates from the Security Council which 
allows this will probably be rare. Particularly, China will oppose interventions 
that may forward regime change in targeted states.
Keywords
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), mass atrocities, the UN Security Council, veto, 
sovereignty, responsibility
I. Introduction
The world order develops in a multipolar direction. In Asia, China and India in 
particular are rising powers, with China as the most likely challenger to US 
influence globally. The expected implications for several international issue areas 
are substantial. This article discusses one such issue, that is, the expectations 
connected to the national and international communities’ responsibility to protect 
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populations from mass atrocities (Responsibility to Protect [R2P]). The article 
poses the following question:
What are the prospects for the implementation of R2P objectives in a world with rising 
Asian powers?
The article has the following structure: the Section II, after the introduction, 
explains what R2P is, its worldwide adoption in 2005, the background and some 
relevant events in the aftermath of its adoption. Section III focuses on how China 
and India understand R2P, including possible changes since 2005. A few selected 
East Asian state’s relations with R2P underpin the Chinese and Indian positions. 
The discussion is carried out in Section IV, while in Section V, the main arguments 
are summarized.
The article connects to ongoing debates about the potential embedded in the 
R2P principle and to debates about the obstacles that often spoil effective 
implementation. It is also possible to see the article as a contribution to a broader 
debate about ‘global governance’, a concept primarily used as a tool to understand 
global change, sources as well as implications (Hewson & Sinclair, 1995). 
Governance comprises the systems of authoritative norms, rules, institutions and 
practices, by means of which any collectivity, from the local to the global, manages 
its common affairs. Governance has been equated with ‘governing’ and understood 
as the process aspect of government. However, there is no government at the 
global level. Global governance is therefore considered as an instance of 
governance in the absence of government, or as coordination of actions without 
hierarchical control (Mayntz, 2003; Ruggie, 2014).
Global governance highlights relocations of authority across multiple levels 
and areas. It is a comprehensive change-oriented concept concerned with many 
issues, but of special relevance for discussion in this article is the capacity of 
world organizations to address world problems. This includes a number of 
expectations to the UN, for instance, about how to deal with challenges calling for 
possible humanitarian-based interventions (Hewson & Sinclair, 1995), a question 
highly relevant when focus is on implementation of R2P objectives with rising 
Asian powers as the background. According to Ruggie (2014), the global 
governance concept has this capacity to capture how power is exercised across the 
globe, including how actors relate to each other on specific issues.
II. Responsibility to Protect
The Adoption and the Pillars
In autumn 2005, the United Nations General Assembly housed the World Summit, 
the largest gathering of state leaders ever to take place. In the Outcome Document, 
unanimously endorsed (GA Resolution 60/1 of 16 September 2005), the leaders 
collectively recognized (§138 and 139) that all populations are entitled to 
protection from mass atrocities, defined as genocide, crimes against humanity, 
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war crimes and ethnic cleansing. This is the objectives of the Responsibility to 
Protect, or R2P, the commonly used acronym. The UN Security Council adopted 
a supportive declaration on 28 June 2006 (SC Resolution 1674), and the General 
Assembly confirmed its support on 15 September 2009 (GA Resolution 63/308). 
Several later reports of the UN Secretary General endorse R2P.
R2P represents a comprehensive approach to deal with humanitarian crisis. 
This article focuses on prevention and action, comprised of three pillars. First 
comes the pure national dimension of R2P, that is, prevention at state level. The 
second pillar is prevention through international assistance to vulnerable states. 
The third one activates when states, despite help, manifestly fail to protect. The 
international community are then prepared to act, on a case-by-case basis, through 
the Security Council, which has a repertoire of both peaceful and coercive 
measures at its disposal. To use peaceful measures is the first choice. Use of 
military force is the last resort, when other measures were without success, or 
when a conflict has escalated to a level where other options are not relevant.
The definitions provided vary, often without clarification, even in the academic 
literature. This can be confusing. The most commonly used labels to define R2P 
are concept, principle, doctrine or norm. The preferred choice for this article is 
‘principle’. R2P is more than a proposal. It includes sufficient shared understanding 
as a foundation for action, but in specifying consequences for perpetrators, it is 
weaker than a norm.
The article discusses prospects for the implementation of R2P objectives. 
However, it is important not to confuse the term ‘implementation’ with results or 
effects. Implementation comes with intentions connected to desirable outcomes. 
It does not guarantee success, but may instead produce something unintended, 
unwanted or both.
Background
A Canadian government initiative established the Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) whose December 2001 report introduced R2P to 
the international audience. UN failure to respond to mass atrocities in the 1990s 
(Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo), made, on several occasions, the then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan to plead world leaders to oblige themselves on behalf of 
humanity. The ICISS report inspired the adoption of R2P at the 2005 World 
Summit, but the adopted version is weaker in content (Shack, 2016). It recognizes 
that R2P has both national and international dimensions. Yet, to be prepared to act 
is not equal to an obligation. It contains a right, but not a duty. Anchored to the 
Security Council, R2P embeds inside existing international law. The ICISS 
Commission discussed alternative procedures when the Council is unable to 
decide (ICISS, 2001, chaps. 6.28–6.40), but the Outcome Document very clearly 
stated that a Security Council mandate, in accordance with international law, must 
be in place before member states and relevant regional organizations can act. This 
was not a receipt for smooth implementation, but it made the 2005 consensus 
possible. Bellamy catches the point: ‘Consensus on R2P was possible precisely 
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because it did not change – or even seek to change – the basic rules governing the 
use of force’ (Bellamy, 2015, p. 14). The ICISS report suggested a variety of tools 
connected to each R2P pillar. The Outcome Document has only few general 
references to them.
R2P first invocated for a particular conflict in Sudan in 2006 (Darfur). Yet, the 
Security Council remained passive towards alleged mass atrocities in Sri Lanka in 
2008–2009. With respect to Libya, in 2011, the Council for the first time ever 
authorized the use of force for human protection purposes against a functioning 
government (SC Resolution 1973 of 11 March 2011). Other comparable missions 
have been with government consent, or there has not been any government to hold 
accountable. R2P language informs many Security Council resolutions, and 
certain noticeable successes report on prevention (Ban, 2015). Most UN peace 
missions incorporate R2P directly in the mandate texts as calls for protection of 
civilians (Ban, 2016). Despite this, after 2011, the Security Council has been 
almost unable to deal effectively with the most severe atrocity crimes.
Since 2009, the UN Secretary-General has delivered yearly reports on R2P to the 
General Assembly, followed by debates. The 2009 and 2015 reports are particularly 
concerned with implementation of R2P objectives. In his R2P report from 2017, 
Secretary-General António Guterres writes: ‘The consensus on the purposes of the 
responsibility to protect spans every continent. There is no longer any question that 
the protection of populations from atrocity crimes is both a national and an 
international responsibility, which is universal and enduring’ (Guterres, 2017, p. 3). 
Yet, too often, these purposes do not match reality on the ground. The Secretary-
General expresses severe concern about fails to take necessary steps, with 
significantly increased number of civilians subjected to atrocity crimes over the past 
few years, and refugee crisis on a scale not seen since the end of World War II 
(WW2). He does not accept this: ‘It is imperative that we put an end to these negative 
trends, indeed, we have a responsibility to do so’ (Guterres, 2017, p. 3). Although he 
does not point directly to any Asian state or case, it is relevant to connect at least 
some of his indignation to Russia and Chinas’ frequent uses of vetoes in the Security 
Council in the shadow of the Syrian civil war.
III. China and India
Responsibility to Protect and China
As a rising power, China has both the appetite and the capacity to influence global 
affairs (Barelli, 2018). China is the only pure Asian state among the five permanent 
Security Council members, having used the veto several times to halt suggested 
resolutions on Syria. Beyond any reasonable doubt, mass atrocities have been 
committed in this conflict. The vetoes therefore may look like a general opposition 
to R2P. However, that conclusion is too hasty. It is partly true for R2P pillar three, 
but not for pillars one and two. China initially opposed many of the suggestions 
launched by ICISS. At the World Summit, during the discussions before adoption 
of the principle, China argued in favour of a narrowing (Fung, 2016), and, it was 
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not alone. The newly appointed US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, made it 
very clear that the USA would not support a text obligating the Security Council. 
The USA had no intention to establish a new kind of legal responsibility for the 
international community (Shack, 2016). China shared this view by endorsing the 
Outcome Document’s restricted R2P version. Since then, the Chinese position has 
moved somewhat in general favour of R2P. Today, China appears as a supporter 
of R2P pillars one and two, but rather than a short-term reactive response at the 
outbreak of a conflict, they support a long-term strategy for the lasting protection 
of vulnerable populations (Fung, 2016). According to Barelli (2018), Chinese 
officials embrace the idea that more power and global influence generate more 
responsibility. A more proactive approach involves China more directly in 
addressing complex international questions, adding Chinese perspectives to their 
solutions. Barelli refers particularly to a speech about this by Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi at the China Development Forum on 25 March 2015.
China has voted in favour of several Security Council resolutions reminding 
governments about their national responsibility, in accordance with R2P’s first 
pillar. They have also accepted the assistance to build state preventive capacities 
described in pillar two, including assistance with a certain coercive character. 
Towards Syria, China has abstained from some suggested resolutions vetoed by 
Russia and sided with Russia in others. Yet, they have also voted in favour of 
resolutions aimed at easing the humanitarian situation, including one demanding 
the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons (SC Resolution 2118 of 27 September 
2013) and one authorizing humanitarian agencies to access rebel-held areas 
without government consent (SC Resolution 2165 of 14 July 2014) (Barelli, 
2018). The third pillar is more problematic for China, due to their traditional 
reluctance to interventions. Fung (2016) describes two conditions for China to 
accept the use of force, to invoke R2P strictly within the confines of the Outcome 
Document language, and that applying R2P must not lead to significant changes 
in the target state’s political infrastructure. With respect to Libya, China abstained 
from voting, allowing the mandate to pass, due to the presence of a regional 
consensus for intervention, cautious not to appear at odds with the Arab League 
and The African Union (Chen, 2016). Yet, in the aftermath, they have criticized 
how NATO implemented the mandate, illustrated by these words from Garwood-
Gowers: ‘The Libyan experience with R2P seemed to trigger renewed Chinese 
determination to resist efforts to impose non-consensual civilian protection 
measures under R2P’s third pillar’ (Garwood-Gowers, 2016, p. 92).
In 2012, Chinese scholars launched a concept called ‘Responsible Protection 
(RP)’, an attempt to develop the third pillar under the commitment to operate 
within the current international order. It became rather short-lived and was never 
formally adopted as official Chinese policy. Instead, China has shown support for 
an initiative with many similarities, the Brazilian Responsibility while Protecting 
(RwP) (Fung, 2016). A proposal from Brazilian diplomats addressed to the UN 
Secretary-General emphasized the need to demonstrate high level of responsibility 
when implementing R2P. The proposal included more debate in order to specify 
criteria before authorizing coercive interventions, shorter mandate periods, and 
closer ties during implementation between the Council and implementing actors 
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(Brochmeier et al., 2016). The main purpose was to ensure as far as possible that 
consensus is maintained throughout the course of an operation (Evans, 2015).
Responsibility to Protect and India
India has been more reluctant to back R2P than has China. Ganguly (2016) 
explains this with reference to India as a post-colonial state extremely zealous 
about safeguarding its sovereignty. Yet, for a very long time, India has also been 
discontent with the UN regarding its long-lasting conflict with Pakistan. Therefore, 
bilateral resolutions of disputes have become a cardinal principle guiding India’s 
foreign policy. India was hostile to the deliberations of ICISS, and others had to 
persuade it to support UN endorsement of R2P.
The General Assembly debate on R2P in 2009, following the first R2P report 
from the Secretary-General, moderated the Indian position somewhat. India 
expressed general support for the need to protect civilians from mass atrocities, but 
still categorically opposed R2P as basis for humanitarian interventions. According to 
the Indian view, this would make the principle an instrument for the pursuit of 
parochial national interests and the toppling of anti-Western regimes (Ganguly, 
2016). Today, India does not resist R2P pillars one and two, but it still sees pillar three 
as a threat to state sovereignty (Makhija, 2019). This explains why, according to 
Bommakanti (2017), India, in most R2P debates, has been concerned more with the 
motives of the intervening state or states than with the outcome of the interventions.
India served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 
2011–2012. The period included the 2011 crisis in the Ivory Coast where India 
voted for sanctions and in favour of a UN peacekeeping mission, the 2011 Libyan 
crisis and the beginning of the Syrian civil war. Similar to China, but without the 
possibility to use the veto, India abstained from voting upon Resolution 1973 
(Libya). Ganguly (2016) mentions pressure from particularly the US in a period 
of improving US-Indian relations as decisive for the Indian choice, but also the 
wish to avoid standing alone with the only no-vote. India very much disliked the 
regime of Ghadaffi, but it continued to insist for external armed interventions to 
be the last resort, not the first. Towards the end of its term, India voted in favour 
of non-military sanctions against the Assad regime, but Russia and China used 
their vetoes to block the proposed resolutions (Makhija, 2019).
India has demonstrated preference for broad multilateral engagement in 
peaceful solutions to conflicts. She is the world’s largest contributor to UN 
peacekeeping missions. During 70 years, more than 200,000 Indian military and 
police officers, both men and women, have served. It includes the most challenging 
missions worldwide and all UN missions in Africa, with the largest number of 
troops in DR Congo (DPO, 2018).
Some Selected East Asian States
If the Chinese and the Indian R2P positions, with similarities and differences, are 
recognizable among other East Asian states, this may indicate the degree of 
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support the rising powers can expect from their geographical neighbourhood on 
this issue. The scope of the article allows only brief comments on a limited number 
of states, but the selection is not random. It concentrates on some quite dominant 
East Asian actors, including Indonesia with the world’s largest Muslim population. 
These states can influence R2P-based decisions in the Security Council directly 
only when they serve a term there, a condition they share with India. They can 
also present their arguments in the yearly UN General Assembly R2P debates or 
clarify positions if asked to participate in implementing efforts under pillar two or 
three. Views are also expressed through government statements and via other 
available channels.
According to the Asia-Pacific Centre for the R2P, housed by the University of 
Queensland in Australia, both Japan and South Korea acknowledge that the UN 
Security Council occasionally needs to authorize coercive measures, but they 
prioritize prevention and international assistance. They do not oppose R2P pillar 
three as India in particular does, but both are concerned about potential use as 
justification for coercion. This seems to match the Chinese position quite well. 
The need for further deliberations to strengthen consensus has been part of Japan 
and South Korea’s policy preferences on R2P since 2005. In a statement delivered 
by Japan at the General Assembly’s informal dialogue on R2P in September 2017, 
stressing the prioritization of prevention, Japan also signalled support for 
initiatives to suspend the veto in cases of mass atrocities.
Vietnam has experienced mass atrocities combat. In 1978, they toppled the 
genocidal Pol Pot regime in Cambodia with a unilateral invasion. Vietnam 
communicated primarily border violations with Cambodian troops opening fire 
against Vietnamese ones, not humanitarian reasons. Reluctant international response 
followed, despite the known character of the toppled regime. The new Vietnamese 
supported government strived many years for access to the Cambodian UN seat.
Vietnam delivered a statement at the General Assembly Plenary Meeting on 
R2P in July 2009 highlighting the state’s responsibility and the international 
community’s critical role in helping the states concerned. By doing so, it signalized 
a general acceptance for R2P pillar one and two. It did not directly oppose pillar 
3, but it requires, according to the Vietnamese view, clarification to avoid possible 
confinement to coercive military force as the only alternative. This is a recognizable 
position compared to both the Chinese and the Indian ones. On the other hand, 
due to internal security problems with separatists in the southern part of the 
country, Thailand has taken a more quiet position in relation to R2P. It has not 
excluded taking part in collective international actions, but Thai politicians are 
inclined not to define any of its own domestic affairs as R2P type situations 
(Kraisoraphong, 2012).
The government of Indonesia also embraces R2P pillar one, but support for 
pillar two comes with a reservation. Assistance can be potentially problematic if 
it takes the character of interference into domestic affairs. Pillar three is hardly 
mentioned, but in a statement to the General Assembly in September 2015, 
Indonesia highlighted cooperation particularly between the UN and ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and expressed support for building 
community resilience. According to Alexandra (2012), robust development of 
civil society in Indonesia is among the positive implications of the democracy 
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process. Local NGOs (non-governmental organizations) have demonstrated their 
ability to put pressure on the government to exercise its responsibility, as reflected 
in R2P pillars one and two.
Although with some variations, the selected states seem more to support than 
to diverge from how China and India understand the principle. The rising powers 
can find resonance for their respective R2P positions among states situated in the 
East Asian region.
IV. Discussion
This article’s discussion about prospects for implementation of R2P objectives 
assumes redistribution of influence. The rising powers strengthen their relative 
positions. This is not limited to material issues, but it affects the normative 
sphere as well. Harig and Kenkel (2017) address this question. They argue that 
rising powers are not satisfied with subordinate roles as norm takers. They 
may not yet be able to make new norms, but they definitely seek to shape existing 
ones, with ambitions to influence the normative foundations of the international 
order.
Responsibility to Protect Pillars one and two
Prevention often communicates as particularly important because it is always less 
costly and less politically controversial to prevent a crisis from developing into a 
manmade catastrophe, compared to any kind of action when the catastrophe visu-
alizes. Successful prevention generates fewer cases where state leaders have only 
two choices, that is, to mobilize military forces or to do nothing (Bellamy, 2009a). 
Fragile situations highlight the importance of understanding the capacity of avail-
able policy measures in combination with political willingness to apply them. 
Early warning is essential. ICISS described the past cases as ad hoc and unstruc-
tured (ICISS, 2001, chaps. 3.9 and 3.12), but according to former UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon (2015), there has been a considerable improvement in the 
capacity of various actors to identify risk factors and to develop preventive strate-
gies. Both the ICISS report and the annual reports from the Secretary-General to 
the UN General Assembly contain many suggestions of efforts designed at pre-
vention. Some address root causes in order to make future occurrence of violent 
conflict less probable, others are of the immediate kind.
Prevention is primarily a national responsibility, with relevant efforts like 
building of stable and inclusive political institutions, creating good education and 
job opportunities for the population, fighting corruption, etc. However, prevention 
often includes an additional international component, that is, mutual assistance 
among states or government cooperation with regional organizations and relevant 
UN bodies. The space for dialogue is normally widest in early stages of a crisis, 
but national authorities may need international help to spark such dialogues and 
to assist as mediators during the following process. NGOs normally lack the 
Dahl-Eriksen 9
resources for comprehensive crisis engagement, but their presence on the ground, 
more or less everywhere, makes them particularly suited to observe the early 
signals of a crisis and to inform authorities who can mobilize the more influential 
actors. The International Crisis Group (ICG) exemplifies an NGO with an explicit 
focus on early warning (ICISS, 2001, chap. 3.13). Atrocity crimes require military, 
financial and technical means. Restricted access to small arms and illicit financing 
is therefore of utter importance, but difficult to obtain solely at the national level. 
The UN Security Council regularly addresses these questions. In Resolution 2482 
about threats to international peace and security, adopted on 19 July 2019, the 
Council urges member states to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in 
small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and to assist each other in 
preventing terrorists from acquiring such weapons, in particular in conflict and 
post-conflict areas.
The first R2P pillar, the national responsibility to protect, is not controversial. 
There are states who do not fulfil their responsibility, but no government officially 
denies that they are responsible for protection against mass atrocities. The 
imagination that with political authority follows responsibilities towards citizens 
seems to span worldwide. It is not a particular Western idea, but it is possible to 
trace it back in time through different cultures. The obligations that underpin the 
pillar today are firmly embedded in pre-existing, treaty-based and customary 
international law (Ban, 2009, p. 12). There is hardly any reason fearing that this 
will change with rising Asian powers. With reference to Yeophantong, O’Hagan 
describes practice in imperial China, embedded in the Chinese Confucian 
tradition: ‘The ruler, who was mandated from heaven, was charged with the 
maintenance of order through rightful conduct and government by example. This 
took the form of the ruler assuming the responsibility for the protection of both 
the spiritual and material welfare of his or her subjects’ (O’Hagan, 2015, p. 289).
The second R2P pillar activates the international component. The real world 
might come up with cases where it is difficult to draw a sharp border between 
when the voluntary ends and coercion in some form begins. Yet, assistance from 
abroad to help states fulfil their responsibility to protect is in principle not 
controversial when based on voluntarily mutual help. Again, we find cultural 
support. With reference to the works by Ephraim Isaac and Paul Gordon Lauren, 
O’Hagan (2015) concludes that all of the world’s major religious traditions deal 
with human responsibilities to others, and that these others are not limited to the 
domestic political community. She adds: ‘What remains controversial in relation 
to R2P, however, is the extent of these responsibilities and the degree to which it 
is viewed as legitimate to use force in pursuit them’ (O’Hagan, 2015, pp. 290–291). 
According to Ban Ki-Moon (2009), measures under pillar two can play a critical 
role in the international implementation of the responsibility to protect, particularly 
when national political leadership is weak or divided and lacks the capacity to 
deal with a threatening armed opposition committing atrocity crimes.
The second pillar may include cases where support comes with a certain degree 
of coercion, for instance, as pressure from abroad to accept suggested efforts. 
Recipients might consider it as unwanted interference into internal affairs. India 
and Indonesia have expressed this kind of worry. China, on the other hand, has not 
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officially fronted scepticism to the second pillar. It was not problematic for it to 
support Security Council Resolution 2482’s call for states to assist each other in 
the combat against illicit arms trade, but this resolution came with a general text 
directed to all UN member states, not a specified selection of them. Gaining 
consensus around general texts is always easier, compared to texts criticizing 
particular actors. The need to balance the text against national interests appears 
limited.
On the other hand, the Chinese attitude to the Myanmar Rohingya case is 
possible to interpret in a sceptical perspective. Myanmar security forces had 
deliberately targeted civilians and carried out mass atrocities against the Rohingya 
and other minorities, with evidence of ethnic cleansing in the Rakhine province 
(Human Rights Council, 2018). From August 2017 to August 2018, more than 
750 000 Rohingya Muslims escaped to neighbouring Bangladesh (Kirby, 2018). 
Since Myanmar denied UN investigators’ access, the report relies on interviews 
with victims. No Security Council resolution addresses the case. China has refused 
to negotiate on a potential resolution, including a UK drafted one that aimed to 
oblige Myanmar to work closer with the UN. However, China supported a 
so-called presidential statement, dated 6 November 2017, (S/PRST/2017/22) 
which is weaker in its criticism of Myanmar authorities (Yhome, 2019). The 
statement not only condemns the attacks against Myanmar security forces, but it 
also expresses concern over human right violations committed by these forces. It 
reminds the Myanmar government of its primary responsibility to protect and is 
supportive of efforts to solve the crisis initiated by Bangladesh authorities.
Yhome (2019) describes how China, when the Rohingya crisis evolved in 
2017, offered to mediate. The Myanmar government refused the offer. Despite 
this, China continued to defend Myanmar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in 
the Security Council. It has supported dialogue with Bangladesh, but wished 
minimum involvement by the UN, arguing that pressure from abroad was not 
helpful to resolve the problem.
China’s position related to the Myanmar case is easier to understand when 
national interests supply the picture. National interests refer to the basic 
determinants that guide state policy in relation to the external environment (Evans 
& Newnham, 2008). The concept is difficult to define with clarity suited for 
scholarly analysis. National interests may change over time if perceptions of the 
environment change. Yet, political use is common, in order to obtain legitimacy 
for a particular policy (Griffiths & O’Callaghan, 2002).
The scope of what Chinese leaders see as national interests expands with rising 
power. China supports free trade, but it opposes the liberal democracy and many 
of the values connected to a liberal world order. To keep other powers, particularly 
the USA, away from its ‘doorsteps’, has high priority. The magnificent growth of 
the Chinese economy in the last two decades has not only made it possible for 
China to build up its military strength and to expand its strategic space, but it has 
also developed dependency on import of natural resources. The so-called Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI), primarily focused on creating trade routes through 
investment in infrastructure, has both defensive and offensive strategic elements. 
China has signed treaties under this initiative with a large number of states and 
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invested huge amounts in many of them. It is in China’s national interest to secure 
investments and loans. Political unrest is a threat. Stability in recipient states is 
therefore highly prioritized. Myanmar is for China a bridge to the Indian Ocean. A 
pipeline through Myanmar is important for China’s oil supply. The potential of 
conflicts spilling over the mutual border is a critical concern for Chinese authorities. 
The ethnic groups on both sides share cultural affinities (Yhome, 2019).
Responsibility to Protect Pillar Three
Barelli writes: ‘It is widely accepted, today, that the international community 
should contribute to prevent, and if prevention fails, to respond to atrocity crimes. 
What is less clear is under what circumstances, and how, it should do so’ (Barelli, 
2018, p. 185). The UN has a long tradition of preference for dialogue and peaceful 
persuasion. The toolbox contains a wide range of non-coercive and non-violent 
responses (Ban, 2009). Yet, the most controversial of the R2P pillars is the third 
one, because the international community, through the Security Council, may give 
a mandate allowing for the use of military force, as they did with Libya in March 
2011. After the Libya intervention, several states around the globe fear misuse of 
this pillar, by Western powers in particular. The view is widespread that the 
implementing actors stretched the mandate far beyond the intentions, forwarding 
a regime change. The Syrian people have paid the price. The Security Council 
never found common ground to halt mass atrocities there.
The outcome of third pillar’s discussions depends heavily on how one 
understands the most important of the constitutive institutions that underpins 
current world order, state sovereignty. The constitutional independence of 
sovereign states, described in the UN Charter chapter 1, articles 2.1, 2.4 and 2.7, 
is traditionally understood as states never being subject to external interference 
into domestic affairs without their consent. They can voluntarily abide rules, but 
no external power can force them. Among the defenders of this position, we find 
states with a doubtful human rights reputation, but also many small states that 
simply consider non-intervention as the ultimate protection against the ambitions 
of the powerful. Sovereignty, as traditionally understood, provides determinacy 
and order in the international system (Chopra, 1994). Yet, ICISS embraced an 
understanding alternative to the traditional one, where responsibility is an aspect 
of sovereignty, a prerequisite for a legitimate claim. Without legitimacy, there is 
no sovereignty to violate, connected to an idea with deep historical roots of 
legitimate rule based on moral standards. The language changes, from ‘right to 
intervene’ to ‘responsibility to protect’ (Evans, 2015).
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan reminded several times the present-
day reader of the UN Charter about its purpose, which is to protect human beings, 
not abusers. In an interview, Dr Francis Deng, former UN Special Advisor on the 
Prevention of Genocide used these words: ‘I don’t see sovereignty as a negative 
concept enabling you to barricade yourself against the world’ (Hehir, 2010, p. 83). 
However, the traditional understanding of state sovereignty, at least in its most 
restricted version, seems at best compatible with a domestic responsibility to 
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protect only, with no outside interference in cases of failure. Yet, Stahn (2007), as 
do Bellamy (2009b), talks about a growing acceptance of sovereignty as 
responsibility, but the extent seems to be rather diffuse. It might perhaps be 
estimated, but probably difficult to measure.
China has traditionally been protective of sovereignty, understood as non-
intervention. According to the Chinese view, to challenge sovereignty has no role 
in the UN Charter. If R2P represents such a challenge, it would be easily abused 
by states for self-interests (Fung, 2016). China sees sovereignty as the cornerstone 
of the whole system of international law (Barelli, 2018). Regime stability is 
paramount. With negative implications for domestic stability, Chinese support for 
R2P intervention under pillar three is unlikely (Chen, 2016). This is partly rooted 
not only in its own struggle for sovereignty, to protect itself from external 
interference, but also in resistance towards Western liberal society (Barelli, 2018).
China and Russia often rely on each other in the Security Council, with a view 
to strengthen their respective positions within a body otherwise dominated by 
Western powers (Barelli, 2018). Yet, this is not the whole story. At the general 
level, China opposes restrictions to sovereignty that are non-reciprocal and non-
voluntary, but the real approach is more pragmatic. An image as responsible is 
preferable because it gains trust abroad for rising influence and enhanced 
legitimacy for the government at home (Chen, 2016). Well, few outside observers 
look to China in search for a country with a good human rights reputation. When 
China chooses friends for investments, a satisfactory degree of domestic order 
and stability is more important than human rights issues. However, a reminder 
here is plausible. R2P is about mass atrocities, not any violations of human rights. 
According to Frost (2009), state leaders frequently use ethical terms to explain 
their state’s behaviour to an international audience, but the ethical aspects need 
not be their main concern. Rather, it might simply be an expectation, more or less 
a prerequisite for legitimate participation. Both China and India have signalled 
that they intend to be responsible rising powers. The exact meaning of this is 
difficult to define, and many political issues call for responsible leadership. Yet, it 
is hardly possible to avoid protection of civilians situated close to the top of that 
list. To communicate responsibility through a general willingness to protect may 
therefore have an effect in itself, even when not or poorly followed up versus 
concrete cases.
China prefers to solve conflicts peacefully. Its increased involvement in UN 
Peacekeeping efforts after the Cold War reflects this. Beginning with Cambodia 
in 1992, later involvements include East Timor, Mali, South Sudan, Darfur, DR 
Congo and Liberia. With about 2600 personnel deployed, in 2016, China was the 
largest contributor among the Security Council veto powers, as well as the second 
largest contributor to the UN Peacekeeping budget among all UN member states 
(ISDP, 2018).
China does not claim an absolute version of sovereignty where state leaders 
can do what they want to their people. Although China is significantly 
uncomfortable with the third pillar of R2P, it quietly accepts that, under 
authorization of the Security Council as an absolute prerequisite, coercive means 
including military force may be employed to halt mass atrocity crimes (Barelli, 
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2018). In relation to pillar three, we can talk about a move from initial reservation 
of R2P in general, towards a cautious endorsement of a conservative interpretation 
of the principle, this pillar included (Chen, 2016). With the particular influence 
given by the status as a veto power, it is in China’s interest to preserve the 
prerogatives held by the Security Council. Among these prerogatives is the option 
to authorize the use of military force in extreme situations. China has never 
suggested any change of international law on this point.
As one of the permanent Council members, China can veto any proposed 
decision it dislikes. Many scholars have studied this arena for decisions and 
concluded that we cannot expect debates there to be real deliberations with careful 
weighting of arguments. Decisions will often reflect domestic and global 
imperatives of the veto powers, and vetoes frequently block proposed resolutions. 
Sometimes when atrocity crimes have been committed, or are at risk, veto powers 
support opposing factions and put these allegiances ahead of their protection 
responsibilities (Ban, 2016), despite calls not to use this powerful instrument 
when mass atrocities are on the agenda.
The basis for the Councils work is cooperation. The ability to act depends on 
collective agreement (Nadin, 2014). The dilemma of selective response has 
accompanied all discussions about humanitarian-based interventions, from long 
before R2P entered the international sphere. According to Mamdani (2011), this is 
the subordination of law to the dictates of power. Rimmer (2015) questions 
whether R2P can be of worth when only weaker states are the recipients of 
interventions. Yet, Bellamy (2015) sees this as somewhat different. R2P has 
entered an imperfect world, but the principle pushes the Security Council into a 
new territory. Acceptance of R2P does not in itself resolve difficult questions 
about realization of objectives in complex cases. However, it does not help to 
wish away political realities.
The Security Council will never adopt a resolution criticizing, for instance, 
the Chinese treatment of the Uighur minority, despite indications that basic 
human rights were systematically violated. On the other hand, one cannot exclude 
the possibility that the Council will address the treatment of minorities in India, 
if a relevant situation develops. India has no veto for disposal. Based on a 
number of case studies through two decades up to 2004, before the adoption 
of R2P, Martin Binder (2015) explained the UN’s selective response to 
humanitarian crisis. Responses were neither random nor explainable by one single 
determinant. The extent of human suffering, negative spill over to neighbours, 
media attention, previous UN involvement, the military strength a target state 
might mobilize and its ties to one or more of the veto powers were relevant 
explanations. As expected, the territories of the veto powers themselves fell 
outside the radar.
As a rising Asian power, although India possesses both diplomatic and other 
resources usable to influence international issues on a broader scale than what small 
and middle sized states are able to, its capacity to influence issues on the global level 
does not match the position of China. India has served seven 2-year terms in the 
Security Council, but the Indian political leaders frequently argue that India deserves 
a permanent seat, as the world’s largest democracy with about 16% of world 
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population. Brazil, Germany and Japan (G4) back each other in seeking permanent 
seats and advocating Security Council reforms, so far without sufficient support. 
China seems to be the permanent member most opposing the Indian claim.
Japan’s support for the call not to use veto when mass atrocities are on the 
agenda is interesting in the light of Japan seeking a permanent seat, but for the 
moment, the Japanese influence on this issue is minor. Yet, the issue itself is 
highly relevant, as Stojkovski explains: ‘Bearing in mind that R2P is considered 
to be a normative standard and a moral imperative of the international community, 
the question of how the five permanent states use their veto in cases of mass 
atrocities logically focuses’ (Stojkovski, 2017, p. 88). The ICISS report addressed 
the question (ICISS, 2001, chaps. 6.20–6.21), and so did former Secretary General 
Ban Ki-Moon. In his first R2P report to the UN General Assembly, he pointed 
particularly to the privileges of tenure and the veto power granted to the perma-
nent five under the UN Charter. He wrote: ‘I would urge them to refrain from 
employing or threatening to employ the veto in situations of manifest failure to 
meet obligations relating to the responsibility to protect, as defined on §139 of the 
Summit Outcome, and to reach a mutual understanding to that effect’ (Ban, 2009, 
pp. 26–27). France and UK have expressed support (Stojkovskij, 2017), but the 
multiple uses of vetoes by Russia and China in the Syrian war do not indicate any 
broader mutual understanding among the permanent members, even 10 years 
after Ban Ki-Moon’s urgent call.
China has accepted that there might be situations where the international 
community needs to use military force for protection purposes, a position India 
seems to oppose under all circumstances. Yet, after 2011, China has been very 
clear that all interventions forwarding regime change are unacceptable. Yet, in 
line with a more confident and responsible China on the international arena, we 
can perhaps expect initiatives to establish concrete criteria connected to R2P pillar 
three. Before such criteria are established, if they ever will, military interventions 
sanctioned by the Council will probably be very rare, perhaps even more selective 
than before. This is hardly good news for those who experience mass atrocities 
today, although it might also prevent interventions that create more problems than 
they solve. It is an established knowledge, demonstrated through a number of 
implementation studies, that leaving up to others to implement decisions often 
creates problems. Implementing actors may interpret mandates different from 
decision-makers. Actors may also have other, perhaps not communicated, reasons 
for their participation than the pure humanitarian ones. The Security Council 
cannot implement decisions themselves. They depend on member state resources 
and their political will. Yet, this loosens the Council’s control over the 
implementation process. According to Dunne (2015), the operational control the 
Security Council is able to exercise upon implementing actors is very limited.
The Chinese view, supported by Russia and many Asian states, is not that 
sovereignty comes without responsibilities, rather that undermining sovereignty 
through interventions leads to state collapses and civil wars, creating environments 
where massive human rights abuses are likely to occur (Averre & Davis, 2015). 
Yet, this is hardly good news for proponents of a new understanding where 
legitimate state sovereignty depends on responsibility. It is more a position 
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defending sovereignty even when the responsible component is weak or absent, 
based on an imagination that available alternatives are worse. It might be plausible 
to follow Webb (2014) who points to another way of seeing the veto, as an 
instrument of slowing down calls for military action. This seems particularly 
relevant in cases where there are qualified reasons to doubt that the last resort 
stadium is now. However, states do not always stand by their flagged positions 
confronted with a concrete challenge. During heavy fighting in 2008–2009, the 
Sri Lankan government forces defeated the Tamil rebels. There were accusations 
on both parties for having committed atrocity crimes. India provided humanitarian 
assistance to Sri Lanka’s Tamil population despite protests from the Sri Lankan 
government about violation of sovereignty (Ganguly, 2016). Sri Lankan 
sovereignty was obviously not that important for India, with around 60 million 
Tamils living in its own southern regions.
The 2005 Outcome Document recommended implementation of R2P objectives 
through relevant regional organizations. In Africa, cooperation between the African 
Union and the UN has been fruitful. To what extent Asian UN members will support 
such cooperation in the years to come probably depends on how it relates to the 
sovereignty of the target states, particularly if we have a pillar three situation where 
implementation through a regional organization implies weak Security Council 
control once the mandate is given. In Asia itself, regional arrangements are rather 
poorly developed. ASEAN probably has a potential, in cooperation with the UN, to 
play a more extensive role in providing assistance and support for capacity building, 
but this intergovernmental organization is a rather loose cooperation arrangement 
where trust between member states is highly questionable, and where the traditional 
understanding of state sovereignty prevails.
V. Conclusion
The article questioned what the prospects are for implementation of R2P objectives 
in a world with rising Asian powers. Events surely may take other directions than 
expected. Yet, based on behaviour and statements from actors, statements from 
actors with increased influence in shaping the evolving global architecture, its 
normative foundations included, and we can say something about probable 
scenarios, at least for the nearest 2–3 decades to come.
It is not possible to see the developing world order as a threat to R2P pillar one. 
Actually, no serious international actor anywhere in the world opposes that 
domestic authority implies responsibility to protect the population from mass 
atrocities. The keyword is prevention. The second R2P pillar mobilizes 
international assistance. Such assistance may come in various forms. As long as 
we talk about mutual agreed efforts, this pillar too is unproblematic and expected 
to remain so. However, assistance from abroad can have a coercive dimension. 
The widespread adherence to a traditional understanding of state sovereignty 
among Asian states, the two rising powers included, might give reasons to expect 
more pressure on the pillar confronted with such cases. Here, the Chinese official 
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support can perhaps become a moderating factor, at least for cases where national 
interests are not at stake.
R2P pillar three, involving the possible use of military force, is more 
controversial. China is the most important Asian actor in this respect, due to their 
position in the Security Council. China has not completely excluded the possibility 
that military force is relevant in certain, but seldom occurring, circumstances. 
However, one must expect that a more powerful and confident China will use its 
increased influence to shape the conditions for when such circumstances occur, in 
a restrictive direction. The use of force as the last choice will probably come more 
into focus. In this, China will find broad support in its Asian neighbourhood. India 
expects to back this position. Unless a broad agreement about more clear criteria 
for the activation of R2P pillar three establishes, China will probably continue to 
veto suggested Security Council resolutions that may embed a potential for regime 
change in the targeted states.
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